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Methods for Measuring the Oil Import Reduction Premium and the Oil Stockpile Premium

James L. Plummer

Year: 1981
Volume: Volume 2
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol2-No1-1
View Abstract

Abstract:
Energy problems can be differentiated into the following three broad categories:1. Oil supply disruptions. These can cause both large short-term price increases and huge short-term economic losses. Some of the price increase impacts may persist after the disruption is over. Energy policies to address this problem, such as oil stockpiles, must have impacts beginning in a zero- to five-year time frame.



Coping with Supply Insecurity

M. A. Adelman

Year: 1982
Volume: Volume 3
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol3-No2-1
View Abstract

Abstract:
Since the end of World War II, there have been six world oil supply disruptions, in 1951, 1956, 1967, 1973, 1979, and 1980-one year in six, and the frequency seems to be increasing. This danger will continue, for there are many sources of disruption. Although the probability of any one type in any one year is low, the chances of escaping them all for several years are also low.



The Potential Role of Natural Gas in a Major Oil Crisis

Benjamin Schlesinger, Nelson E. Hay, and Jacquelyn S. Mitchell

Year: 1982
Volume: Volume 3
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol3-No2-6
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Abstract:
Most energy experts in the federal government involved with contingency planning concern themselves with what to do when or if "the balloon goes up"; i.e., after the nation's 6-million-barrel-per-day oil supply is substantially cut off.



Efficient Pricing During Oil Supply Disruptions

Richard J. Gilbert and Knut Anton Mork

Year: 1986
Volume: Volume 7
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol7-No2-4
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Abstract:
Recent events in the oil market make it easy to forget the policy problems of dealing with supply interruptions. Realizing that history tends to repeat itself and that crises are not conducive to good decisions, it seems worthwhile, therefore, to examine the problem of efficient pricing in the wake of an oil price shock.



The 1990 Oil Shock is Like the Others

M. A. Adelman

Year: 1990
Volume: Volume 11
Number: Number 4
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol11-No4-1
View Abstract

Abstract:
First I will set out what happened to prices in 1990, then review the long term prospects in the light of the change.Challenge and responseSince 1912, and the first shipments out of the Persian Gulf, the world price of oil has been far above the fording/developing cost of creating new reserves. The result is a huge excess of potential production, which the owners must somehow dam up to maintain the price.Since the OPEC nations took over 20 years ago, the process has been much more turbulent. First, their chief instrument for price-raising has been to provoke a crisis, or take advantage of one. Second, there has usually been not only potential excess supply but actual excess producing capacity. This makes the high price even more insecure.



Oil Shocks and the Demand for Electricity

Edward C Kokkelenberg and Timothy D. Mount

Year: 1993
Volume: Volume 14
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol14-No2-6
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Abstract:
This paper uses a Structural Econometric Model - Time Series Analysis to forecast the demand for electricity in the United States. The main innovation is to incorporate price shocks for oil into the model. The results show that if forecasts had been made with this model in the mid-1970s, they would have predicted the drop in the growth of demand more promptly than did the electric utility industry forecasts. Using current data, forecasts of demand for the year 2000 from the model are higher than industry forecasts, suggesting a reversal of the situation that existed in the 1970s.



Business Cycles and the Oil Market

Knut Anton Mork

Year: 1994
Volume: Volume 15
Number: Special Issue
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol15-NoSI-3
View Abstract

Abstract:
The last twenty years have seen a number of oil-price changes with macroeconomic effects. Oil price increases spur inflation and produce recessions. Oil price declines dampen inflation, but do not necessarily boost real activity. The correlations can be traced back to World War II. The paper gives a survey of oil market events with macroeconomic consequences. It also discusses hypotheses about the nature of the link and efforts to incorporate oil in macroeconomic models. Business cycle research has recently advanced sectoral imbalance and uncertainty as leading hypotheses to explain the apparent asymmetry in the macroeconomic effects of oil price changes.



Oil Shocks and the Macroeconomy: The Role of Price Variability

Kiseok Lee, Shawn Ni, and Ronald A. Ratti

Year: 1995
Volume: Volume16
Number: Number 4
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol16-No4-2
View Abstract

Abstract:
In this paper we argue that an oil price change is likely to have greater impact on real GNP in an environment where oil prices have been stable, than in an environment where oil price movement has been frequent and erratic. An oil price shock variable reflecting both the unanticipated component and the time-varying conditional variance of oil price change (forecasts) is constructed and found to be highly significant in explaining economic growth across different sample periods, even when matched against various economic variables and other functions of oil price. We find that positive normalized shocks have a powerful effect on growth while negative normalized shocks do not.



Is the Strategic Petroleum Reserve our Ace in the Hole?

Timothy J. Considine

Year: 2006
Volume: Volume 27
Number: Number 3
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol27-No3-6
View Abstract

Abstract:
The Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) is often touted as a vital asset in mitigating the adverse effects of oil supply disruptions on the economy. The importance of SPR, however, largely depends upon the effect of stock sales on market prices. To address this question, this study develops a monthly econometric model of the world crude oil market. Inventories, consumption, production, and prices for crude oil are determined within a dominant producer pricing framework in which Saudi Arabia adjusts output based upon market demand and competitive fringe supply. The estimation results provide additional support for the dominant producer pricing model for world oil markets and reasonable estimates of short-run supply and demand elasticities. Several model simulations are conducted to assess the impacts of SPR policies. For example, the gradual build-up of the SPR by the Bush Administration resulted in a very small, almost imperceptible increase in world prices. Similarly, the Clinton sale from SPR had minor impacts on market prices. Another simulation indicates that while SPR sales can lower world prices during a supply shock, the required drawdown would be so substantial the reserve would be significantly depleted after just a few months. These findings suggest that once played, the SPR card has modest impacts on world prices and could be easily trumped by actions of other players, including output adjustments by world oil producers.



Oil Price Shocks and the U.S. Stagflation of the 1970s: Some Insights from GEM

Benjamin Hunt

Year: 2006
Volume: Volume 27
Number: Number 4
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol27-No4-3
View Abstract

Abstract:
Using a variant of the IMF's Global Economy Model (GEM), featuring energy as both an intermediate input into production and a final consumption good, this paper examines the macroeconomic implications of large increases in the price of energy. Within a fully optimizing framework with nominal and real rigidities arising from costly adjustment, large increases in energy prices can generate inflation persistence similar to that seen in the 1970s if the monetary authority misperceives the economy�s supply capacity and workers are able to temporarily resist some of the erosion in their real consumption wages resulting from the energy price increase. In the absence of these two responses, the model suggests that energy price shocks cannot generate the type of stagflation witnessed in the 1970s. The analysis goes some way toward reconciling the results found in the empirical literature on the changing nature of the macroeconomic implications of oil price shocks.




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