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(Showing results 1 to 6 of 6)



Should GNP Impacts Preclude Oil Tariffs?

Hillard G. Huntington

Year: 1988
Volume: Volume 9
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol9-No2-3
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Abstract:
The oil security issue has been pushed once again to the forefront of energy policy deliberations. While a number of different policy options are being considered and discussed, none has generated as much heated debate as the imposition of an oil import tariff in the United States (see Broadman and Hogan, 1986; U.S. Department of Energy, 1987.)



World Oil Resources, Reserves and Production

Peter R. Odell

Year: 1994
Volume: Volume 15
Number: Special Issue
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol15-NoSI-6
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Abstract:
Recent estimates of limited oil resources as constituting a constraint on the future of oil, lack validity. The issue is unimportant for the oil market for 50 years. Similarly, fears for the adequacy of annual additions to reserves are unfounded: the world is running into oil, not out of it.By contrast, the geography of reserves development is important. Twothirds of reserves are in the Middle East, but 85% of these are irrelevant to global production to 2010, given the potential in OECD and non-OPEC developing countries, and the maintenance of the current oil price.Thus, demand for Middle East oil will remain frustratingly modest. Efforts to expand production, necessarily in cooperation with major oil corporations, will regenerate fears elsewhere for supply security and create prospects for regionalising global oil around the three groupings of OECD countries, to which the non-Middle East OPEC members will adhere.



Simulating Security of Supply Effects of the Nabucco and South Stream Projects for the European Natural Gas Market

Caroline Dieckhoner

Year: 2012
Volume: Volume 33
Number: Number 3
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.33.3.6
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Abstract:
Because of the decrease in domestic production in Europe, additional natural gas volumes will be required. In addition to Nord Stream, the major import pipeline projects, Nabucco and South Stream, have been announced to provide further gas supplies to Europe. This raises the question concerning whether and how these projects contribute to the European Union's focus on security of supply. Applying the natural gas infrastructure model TIGER, this paper investigates the impact of these pipeline projects on southeastern Europe's gas supply. Gas flows and marginal cost prices are evaluated in general and considering the possibility of supply disruptions via Ukraine for the year 2020. The model results show a positive impact of these pipelines on security of supply despite few consumer cut-offs that result from intra-European bottlenecks. South Stream is only highly utilized in case of a Ukraine crisis, supporting the idea that its main purpose is to bypass Ukraine. Keywords: Natural gas, security of supply, Nabucco, South Stream, linear-optimization, transport infrastructure



Conventional Power Plants in Liberalized Electricity Markets with Renewable Entry

Gerard Llobet and Jorge Padilla

Year: 2018
Volume: Volume 39
Number: Number 3
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.39.3.gllo
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Abstract:
This paper examines the optimal capacity choices of conventional power generators after the introduction of renewable production. We start with a basic and generally accepted model of the liberalized wholesale electricity market in which firms have insufficient incentives to invest and we illustrate how the entry of renewable generation tends to aggravate that problem. We show that the incentives to invest in firm capacity (e.g. conventional thermal plants) may be restored by means of a capacity auction mechanism. That mechanism is vulnerable and, hence, may prove ineffective unless governments can credibly commit not to sponsor the entry of new capacity outside the auction mechanism. We explain that such commitment may be particularly difficult in the current political context where energy policy is conditioned by environmental and industrial-policy goals. We finally propose a way to enhance the credibility of capacity auctions by committing to optimally retire idle (conventional) power plants in response to entry outside the auction.



Impact of Coordinated Capacity Mechanisms on the European Power Market

Michael Bucksteeg, Stephan Spiecker, and Christoph Weber

Year: 2019
Volume: Volume 40
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.40.2.mbuc
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Abstract:
There is an ongoing debate on the introduction of capacity markets in most European countries while a few of them have already established capacity markets. Since the implementation of independent national capacity markets is not in line with the target of a pan-European internal electricity market we investigate the impacts of uncoordinated capacity markets compared with coordinated capacity markets. A probabilistic approach for the determination of capacity requirements is proposed and a European electricity market model (E2M2s) is applied for evaluation. The model simultaneously optimizes investments and dispatch of power plants. Besides the impact on generation investments, market prices and system costs we analyze effects on production and security of supply. While coordinated capacity markets reveal high potentials for cross-border synergies and cost savings, uncoordinated and unilateral implementations can lead to inefficiencies, in particular free riding effects and endanger security of supply due to adverse allocation of generation capacity.



A Strategic Perspective on Competition between Pipeline Gas and LNG

Robert A. Ritz

Year: 2019
Volume: Volume 40
Number: Number 5
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.40.5.rrit
View Abstract

Abstract:
Global gas markets feature two types of suppliers: piped gas and LNG exporters. Pipelines have a high degree of "asset specificity" : once built, they are physically bound to a particular route. LNG is transported by tanker, with a choice of export markets. Put simply: LNG is mobile, pipelines are not. This paper uses game-theoretic modelling to show how its commitment to serving a single market confers a strategic advantage on piped gas. By "overinvesting" in its own market, a pipeline exporter can induce LNG rivals to shift sales to their other markets. The model helps understand competition between Russian piped gas and Qatari LNG. It shows how Russia's dependence on Europe can be good news for gas buyers, why these nonetheless strongly benefit from diversifying into LNG imports, and how the Herfindahl index of imports can mismeasure "supply security" . The paper also discusses Russia's evolving gas export strategy, including gas deals with China.





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