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III. How Industry Sees the Future - The Tenneco Perspective

Joe B. Foster

Year: 1982
Volume: Volume 3
Number: Number 4
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol3-No4-3
View Abstract

Abstract:
A brief comment about the title given to this presentation. If you know the gas industry at all, you know that no one dares to speak for anyone else. Even within Tenneco, we look at natural gas deregulation from several points of view: Tenneco Oil is the country's fifteenth largest producer of natural gas, and it is the only one of the top 20 oil companies that derives more revenue from sales of natural gas than from crude oil.



Deregulating the Generation of Electricity Through the Creation of Spot Markets for Bulk Power

Roger E. Bohn, Bennett W. Golub, Richard D. Tabors, and Fred C. Schweppet

Year: 1984
Volume: Volume 5
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol5-No2-5
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Abstract:
Many observers are dissatisfied with the current condition of privately owned electric utilities in the United States. Numerous pro-posals have been made for change, including suggestions to deregulate all or part of the industry.' Those who favor deregulation argue that electric power systems, and especially electric generation, may no longer be natural monopolies. Furthermore, under the present regulatory regime, many utilities are refraining from investing, which is not in the best interests of their customers.2 Others, however, worry that quality and reliability of1. See Golub (1982, Chapter 2) for a review of the literature on deregulating electricutilities.2. A major electric utility's internal planning documents discussed the problem as follows. The ability to raise new capital is finite, and is especially limited given the current financial condition, the economy, and the regulatory climate. Thus, although the recommended investments ... will lead to a correct economic decision ... they may not be desirable due to other constraints [on the company] ... The document goes on to report that the company is not investing in coal projects, although such projects' long-term cost is one-third less than current anticipated generating costs.



The Effects of Natural Gas Decontrol on Fertilizer Demand, Production Costs, and Income in Agriculture

Michael LeBlanc

Year: 1985
Volume: Volume 6
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol6-No1-10
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Abstract:
Under the provisions of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA), about 50 percent of natural gas production will be decontrolled in 1985. Whether natural gas is decontrolled under the provisions of NGPA or new decontrol legislation is enacted, real natural gas prices are likely to increase during the next few years. Rising natural gas prices will directly affect agriculture by increasing crop drying and irrigation costs. However, the largest effects will occur indirectly through increases in nitrogenous fertilizer prices; natural gas represents 60 to 70 percent of fertilizer production costs (Lutton and Andrilenas 1983). Because farm production expenses have increased nearly $100 billion from 1970 through 1981 (U.S. Department of Agriculture 1982b) and real farm income has decreased 70 percent during the same period, the decontrol of natural gas is viewed with concern by the agricultural community.



International Energy Policy: The Conflict of Investment Needs and Market Signals

Paul Tempest

Year: 1985
Volume: Volume 6
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol6-No2-2
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Abstract:
I am delighted to have the privilege to welcome you to this, our sixth annual North American Conference, here in San Francisco today. By some curious coincidence we have elected to meet on the very day, November 6th, when in the United States you are making the most important world leadership decision of the decade. Today, the rest of the world will be watching to see whether the U.S. electorates will endorse, inter alia, the deregulation of oil and gas and the underlying reliance on market forces to produce acceptable energy solutions for national security.Energy security, then, and the role of government is the theme I have chosen today, as I believe it still lies very much at the heart of the current energy debate. Can our energy systems survive and prosper? To what extent are volatile markets or irresponsible governments likely to mess them up? In this I conclude that, while on resource and production cost grounds, the Arabian Gulf still presents a neglected opportunity and Western Europe a neglected risk, the greatest danger lies in the United States' imposing its highly market-oriented energy logic on the rest of the world.



The Diminishing Role of Regulation in the Natural Gas Industry

Charles G. Slalon

Year: 1986
Volume: Volume 7
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol7-No2-1
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Abstract:
The natural gas industry grew to maturity under a system of strong monopoly power of pipelines and local distribution companies (LDCs) and balkanized markets at wellheads and burnertips. Recent developments in the industry, especially phased deregulation of wellhead prices implemented by the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA) and competition induced by the gas bubble since 1982, have somewhat reduced pipeline monopoly power in some markets. Considerations of economic efficiency and economic justice now require that competitive forces be strengthened further. The FERC's Order 436 was an attempt to do that.



