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Net Effects of Government Interventionin Energy Markets

Paul F. Dickens III, David L. McNicol, Frederic H. Murphy, and Julie H. Zalkind

Year: 1983
Volume: Volume 4
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol4-No2-10
View Abstract

Abstract:
There have been several comprehensive studies of energy policy in the last few years, for example, Shurr (1979), Federal Energy Administration (1976), ERDA (1976), and the Ford Foundation (Landsberg, 1978). Unlike these studies of energy policies, this effort is not prescriptive. Rather, it measures the effects of a large set of policies on energy markets to provide an understanding of how government programs reinforce or offset one another.



Notes - A Comparison of Original Costs and Trended Original Cost Ratemaking Methods

Robert E. Anderson and David E. Mead

Year: 1983
Volume: Volume 4
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol4-No2-11
No Abstract









Energy Prices and Capital Obsolescence: Evidence from the Oil Embargo Period

Joel C. Gibbons

Year: 1984
Volume: Volume 5
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol5-No1-2
View Abstract

Abstract:
The average service life of fixed assets in U.S. manufacturing industries increased gradually from 1962 to 1969. Thereafter, it fell sharply up to the mid-1970s. The most rapid change occurred in the three years following the Arab oil embargo. There is reason to believe that these events were causally related: the rapid escalation of petroleum prices caused the decline in useful lives of plant and machinery. The reasoning behind this statement and an analysis of the data on service lives of fixed assets are the topic of this paper.



Deregulating the Generation of Electricity Through the Creation of Spot Markets for Bulk Power

Roger E. Bohn, Bennett W. Golub, Richard D. Tabors, and Fred C. Schweppet

Year: 1984
Volume: Volume 5
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol5-No2-5
View Abstract

Abstract:
Many observers are dissatisfied with the current condition of privately owned electric utilities in the United States. Numerous pro-posals have been made for change, including suggestions to deregulate all or part of the industry.' Those who favor deregulation argue that electric power systems, and especially electric generation, may no longer be natural monopolies. Furthermore, under the present regulatory regime, many utilities are refraining from investing, which is not in the best interests of their customers.2 Others, however, worry that quality and reliability of1. See Golub (1982, Chapter 2) for a review of the literature on deregulating electricutilities.2. A major electric utility's internal planning documents discussed the problem as follows. The ability to raise new capital is finite, and is especially limited given the current financial condition, the economy, and the regulatory climate. Thus, although the recommended investments ... will lead to a correct economic decision ... they may not be desirable due to other constraints [on the company] ... The document goes on to report that the company is not investing in coal projects, although such projects' long-term cost is one-third less than current anticipated generating costs.



The Incidence of Severance Taxes in a Residual Demand Framework

Albert L. Danielsen and Phillip A. Cartwright

Year: 1985
Volume: Volume 6
Number: Special Issue
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol6-NoSI-19
No Abstract



Field Price Deregulation and the Carrier Status of Natural Gas Pipelines

Harry G. Broadman, W. David Montgomery, and Milton Russell

Year: 1985
Volume: Volume 6
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol6-No2-10
View Abstract

Abstract:
The move to deregulate natural gas field markets is likely to stimulate changes in the way the downstream segments of the industry are regulated. In particular, because the uncertainty endemic to freer upstream markets will emerge for the first time in the contemporary gas industry, the relative merits of having pipelines perform different economic functions will be altered. Producers and distributors will also, in varying degrees, face greater price uncertainty than before. This will lead to changes in the desired allocation of risk and incentives associated with activities traditionally carried out by transmission companies.



Oil Shock

Hillard G. Huntington

Year: 1985
Volume: Volume 6
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol6-No2-11
View Abstract

Abstract:
The move to deregulate natural gas field markets is likely to stimulate changes in the way the downstream segments of the industry are regulated. In particular, because the uncertainty endemic to freer upstream markets will emerge for the first time in the contemporary gas industry, the relative merits of having pipelines perform different economic functions will be altered. Producers and distributors will also, in varying degrees, face greater price uncertainty than before. This will lead to changes in the desired allocation of risk and incentives associated with activities traditionally carried out by transmission companies.



Oil Prices, Energy Security, and Impact Policy

R. Glenn Hubbard

Year: 1985
Volume: Volume 6
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol6-No2-12
View Abstract

Abstract:
The move to deregulate natural gas field markets is likely to stimulate changes in the way the downstream segments of the industry are regulated. In particular, because the uncertainty endemic to freer upstream markets will emerge for the first time in the contemporary gas industry, the relative merits of having pipelines perform different economic functions will be altered. Producers and distributors will also, in varying degrees, face greater price uncertainty than before. This will lead to changes in the desired allocation of risk and incentives associated with activities traditionally carried out by transmission companies.



