Facebook LinkedIn Instagram Twitter
Shop
Search
Begin New Search
Proceed to Checkout

Search Results for All:
(Showing results 1 to 4 of 4)



Gasoline Tax as a Corrective Tax: Estimates for the United States, 1970-1991

Jonathan Haughton and Soumodip Sarkar

Year: 1996
Volume: Volume17
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol17-No2-6
View Abstract

Abstract:
Gasoline consumption creates externalities, through pollution, road congestion, accidents, and import dependence. Mat effect would a higher gasoline tax have on the related magnitudes: gasoline consumption, miles driven, and road fatalities? In this paper, separate models are estimated for gasoline use per mile, miles driven per driver, and fatalities per mile driven. We use data from 50 U.S. states and DC for 1970 through 1991, with a variety of stochastic specifications. The own-price elasticity of demand for gasoline is derived from projections with, and without, a higher gasoline tax, and is found to be between -0.12 and -0.17 in the short-run, and between -0.23 and -0.35 in the long-run. A tax of $1 per gallon would cut use by 15-20%, miles driven by 11-12%, and fatalities by 16 18% over 10 years, while raising almost $100 billion in revenue annually.



Pollution Control and Energy Conservation: Complements or Antagonists? A Study of Gasoline Taxes and Automobile Fuel Economy

Molly Espey

Year: 1997
Volume: Volume18
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol18-No2-2
View Abstract

Abstract:
Energy conservation regulations, such as fuel taxes and fuel economy mandates for automobiles, are often assumed to reduce air pollution in lock step with the reduction in fuel consumption. Under the current system of tailpipe emissions regulations in the United States, this is not necessarily true. This paper uses a simple graphical analysis to illustrate the relative impact of fuel taxes and fuel economy standards on pollution levels given the current tailpipe emissions standards and an alternative emissions standard. Under current tailpipe emissions standards, increases in fuel economy would actually raise emissions, and significantly larger fuel taxes would be required to achieve the same level ftollution reduction as under the proposed alternative standard. These results confirm earlier findings that used mathematical and stochastic simulation methods to address this issue.



The Political Economy of Motor-Fuel Taxation

Rajeev K. Goel and Michael A. Nelson

Year: 1999
Volume: Volume20
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol20-No1-3
View Abstract

Abstract:
This paper examines the political and economic underpinnings of gasoline tax policy. The theoretical model extends the earlier work of Hettich and Winer (1988) to flush out the effect of a change in the pre-tax price of a taxable activity on the politically optimal tax rate. Using a large cross-sectional sample of U.S. states over 1960-94, the empirical model tests the predictions of the theoretical model within the context of the state tax policy on gasoline. While simultaneously controlling for other politico-economic influences, we find that the influence of changes in gas prices on tax rates is negative. To our knowledge, this is the first study to include a fully developed theoretical model and its empirical application to the gasoline market for a test of the votemaximizing model of tax policy.



Should Automobile Fuel Economy Standards be Tightened?

Carolyn Fischer, Winston Harrington and Ian W.H. Parry

Year: 2007
Volume: Volume 28
Number: Number 4
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol28-No4-1
View Abstract

Abstract:
This paper develops analytical and numerical models to explain and estimate the welfare effects of raising Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards for new passenger vehicles. The analysis encompasses a wide range of scenarios concerning consumers valuation of fuel economy and the full economic costs of adopting fuel-saving technologies. It also accounts for, and improves estimates of, CAFE's impact on externalities from local and global pollution, oil dependence, traffic congestion and accidents. The bottom line is that it is difficult to make an airtight case either for or against tightening CAFE on pure efficiency grounds, as the magnitude and direction of the welfare change varies across different, plausible scenarios.





Begin New Search
Proceed to Checkout

 





function toggleAbstract(id) { alert(id); }