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The Clumsy Cartel

M.A. Adelman

Year: 1980
Volume: Volume 1
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol1-No1-5
View Abstract

Abstract:
The recent price explosions in the world oil market result from the tardy recognition of the post-1973 consumption slowdown. Such odd results could not happen in a competitive market, but they are not at all strange in the world of the cartel. An analogy may help explain. A diver in the sea cannot go lower than the sea floor, nor higher than the water's surface. He is nearly weightless, and can float at any depth between these extremes, but the slightest impact or effort sends him up or down. Similarly, in any market, the price cannot drop below incremental cost, since such a drop would choke off supply, nor can it rise above the level that would maximize profit to a monopoly, since the monopoly would gain by putting the price back down. But in a once-competitive market, where the price has been rising toward some unknown monopoly optimum, the price can hold steady or can move drastically up or down in response to very slight impulses. In this range the price may show no response, or even a perverse response, to changes in demand. Since 1973, price response has been perverse. This was clearly the case in 1974, as the world headed into recession. It is so again in 1979.During 1973-1978, real incomes in the non-Communist indus-trialized countries rose 13 percent, but oil use nevertheless was flat at approximately 50 million barrels daily (MBD). Exports



The World Oil Market: An Exporter's View

Alirio A. Parra

Year: 1980
Volume: Volume 1
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol1-No1-6
View Abstract

Abstract:
I am deeply honored to be part of this distinguished panel and to address my professional colleagues on the occasion of the first annual meeting of the International Association of Energy Econo-mists.



Simulation of World Oil Market Shocks: A Markov Analysis of OPEC and Consumer Behavior

Richard F. Kosobud and Houston H. Stokes

Year: 1980
Volume: Volume 1
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol1-No2-3
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Abstract:
One major determinant of crude oil price will be the question of whether or not OPEC can resolve its internal conflicts and act effectively as a coalition in restricting the quantities it will supply. For the economist, this question stands at the center of the energy problem; unfortunately, economic analysis has little that is definite to say about the question, and consequently little to say about how OPEC determines its posted price policies and the quantities of oil to be placed on the market. Economic analysis has also failed to provide any definite explanation of the fact that individual OPEC members have not been prone to seek net revenue increases through additional sales, even during periods of declining sales or during oil gluts such as the 1975 recession in OECD countries.



Crude Oil Resource Appraisal in the United States

Noel D. Uri

Year: 1980
Volume: Volume 1
Number: Number 3
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol1-No3-3
View Abstract

Abstract:
Prior to the Arab oil embargo that began in October 1973, the general feeling was that U.S. oil resources were almost limitless. Certainly there were some who were aware that the rate of crude oil produc-tion was falling and costs were increasing, but these perceptions were relegated to the background. Past experience supported the explorer's optimistic outlook concerning potential discoveries. The United States never seemed in danger of being less than the world's foremost producer of crude oil.



Petroleum Policy and Mexican Domestic Politics: Left Opposition, Regional Dissidence, and Official Apostasy

Edward J. Williams

Year: 1980
Volume: Volume 1
Number: Number 3
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol1-No3-4
View Abstract

Abstract:
The impact of the petroleum industry on oil-producing countries has frequently emphasized the intimate interconnection and reciprocal influences of economic and political change. The agony of contemporary Iran is a dramatic example, but only one of many that help prove the point. In Nigeria's recent history, the competition for control of petroleum resources was one factor instigating a brutal civil war. In Venezuela, a new era of constitutional stability flowed from an expanded economic base provided by petroleum export earnings. In the United States, the rise to national prominence of the Texas politicos reflected the economic changes that evolved from petroleum discoveries.



The Real Price of Imported Oil

Joy Dunkerley and John E. Jankowski, Jr.

Year: 1980
Volume: Volume 1
Number: Number 3
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol1-No3-6
View Abstract

Abstract:
The continual upward adjustment since 1973 in international quoted oil prices has been accompanied by two countervailing developments. The first is the weakening of the dollar against many national currencies. Since transactions in the international oil market are conducted in dollars, many countries were able to offer less of their national currency for each dollar of oil purchased. Second, sharply rising prices of all other goods and services in many oil-importing coun-tries diminished the impact of the relative rise in oil prices. Thus oil appeared as only one of a host of rising prices, perhaps rising more strongly than other prices but otherwise indistinguishable from a multitude of inflationary pressures. In other words, the real price of oil to importing countries may not have been rising as strongly in real terms as is suggested by price quotations from internationally traded crude oil. If this is the case, pressures for limiting oil imports and oil conservation generally would be weakened.



An Assessment of the Effects of the Windfall Profits Tax on Crude Oil Supply

Philip K. Verleger, Jr.

Year: 1980
Volume: Volume 1
Number: Number 4
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol1-No4-3
View Abstract

Abstract:
Most economic assessments of the recently enacted crude oil "windfall profits tax" (P. L. 96-223) have concluded that the tax will reduce the economic incentive to produce crude oil and will therefore have a negative impact on U.S. oil production.' This article disagrees with that view. Instead we show that the tax offers incentives to producers on existing properties that exceed those offered by a free market. Furthermore, based on estimates of these incentives, we conclude that the tax will1. See, for instance, Mead (1979) Wall Street Journal (1980), and Friedman (1980).Support from grants to the program on business and government relations at the School of Organization and Management at Yale University is gratefully acknowledged. Extraordinary assistance from Edward Erickson and Linda Scotten in improving the exposition of this paper is also gratefully acknowledged. The author assumes full responsibility for any errors.



World Oil Price Increases: Sources and Solutions

Albert L. Danielsen, Edward B. Selby, Jr.

Year: 1980
Volume: Volume 1
Number: Number 4
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol1-No4-4
View Abstract

Abstract:
World oil prices have been high since 1973, compared to average production costs and historical norms, because the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has functioned as a viable price-setting and output-restricting institution. Prices increased sharply in 1973-1974 and 1979, and in each case OPEC validated the higher price levels by subsequently cutting production. On the other hand, the importing countries have failed to establish institutions of their own that could mitigate price increases because they have not perceived the problem to be one of institutional control over prices. Instead, they have tended to view high oil prices as the result of resource scarcity. Their responses have been predominantly intermediate to long term, stockpiling for an embargo, encouraging conservation, and promoting the development of alternative energy



Methods for Measuring the Oil Import Reduction Premium and the Oil Stockpile Premium

James L. Plummer

Year: 1981
Volume: Volume 2
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol2-No1-1
View Abstract

Abstract:
Energy problems can be differentiated into the following three broad categories:1. Oil supply disruptions. These can cause both large short-term price increases and huge short-term economic losses. Some of the price increase impacts may persist after the disruption is over. Energy policies to address this problem, such as oil stockpiles, must have impacts beginning in a zero- to five-year time frame.



An Analysis of the Supply of Oil

Ali M. Reza

Year: 1981
Volume: Volume 2
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol2-No2-4
View Abstract

Abstract:
The demand for oil has been studied more extensively than the supply of oil, perhaps because the theory underlying the demand for oil is more developed. But a better understanding of the supply of oil is also necessary in our analysis of the oil market, and this article is an effort in that direction. More specifically, in this article we are interested in determining the shape of the supply of oil for an oil-exporting nation and the factors that cause this supply to change; upon aggregation of such individual supplies OPEC's supply can then be obtained.




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