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Field Price Deregulation and the Carrier Status of Natural Gas Pipelines

Harry G. Broadman, W. David Montgomery, and Milton Russell

Year: 1985
Volume: Volume 6
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol6-No2-10
View Abstract

Abstract:
The move to deregulate natural gas field markets is likely to stimulate changes in the way the downstream segments of the industry are regulated. In particular, because the uncertainty endemic to freer upstream markets will emerge for the first time in the contemporary gas industry, the relative merits of having pipelines perform different economic functions will be altered. Producers and distributors will also, in varying degrees, face greater price uncertainty than before. This will lead to changes in the desired allocation of risk and incentives associated with activities traditionally carried out by transmission companies.



Oil Shock

Hillard G. Huntington

Year: 1985
Volume: Volume 6
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol6-No2-11
View Abstract

Abstract:
The move to deregulate natural gas field markets is likely to stimulate changes in the way the downstream segments of the industry are regulated. In particular, because the uncertainty endemic to freer upstream markets will emerge for the first time in the contemporary gas industry, the relative merits of having pipelines perform different economic functions will be altered. Producers and distributors will also, in varying degrees, face greater price uncertainty than before. This will lead to changes in the desired allocation of risk and incentives associated with activities traditionally carried out by transmission companies.



Oil Prices, Energy Security, and Impact Policy

R. Glenn Hubbard

Year: 1985
Volume: Volume 6
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol6-No2-12
View Abstract

Abstract:
The move to deregulate natural gas field markets is likely to stimulate changes in the way the downstream segments of the industry are regulated. In particular, because the uncertainty endemic to freer upstream markets will emerge for the first time in the contemporary gas industry, the relative merits of having pipelines perform different economic functions will be altered. Producers and distributors will also, in varying degrees, face greater price uncertainty than before. This will lead to changes in the desired allocation of risk and incentives associated with activities traditionally carried out by transmission companies.



The Making of Federal Coal Policy

Richard L. Gordon

Year: 1985
Volume: Volume 6
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol6-No2-13
View Abstract

Abstract:
The move to deregulate natural gas field markets is likely to stimulate changes in the way the downstream segments of the industry are regulated. In particular, because the uncertainty endemic to freer upstream markets will emerge for the first time in the contemporary gas industry, the relative merits of having pipelines perform different economic functions will be altered. Producers and distributors will also, in varying degrees, face greater price uncertainty than before. This will lead to changes in the desired allocation of risk and incentives associated with activities traditionally carried out by transmission companies.



Electric Power Strategic Issues

Richard L. Gordon

Year: 1985
Volume: Volume 6
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol6-No2-14
View Abstract

Abstract:
The move to deregulate natural gas field markets is likely to stimulate changes in the way the downstream segments of the industry are regulated. In particular, because the uncertainty endemic to freer upstream markets will emerge for the first time in the contemporary gas industry, the relative merits of having pipelines perform different economic functions will be altered. Producers and distributors will also, in varying degrees, face greater price uncertainty than before. This will lead to changes in the desired allocation of risk and incentives associated with activities traditionally carried out by transmission companies.



Risk Analysis and Decision Processes

Nelson E. May

Year: 1985
Volume: Volume 6
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol6-No2-15
View Abstract

Abstract:
The move to deregulate natural gas field markets is likely to stimulate changes in the way the downstream segments of the industry are regulated. In particular, because the uncertainty endemic to freer upstream markets will emerge for the first time in the contemporary gas industry, the relative merits of having pipelines perform different economic functions will be altered. Producers and distributors will also, in varying degrees, face greater price uncertainty than before. This will lead to changes in the desired allocation of risk and incentives associated with activities traditionally carried out by transmission companies.



The Natural Gas Industry

Harry G. Broadman

Year: 1985
Volume: Volume 6
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol6-No2-16
View Abstract

Abstract:
The move to deregulate natural gas field markets is likely to stimulate changes in the way the downstream segments of the industry are regulated. In particular, because the uncertainty endemic to freer upstream markets will emerge for the first time in the contemporary gas industry, the relative merits of having pipelines perform different economic functions will be altered. Producers and distributors will also, in varying degrees, face greater price uncertainty than before. This will lead to changes in the desired allocation of risk and incentives associated with activities traditionally carried out by transmission companies.



Elements of Market Power in the Natural Gas Pipeline Industry

Harry G. Broadman

Year: 1986
Volume: Volume 7
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol7-No1-8
View Abstract

Abstract:
As a result of the distortions that have beset natural gas markets in the wake of partial wellhead deregulation under the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA)-the most visible problem being the existence of increased prices amid a glut of deliverable supplies-concern has mounted about whether the natural gas pipeline industry will perform in a socially efficient manner in the long run when field prices are completely decontrolled.In addition to transporting natural gas from the field to the city-gate, interstate natural gas pipeline companies have traditionally performed two functions. Granted private carrier status by the Natural Gas Act of 1938 (NGA), they both purchase gas shipments in upstream markets and resell them in downstream markets as well as match up gas producers who have available supply with distribution companies and wholesale end-users (direct industrial consumers and electric utilities) who have unfilled demand. In other words, as private carriers gas pipelines not only provide a gas transmission service but also assume the twin roles of gas merchandiser and broker.



Competition in Natural Gas Pipeline Wellhead Supply Purchases

Harry G. Broadman

Year: 1987
Volume: Volume 8
Number: Number 3
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol8-No3-6
View Abstract

Abstract:
Throughout most of the last three decades, interstate natural gas pipeline companies-operating mainly as private carriers, buying gas supplies in the field and reselling them downstream'-have competed primarily on the basis of nonprice terms. Under the regime of wellhead regulation stemming from Phillips,' in upstream (field) markets binding price ceilings meant thatinterpipeline competition in gas purchases was governed principally by the attractiveness of take-or-pay provisions pipelines offer in their contracts with gas producers.' In downstream (city-gate) markets the chronic excess demand induced by wellhead regulation meant that pipelines competed for gas sales to local distribution companies and direct wholesale consumers (large industrial end-users and electric utilities) largely on the basis of the maximumquantity of gas that could be delivered.



Special Feature's an Oil Tariff Justified? An American Debate

Arlon R. Tussing, Samuel A. Van Vactor, Harry G. Broadman, William W. Hogan, Dale M. Nesbitt and Thomas Y. Choi

Year: 1988
Volume: Volume 9
Number: Number 3
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol9-No3-1
View Abstract

Abstract:
I. Reality Says No, Arlon R. Tussing and Samuel A. Van VactorII. The Numbers Say Yes, Harry G. Broadman and William W. HoganIII. The Numbers Say No, Dale M. Nesbitt and Thomas Y. ChoiMany oil industry spokesmen who pleaded for a free market in the era of regulation are now urging the opposite: federal protection from low-cost imported oil. It is ironic that some economists should find merit in these arguments, particularly now that the very idea of free trade is facing the most serious assault in decades.





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