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Technology Adoption in Emission Trading Programs with Market Power

Francisco J. André and Carmen Arguedas

Year: 2018
Volume: Volume 39
Number: Special Issue 1
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.39.SI1.fand
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Abstract:
In this paper we study the relationship between market power in emission permit markets and endogenous technology adoption. We find that the initial distribution of permits, in particular, the amount of permits initially given to the dominant firm, is crucial in determining over- or under-investment in relation to the benchmark model without market power. Specifically, if the dominant firm is initially endowed with more permits than the corresponding cost effective allocation, this results in under-investment by the dominant firm and over-investment by the competitive fringe, regardless of the specific amount of permits given to the latter firms. The results are reversed if the dominant firm is initially endowed with relatively few permits. Also, the presence of market power results in a divergence of both abatement and technology adoption levels with respect to the benchmark scenario of perfect competition, as long as technology adoption becomes more effective in reducing abatement costs.



Counterpart Choice in Emission Markets: Beyond Pollution Abatement Motives

María Eugenia Sanin

Year: 2018
Volume: Volume 39
Number: Special Issue 2
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.39.SI2.msan
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Abstract:
This paper examines the determinants of electricity generator's trading strategies in the U.S. Acid Rain Market. Model estimates show that the SO2 allowances market is de facto regionalized due to the regionalization of the electricity market. The national dimension only appears when there are local imbalances in the electricity market that give strong incentives to search for a better deal outside of the generator's regional market. We also identify the importance of counterpart differentiation and the influence on the counterpart choice of the regulatory framework, market evolution and transaction size. These findings are shown to be robust to Enron's abnormal behavior during 2000-2001 and its subsequent bankruptcy. The results suggest that, contrary to received knowledge, abatement costs are not the only consideration when trading pollution allowances: market microstructure can play a crucial role.





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