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The Value of Commodity Purchase Contracts With Limited Price Risk

Elizabeth Olmsted Teisberg and Thomas J. Teisberg

Year: 1991
Volume: Volume 12
Number: Number 3
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol12-No3-8
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This paper describes and demonstrates the equilibrium market valuation of commodity purchase contracts with price ceilings or price floors or both. These contracts, which we call "limited price risk" contracts, are significantly easier for buyers and sellers to agree upon than fixed price contracts when price uncertainty is high and buyers and sellers have inconsistent price expectations. Analysis of an actual natural gas contract as well as the existence of many brokers promoting limited price risk gas contracts, suggest that these contracts may be priced inefficiently in practice. Our example application should help managers to make use of modem financial techniques in assessing the value of these types of contracts.

CETA: A Model for Carbon Emissions Trajectory Assessment

Stephen C Peck and Thomas J. Teisberg

Year: 1992
Volume: Volume 13
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol13-No1-4
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We present an economic growth and energy use model incorporating representations of greenhouse gas accumulation, global mean temperature rise, and the damage cost associated with this temperature rise. Under alternative assumptions about the damage cost function, we find optimal time paths of CO, emissions control and associated optimal carbon taxes. Our work indicates that with plausible assumptions, an optimal carbon tax will rise over time, in contrast to the "hump shaped" carbon taxes implied by C02 reduction policies currently being discussed. Our work also suggests that the damage cost function would have to be both high and nonlinear in order to justify the general level of CO2 control and carbon taxes implied by these policies.

CO2 Emissions Control Agreements: Incentives for Regional Participation

Stephen C. Peck and Thomas J. Teisberg

Year: 1999
Volume: Volume 20
Number: Special Issue - The Cost of the Kyoto Protocol: A Multi-Model Evaluation
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol20-NoSI-14
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This paper explores the incentives for participation in international CO2 control agreements using tradable emission permits. We employ a welfare analysis in a two-region model to explore these incentives. The two regions are Annex-I (A-I) and Non-Annex I (Non-A-I). A key insight underlying the analysis is that emission permit allocations must not depart too far from optimal emissions paths, to avoid creating future incentives to drop out of the agreement. We find a range of permit allocations that improves the welfare of both the Annex-I and the Non-Annex I, and compare them with allocations based on regional population or GDP. In addition, we examine the implications of the Kyoto agreement in the context of this welfare analysis. We find that the Kyoto agreement transfers wealth from A-I to the Non-A-I, while failing to realize tile efficiency gains to be hoped for from an agreement to control CO2 emissions.

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