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The Energy Crisis and Macroeconomic Policy

William D. Nordhaus

Year: 1980
Volume: Volume 1
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol1-No1-2
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Abstract:
It is hard to find an issue more confusing than energy policy. Is there a shortage of oil? Why? How long will the shortages last? Who's to blame? What will be the supply and demand response to price decontrol? What are the appropriate policy responses today? Can the president or the secretary of energy or the Congress be trusted to find the answers? And so on.

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Residential Electricity Revisited

Hendrik S. Houthakker

Year: 1980
Volume: Volume 1
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol1-No1-4
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Abstract:
The following is a report on various attempts to update and improve an earlier analysis of residential electricity demand (Houthakker, Verleger, and Sheehan, 1974-hereafter referred to as HVS). To understand what is new the reader should first know what has been maintained, namely:1. the logarithmic flow-adjustment model which estimates this year's consumption from last year's consumption, this year's price and income, and possibly (though not in HVS) from other variables,2. the pooling of annual time series for 48 states using the error component approach of Balestra & Nerlove, 3. the use of a "marginal price" for electricity.The present paper may be regarded as a verification of the first of these hypotheses, and to some extent of the other two.

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The Clumsy Cartel

M.A. Adelman

Year: 1980
Volume: Volume 1
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol1-No1-5
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Abstract:
The recent price explosions in the world oil market result from the tardy recognition of the post-1973 consumption slowdown. Such odd results could not happen in a competitive market, but they are not at all strange in the world of the cartel. An analogy may help explain. A diver in the sea cannot go lower than the sea floor, nor higher than the water's surface. He is nearly weightless, and can float at any depth between these extremes, but the slightest impact or effort sends him up or down. Similarly, in any market, the price cannot drop below incremental cost, since such a drop would choke off supply, nor can it rise above the level that would maximize profit to a monopoly, since the monopoly would gain by putting the price back down. But in a once-competitive market, where the price has been rising toward some unknown monopoly optimum, the price can hold steady or can move drastically up or down in response to very slight impulses. In this range the price may show no response, or even a perverse response, to changes in demand. Since 1973, price response has been perverse. This was clearly the case in 1974, as the world headed into recession. It is so again in 1979.During 1973-1978, real incomes in the non-Communist indus-trialized countries rose 13 percent, but oil use nevertheless was flat at approximately 50 million barrels daily (MBD). Exports

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The World Oil Market: An Exporter's View

Alirio A. Parra

Year: 1980
Volume: Volume 1
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol1-No1-6
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Abstract:
I am deeply honored to be part of this distinguished panel and to address my professional colleagues on the occasion of the first annual meeting of the International Association of Energy Econo-mists.

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Energy Prices and the U.S.Economy in 1979-1981

Knut Anton Mork and Robert E. Hall

Year: 1980
Volume: Volume 1
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol1-No2-2
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Abstract:
For the second time in the decade, the U.S. economy is absorbing a large sudden shock in the world price of oil. From late in 1978 to June 1979, OPEC raised the world price of oil by closeto $9 per barrel. Western industrial nations could face a repetition of the serious recession of 1974-75 on close to the same scale. The increase in the total cost of energy inputs induced by this oil price increase is about two-thirds of the increase in 1974. The potential disruption to the U.S. economy and others is a similar fraction of what occurred in the earlier episode.

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Simulation of World Oil Market Shocks: A Markov Analysis of OPEC and Consumer Behavior

Richard F. Kosobud and Houston H. Stokes

Year: 1980
Volume: Volume 1
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol1-No2-3
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Abstract:
One major determinant of crude oil price will be the question of whether or not OPEC can resolve its internal conflicts and act effectively as a coalition in restricting the quantities it will supply. For the economist, this question stands at the center of the energy problem; unfortunately, economic analysis has little that is definite to say about the question, and consequently little to say about how OPEC determines its posted price policies and the quantities of oil to be placed on the market. Economic analysis has also failed to provide any definite explanation of the fact that individual OPEC members have not been prone to seek net revenue increases through additional sales, even during periods of declining sales or during oil gluts such as the 1975 recession in OECD countries.

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Energy Prices, Inflation, and Recession, 1974-1975

Knut Anton Mork and Robert E. Hall

Year: 1980
Volume: Volume 1
Number: Number 3
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol1-No3-2
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Abstract:
The rapid escalations of energy prices, in late 1973 and early 1974 and again in mid- and late-1979, have had major adverse impactson the U.S. economy. The energy price shock of 1973-1974 played a dominant role, by most accounts, in bringing about the deep recession and high inflation of the mid-1970s. In the most recent period, the full impact is yet to be seen, but it does not appear to be minor.In a previous paper published in this journal, (volume 1, number 2, April 1980), we presented the results of our efforts to quantify the economic impact on the U.S. economy of the July 1979 oil price increases.

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The Real Price of Imported Oil

Joy Dunkerley and John E. Jankowski, Jr.

Year: 1980
Volume: Volume 1
Number: Number 3
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol1-No3-6
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Abstract:
The continual upward adjustment since 1973 in international quoted oil prices has been accompanied by two countervailing developments. The first is the weakening of the dollar against many national currencies. Since transactions in the international oil market are conducted in dollars, many countries were able to offer less of their national currency for each dollar of oil purchased. Second, sharply rising prices of all other goods and services in many oil-importing coun-tries diminished the impact of the relative rise in oil prices. Thus oil appeared as only one of a host of rising prices, perhaps rising more strongly than other prices but otherwise indistinguishable from a multitude of inflationary pressures. In other words, the real price of oil to importing countries may not have been rising as strongly in real terms as is suggested by price quotations from internationally traded crude oil. If this is the case, pressures for limiting oil imports and oil conservation generally would be weakened.

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Energy Price Increases and Macroeconomic Policy

Robert S. Pindyck

Year: 1980
Volume: Volume 1
Number: Number 4
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol1-No4-1
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Abstract:
A rising world price of energy imposes a macroeconomic cost on the United States in two different ways. First, to the extent that energy is both an important input to production and a consumption good, with limited elasticities of substitution and demand, the economy's production and consumption possibilities are necessarily reduced as energy becomes more scarce. Thus, even if an expansionary monetary and fiscal policy were successful in pushing the economy close to its full capacity level, the resulting real national income would be lower than if energy prices had notAn earlier version of this paper was presented at the CEPR Conference on Energy Prices, Inflation and Economic Activity, Cambridge, November 9, 1979. Work leading to this paperwas supported by the Center for Energy Policy Research of the M.I.T. Energy Laboratory, and that support is gratefully acknowledged. In writing this paper, I benefited considerablyfrom conversations with and comments from Olivier Blanchard, Stanley Fischer, Benjamin Friedman, Robert Hall, Franco Modigliani, Robert Solow, and an anonymous referee.

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World Oil Price Increases: Sources and Solutions

Albert L. Danielsen, Edward B. Selby, Jr.

Year: 1980
Volume: Volume 1
Number: Number 4
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol1-No4-4
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Abstract:
World oil prices have been high since 1973, compared to average production costs and historical norms, because the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has functioned as a viable price-setting and output-restricting institution. Prices increased sharply in 1973-1974 and 1979, and in each case OPEC validated the higher price levels by subsequently cutting production. On the other hand, the importing countries have failed to establish institutions of their own that could mitigate price increases because they have not perceived the problem to be one of institutional control over prices. Instead, they have tended to view high oil prices as the result of resource scarcity. Their responses have been predominantly intermediate to long term, stockpiling for an embargo, encouraging conservation, and promoting the development of alternative energy

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