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Tax Issues in Petroleum Industry Reorganization

E. Allen Jacobs and Stephen T. Limberg

Year: 1985
Volume: Volume 6
Number: Special Issue
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol6-NoSI-25
No Abstract



Elements of Market Power in the Natural Gas Pipeline Industry

Harry G. Broadman

Year: 1986
Volume: Volume 7
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol7-No1-8
View Abstract

Abstract:
As a result of the distortions that have beset natural gas markets in the wake of partial wellhead deregulation under the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA)-the most visible problem being the existence of increased prices amid a glut of deliverable supplies-concern has mounted about whether the natural gas pipeline industry will perform in a socially efficient manner in the long run when field prices are completely decontrolled.In addition to transporting natural gas from the field to the city-gate, interstate natural gas pipeline companies have traditionally performed two functions. Granted private carrier status by the Natural Gas Act of 1938 (NGA), they both purchase gas shipments in upstream markets and resell them in downstream markets as well as match up gas producers who have available supply with distribution companies and wholesale end-users (direct industrial consumers and electric utilities) who have unfilled demand. In other words, as private carriers gas pipelines not only provide a gas transmission service but also assume the twin roles of gas merchandiser and broker.



The World Oil Market: Past and Future

M.A. Adelman

Year: 1994
Volume: Volume 15
Number: Special Issue
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol15-NoSI-2
View Abstract

Abstract:
Private owners of world oil resources eventually failed to restrain abundance and keep an above-competitive price. The OPEC nations had far greater market power, but overestimated it. Short time horizons drove OPEC nations to raise the price too much. They retreated to a more tenable level. But like all cartels, they find it hard to reconcile group welfare with short-run individual interest. Oil continues abundant, so far. The main obstacles to noncartel expansion are man made such as taxation and state companies. They are very slowly yielding. Depending on how fast they erode, world supply will grow, and price pressure will be downward.



Reactive Power is a Cheap Constraint

Edward Kahn and Ross Baldick

Year: 1994
Volume: Volume15
Number: Number 4
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol15-No4-9
View Abstract

Abstract:
Hogan (1993) has proposed a version of marginal cost pricing for electricity transmission transactions that include a component for reactive power to support voltage at demand nodes. His examples support the notion that the cost of satisfying voltage constraints can be quite high. We show that in his simplest example the price on this constraint results from an uneconomic and artificial characterization of the problem, namely an inefficient and unnecessarily constrained dispatch. By eliminating this characterization, the price of reactive power falls to a very modest level. Our counterexample has implications for the institutional arrangements under which transmission pricing reform will take place. We believe that environment will be an open access competitive setting, where dispatch is still controlled by one group of participants. Manipulation of marginal transmission costs becomes quite feasible in complex networks through subtle changes to dispatch. Therefore an open access regime using marginal cost pricing must involve either some kind of monitoring and audit function to detect potential abuses, or alternatively, institutional restructuring to eliminate conflicts of interest.



Power Markets and Market Power

David M. Newbery

Year: 1995
Volume: Volume16
Number: Number 3
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol16-No3-2
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Abstract:
Privatization was intended to make the English bulk electricity market sufficiently competitive to avoid the need for regulation, but two generators set the spot price over 90% of the time though they supply less than 60% of total electricity generated. Their market power depends on their share of non-baseload plant, and agreed divestiture here should increase competition. The paper argues that the contract market, which makes entry contestable, will ensure that longrun average prices are kept at the competitive entry level, with increased competition mainly increasing medium-run volatility and short-run economic efficiency.



Market Power in a System of Tradeable CO2 Quotas

Hege Westskog

Year: 1996
Volume: Volume17
Number: Number 3
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol17-No3-6
View Abstract

Abstract:
This paper examines the connection between market power and the size of efficiency loss in a market for tradeable CO2 permits. Countries, not firms, are the players in the market. A situation is analyzed where some of the, participants have market power, i.e., they can influence the price of a CO2 quota. Each country with market power decides how many quotas to buy or sell, given the other market power countries' sales or purchases of quotas, and the behavior of countries without market power. The latter countries act as price takers. The market equilibrium is compared to a cost effective market situation in order to quantify the efficiency loss resulting from market power.