On Regulation, Deregulation, and Economics

Sharon B. Megdal

Year: 1989
Volume: Volume 10
Number: Number 3
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol10-No3-11
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Abstract:
This article considers some key elements of the current debates on utility deregulation and industry restructuring. Its purpose is to bridge the gap between economic theory and actual regulatory policymaking. The author explains that the emphasis of regulatory debates has, in large part, shifted from rather routine cases to matters that fundamentally affect market structure. Jurisdictional issues, difficulties associated with determining how to relax regulation of an industry that still has monopoly elements, and problems with the process itself are addressed. The author concludes that important and necessary policy debates would benefit from more substantive dialogue among all involved.



Common Carriage and the Pricing of Electricity Transmission

Chris Doyle and Maria Maher

Year: 1992
Volume: Volume 13
Number: Number 3
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol13-No3-4
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Abstract:
The electric supply industry in Europe is increasingly under pressure to become more competitive. Deregulation and privatisation in the United Kingdom demonstrate the feasibility of this. Draft directives have already been agreed upon by the European Commission to open access in energy markets. We examine the relationship between generators, transmission networks and consumers within a full information static, short-run framework. We show that open access is desirable if accompanied by common carriage and competition in generation. Common carriage is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for efficient outcomes to emerge. We also discuss the pricing of transmission services under conditions of open access and competition in generation.



Deregulation and Common Carriage in the Nordic Power System

Kjetil Bjorvatn and Sigve Tjotta

Year: 1993
Volume: Volume14
Number: Number 4
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol14-No4-4
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Abstract:
In this paper we analyze deregulation and integration of the Nordic markets for electric power. Nordic trade in electricity is controlled by national monopolies and is confined to occasional power. No transit is allowed. Due to its central location, Sweden plays a crucial role in the Nordic electricity market. For Sweden, common carriage without some form of compensation is not likely to be an acceptable form of integration. The Shapley values reveal that compensatory demands are likely to be quite large-a fact which might complicate negotiations on the introduction of common carriage. An alternative to common carriagewould be for Sweden to exert market power through monopolistic pricing of its transmission services. Government involvement may be necessary to secure a successful integration of international electricity markets.



Market Structure and the Price of Electricity: An Ex Ante Analysis of the Deregulated Swedish Electricity Market

Bo Andersson and Lars Bergman

Year: 1995
Volume: Volume16
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol16-No2-5
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Abstract:
Following new legislation the Swedish electricity market is about to be deregulated. The new system is designed to ensure competition introduction and supply. The main motive for deregulation is to increase competition and thus achieve lower market prices. A possible threat to this outcome is the high degree of concentration on the seller side that characterizes the Swedish electricity market. In this paper we show that given the current structure of firms on the supply side, deregulation is not a sufficient condition for lower equilibrium prices in the electricity market. We use a numerical model to explore the quantitative relation between the Cournot-equilibrium price, the number of firms, and the size distribution of firms in the Swedish electricity market. We compute equilibrium electricity prices and a welfare measure in order to quantify the effect of asymmetric market concentration on competition.



The Performance of the U.S. Market for Independent Electricity Generation

G. Alan Comnes, Edward P. Kahn and Tim N. Belden

Year: 1996
Volume: Volume17
Number: Number 3
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol17-No3-2
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Abstract:
We examine recent evidence on the economic performance of the U.S. independent electricity generation market. A sample of power purchase contracts for 26 independent power facilities is used as the basis of this assessment. The contracts were executed in various years between 1987-94. We describe qualitative features of the contracts, including dispatchability and allocation of fuel price risk. We standardize the price formulas of the contract sample and conduct a simple statistical analysis. Because of residual price variation and an indication that buyer willingness-to-pay is highly correlated with price, we conclude that bulk power sold by independent power producers is a heterogeneous product, and evidence for competition in market prices is weak.




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