The Making of Federal Coal Policy

Richard L. Gordon

Year: 1985
Volume: Volume 6
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol6-No2-13
View Abstract

Abstract:
The move to deregulate natural gas field markets is likely to stimulate changes in the way the downstream segments of the industry are regulated. In particular, because the uncertainty endemic to freer upstream markets will emerge for the first time in the contemporary gas industry, the relative merits of having pipelines perform different economic functions will be altered. Producers and distributors will also, in varying degrees, face greater price uncertainty than before. This will lead to changes in the desired allocation of risk and incentives associated with activities traditionally carried out by transmission companies.



Electric Power Strategic Issues

Richard L. Gordon

Year: 1985
Volume: Volume 6
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol6-No2-14
View Abstract

Abstract:
The move to deregulate natural gas field markets is likely to stimulate changes in the way the downstream segments of the industry are regulated. In particular, because the uncertainty endemic to freer upstream markets will emerge for the first time in the contemporary gas industry, the relative merits of having pipelines perform different economic functions will be altered. Producers and distributors will also, in varying degrees, face greater price uncertainty than before. This will lead to changes in the desired allocation of risk and incentives associated with activities traditionally carried out by transmission companies.



Risk Analysis and Decision Processes

Nelson E. May

Year: 1985
Volume: Volume 6
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol6-No2-15
View Abstract

Abstract:
The move to deregulate natural gas field markets is likely to stimulate changes in the way the downstream segments of the industry are regulated. In particular, because the uncertainty endemic to freer upstream markets will emerge for the first time in the contemporary gas industry, the relative merits of having pipelines perform different economic functions will be altered. Producers and distributors will also, in varying degrees, face greater price uncertainty than before. This will lead to changes in the desired allocation of risk and incentives associated with activities traditionally carried out by transmission companies.



The Natural Gas Industry

Harry G. Broadman

Year: 1985
Volume: Volume 6
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol6-No2-16
View Abstract

Abstract:
The move to deregulate natural gas field markets is likely to stimulate changes in the way the downstream segments of the industry are regulated. In particular, because the uncertainty endemic to freer upstream markets will emerge for the first time in the contemporary gas industry, the relative merits of having pipelines perform different economic functions will be altered. Producers and distributors will also, in varying degrees, face greater price uncertainty than before. This will lead to changes in the desired allocation of risk and incentives associated with activities traditionally carried out by transmission companies.



The Great Transition: Energy and Economic Change

Dale W. Jorgenson

Year: 1986
Volume: Volume 7
Number: Number 3
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol7-No3-1
View Abstract

Abstract:
This paper examines the interactions between energy prices and economic growth since the first world oil crisis in 1973. Its title comes from a report by the Swedish National Energy Administration. The report, which details the transition of the world economy from low-priced to high-priced energy, is an excellent overview of the interrelationships between industrialized economies and international energy markets.



Defending the Price of Oil

Dr. Edith Penrose

Year: 1988
Volume: Volume 9
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol9-No1-2
View Abstract

Abstract:
Potential surpluses of oil have been around for a very long time; as a consequence, the defense of prices has always required continually renewed vigilance. It is true that there have been short periods of temporary scarcity and, from time to time, fears of an imminent long-run scarcity, as in the 1920s in the United States and again today. But for at least 60 years, the oil industry seems to have been more concerned with maintaining prices against the pressure of surpluses. "Competition" was always the scapegoat, for in spite of the strong monopolistic elements in the organization of the industry, gluts were the direct result of the behavior of oil companies as they competed to discover and control crude oil production and markets.



The World Oil Market: An Examination Using Small-Scale Models

David Jay Green

Year: 1988
Volume: Volume 9
Number: Number 3
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol9-No3-2
View Abstract

Abstract:
This article presents the results of a series of exercises in the use of small-scale models to explain the spot price of crude oil. Small scale modeling-the use of a limited number of equations-involves a number of disadvantages: many interesting questions will have to be ignored and often a sense of realism may be sacrificed. However, small-scale models are an essential part of economic research. Compared to large, multi-equation models, small-scale models are often transparent-causal relations are clearly visible. In addition, small-scale models can often be easily updated and reexamined in the light of new information or assumptions. This is particularly important in policy-making when time and clear communication are at a premium.



Competitive Bidding In Electricity Markets: A Survey

Richard P. Rozek

Year: 1989
Volume: Volume 10
Number: Number 4
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol10-No4-8
View Abstract

Abstract:
A number of states as well as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission have been considering whether traditional regulatory regimes in electricity and natural gas markets should be replaced with competitive bidding systems. This shift is designed to yield a more efficient allocation of energy resources within the existing legal framework The paper examines both the theoretical basis and empirical evidence on bidding processes in light of the characteristics of energy markets, especially electricity markets. It then discusses the extent to which one can draw policy conclusions about designing specific bidding processes for these markets. It concludes that given the underlying complexity of the products involved, the optimal system for procuring power should include a mix of bidding negotiation and utility construction.




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