Electricity Market Integration in the Pacific Northwest

Chi-Keung Woo, Debra Lloyd-Zannetti and Ira Horowitz

Year: 1997
Volume: Volume18
Number: Number 3
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol18-No3-4
View Abstract

Abstract:
Evidence of market integration and price competition support a policy of price deregulation and open access in the electric power industry. The objective of this paper is to test the hypotheses that wholesale electricity submarkets in the Pacific Northwest region of the WSCC are integrated, and price competition exists within these integrated submarkets. To this end, we apply a bivariate cointegration test, a price-difference test and a causality test to the 1996 on-peak daily electricity prices off our submarkets in the Pacific Northwest of North America: Mid-Columbia and California-Oregon Border (COB) in the Western US, and BC/US Border and Alberta Power Pool in Western Canada. The price-difference test results support the hypothesis that the following pairs of markets are integrated: (a) BC/US Border and Mid-Columbia; (b) BC/US Border and COB; and (c) Mid-Columbia and COB. A comparison between the gross profit from price arbitrage and the posted transmission tariff indicates that price competition prevails in these market pairs, and the causality test results provide supporting evidence that price leadership does not exist in these three market pairs. Finally, a market-share analysis indicates that B. C. Hydro does not have market power in the aggregate market comprising BC/US Border, Mid-Columbia and COB.



A Market Power Model with Strategic Interaction in Electricity Networks

William W. Hogan

Year: 1997
Volume: Volume18
Number: Number 4
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol18-No4-5
View Abstract

Abstract:
When transmission constraints limit the flow of power in an electric network, there are likely to be strong interaction effects across different parts of the system. A model of imperfect competition with strategic interactions in an electricity transmission network illustrates a possible exercise of market power that differs from the usual analysis of imperfect competition in more familiar product markets. Large firms could exercise horizontal market power by increasing their own production, lowering some prices, and exploiting the necessary feasibility constraints in the network to foreclose competition from others. This behavior depends on the special properties of electric networks, and reinforces the need for market analysis with more realistic network models.



Modeling Electricity Pricing in a Deregulated Generation Industry: The Potential for Oligopoly Pricing in a Poolco

Aleksandr Rudkevich, Max Duckworth, and Richard Rosen

Year: 1998
Volume: Volume19
Number: Number 3
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol19-No3-2
View Abstract

Abstract:
We calculate the electricity prices that would result from a pure "poolco" market with identical profit-maximizing generating firms. We advance theoretical concepts developed by Klemperer and Meyer (1989) and Green and Newbery (1992), and propose a new formula for the instantaneous market clearing price when generating firms adopt bidding strategies given by the Nash Equilibrium. Applying this formula to empirical electricity supply and demand data, we find that even in markets with a relatively high number of firms, the price of electricity is significantly higher than the short-run marginal cost of generation. We express the average annual price mark-up with a Price-Cost Margin Index, and show how it varies with market concentration, as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI). We conclude that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's use of the HHI in its merger guidelines could prove inadequate in addressing market power concerns in deregulated poolco markets.



Financial Transmission Rights Meet Cournot: How TCCs Curb Market Power

Steven Stoft

Year: 1999
Volume: Volume20
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol20-No1-1
View Abstract

Abstract:
This paper reconsiders the problem of market power when generators face a demand curve limited by a transmission constraint. After demonstrating that the problem's importance originates in an inherent ambiguity in Cournot-Nash theory, I review Oren's (1997a) argument that generators in this situation capture all congestion rents. In the one-line case, this argument depends on an untested hypothesis while in the three-line case, the Nash equilibrium was misidentified. Finally, the argument that financial transmission rights (and TCCs in particular) will have zero market value is refuted by modeling the possibility of their purchase by generators. This allows transmission owners, who initially own the TCCs, to capture some of the congestion rent. In fact when total capacity exceeds line capacity by more than the capacity of the largest generator, TCCs should attain their perfectly competitive value, thereby curbing the market power of generators.




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