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Welfare Impacts of Electricity Storage and the Implications of Ownership Structure

Ramteen Sioshansi

Year: 2010
Volume: Volume 31
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol31-No2-7
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Abstract:
Increases in electricity price volatility have raised interest in electricity storage and its potential arbitrage value. Large utility-scale electricity storage can decrease the value of energy arbitrage by smoothing differences in prices on- and off-peak, however this price-smoothing effect can result in significant external welfare gains by reducing consumer energy costs and generator profits. As such, the incentives of merchant storage operators, consumers, and generators may not be properly aligned to ensure socially-optimal storage use. We examine storage use incentives for these different agent types and show that under most reasonable market structures a combination of merchant and consumer ownership of storage maximizes potential welfare gains from storage use.



Price Signals in "Energy-only" Wholesale Electricity Markets: An Empirical Analysis of the Price Signal in France

Philippe Vassilopoulos

Year: 2010
Volume: Volume 31
Number: Number 3
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol31-No3-5
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Abstract:
This paper analyzes the price signals of the French wholesale electricity market. We build a model of electricity prices that takes into account several key features of the French electricity market in order to assess the capacity of the price signal to guide investments. Wholesale prices should reflect the imbalances in the generation mix but the signal can be distorted if monopoly rents and/or �missing money� are present. We simulate over the 2003-2005 period theoretical perfectly competitive prices with the installed capacity and with the optimal mix to estimate the capacity imbalances and scarcity rents. We then compare the investment signal sent by observed electricity prices and the theoretical prices with the installed capacity. Although there are signs of market contestability for the mid-merit load, through market integration with the other continental markets, observed prices are too high for the baseload and too low for the peakload, as a result distorting the signal.





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