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Information and Bidding Behavior by Major Oil Companies for Outer Continental Shelf Leases: Is the joint Bidding Ban Justified?

Steven W. Millsaps, Mack Ott

Year: 1981
Volume: Volume 2
Number: Number 3
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol2-No3-6
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Abstract:
The Energy Policy and Conservation Act (PL 94-163), signed into law in December 1975, forbade oil companies that produced the equivalent of 1.6 million barrels of oil per day (mbd) worldwide from bidding jointly for outer continental shelf (OCS) leases. The U.S. Department of the Interior adopted regulations to that effect. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendment of 1978 (PL 95-372) modified the 1975 law. This amendment gives the Secretary of the Interior the power to conduct periodic reviews of production rates by petroleumproducers and to ban from joint bidding any person or firm that produced, during a prior six-month period specified by the secretary, an average of 1.6 mbd.



The Rate of Return Earned by Lessees under Cash Bonus Bidding for OCS Oil and Gas Leases

Walter J. Mead, Asbjorn Moseidjord, and Philip E. Sorensen

Year: 1983
Volume: Volume 4
Number: Number 4
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol4-No4-3
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Abstract:
The remaining oil and gas reserves and resources of the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) represent one of America's largest publicly owned assets. Through 1980, OCS oil and gas leases had produced $62.8 billion in gross revenue and $41.3 billion in bonus, royalty, and rental payments to the federal government (U.S. Geological Survey, 1981).



OCS Leasing Policy: Its Effects on the Structure of the Petroleum Industry

Mark Kosrno

Year: 1985
Volume: Volume 6
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol6-No1-8
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Abstract:
The disposition of offshore lands is one of the decade's most im-portant and controversial natural resource policy issues. Several disputes focus on the economic effects of federal Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) leasing policy. This paper addresses one of these disputes-how will OCSleasing policy affect the structure of the petroleum industry?This paper presents and summarizes an econometric model that evaluates the competitive implications of alternative OCS leasing policies.Specifically, it seeks to explain the differential bidding success of the major, minor, and independent oil companies.1 The following determinantsof OCS access were evaluated.



The Cost of OCS Bid Rejection

Paul R. Kobrin

Year: 1986
Volume: Volume 7
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol7-No1-6
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Abstract:
The U.S. Interior Department periodically offers Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) tracts for lease at seated bid auction. The bid variable typically is the bonus, a sum paid by the lessee at commencement of the lease. A tract is awarded only to the high bidder. However, the seller often deems even the high bid insufficient, rejecting it and withholding the tract for possible laterauction.





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