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The Clumsy Cartel

M.A. Adelman

Year: 1980
Volume: Volume 1
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol1-No1-5
View Abstract

Abstract:
The recent price explosions in the world oil market result from the tardy recognition of the post-1973 consumption slowdown. Such odd results could not happen in a competitive market, but they are not at all strange in the world of the cartel. An analogy may help explain. A diver in the sea cannot go lower than the sea floor, nor higher than the water's surface. He is nearly weightless, and can float at any depth between these extremes, but the slightest impact or effort sends him up or down. Similarly, in any market, the price cannot drop below incremental cost, since such a drop would choke off supply, nor can it rise above the level that would maximize profit to a monopoly, since the monopoly would gain by putting the price back down. But in a once-competitive market, where the price has been rising toward some unknown monopoly optimum, the price can hold steady or can move drastically up or down in response to very slight impulses. In this range the price may show no response, or even a perverse response, to changes in demand. Since 1973, price response has been perverse. This was clearly the case in 1974, as the world headed into recession. It is so again in 1979.During 1973-1978, real incomes in the non-Communist indus-trialized countries rose 13 percent, but oil use nevertheless was flat at approximately 50 million barrels daily (MBD). Exports



The World Oil Market: An Exporter's View

Alirio A. Parra

Year: 1980
Volume: Volume 1
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol1-No1-6
View Abstract

Abstract:
I am deeply honored to be part of this distinguished panel and to address my professional colleagues on the occasion of the first annual meeting of the International Association of Energy Econo-mists.



Simulation of World Oil Market Shocks: A Markov Analysis of OPEC and Consumer Behavior

Richard F. Kosobud and Houston H. Stokes

Year: 1980
Volume: Volume 1
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol1-No2-3
View Abstract

Abstract:
One major determinant of crude oil price will be the question of whether or not OPEC can resolve its internal conflicts and act effectively as a coalition in restricting the quantities it will supply. For the economist, this question stands at the center of the energy problem; unfortunately, economic analysis has little that is definite to say about the question, and consequently little to say about how OPEC determines its posted price policies and the quantities of oil to be placed on the market. Economic analysis has also failed to provide any definite explanation of the fact that individual OPEC members have not been prone to seek net revenue increases through additional sales, even during periods of declining sales or during oil gluts such as the 1975 recession in OECD countries.



Methods for Measuring the Oil Import Reduction Premium and the Oil Stockpile Premium

James L. Plummer

Year: 1981
Volume: Volume 2
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol2-No1-1
View Abstract

Abstract:
Energy problems can be differentiated into the following three broad categories:1. Oil supply disruptions. These can cause both large short-term price increases and huge short-term economic losses. Some of the price increase impacts may persist after the disruption is over. Energy policies to address this problem, such as oil stockpiles, must have impacts beginning in a zero- to five-year time frame.



Will President Reagan's Energy Policy Lead Households to Conserve?

Eric S. Brown

Year: 1982
Volume: Volume 3
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol3-No1-5
View Abstract

Abstract:
When energy was cheap and easily available, consumers' paid little attention to their energy use and bills, so after the supply disruptions of the1970s, they were poorly equipped to deal with the changes they faced in energy prices and availability. During the 1970s, the federal government undertook various programs of education and assistance, including dissemination of printed information, establishment of energy standards for federally financed homes, and tax credits for use of alternative energy sources.









Notes - Risk Analysis of Alternative Energy Sources

Daniel R. Kazmer

Year: 1982
Volume: Volume 3
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol3-No1-11
No Abstract



Reply to "Risk Analysis of Alternative Energy Sources"

Miller B. Spangler

Year: 1982
Volume: Volume 3
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol3-No1-12
No Abstract



Wood Energy Bibliography

n/a

Year: 1982
Volume: Volume 3
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol3-No1-13
No Abstract





Notes - Comment on "Economic Implications of Mandated Efficiency..."

Stanley M. Besen and Leland L. Johnson

Year: 1982
Volume: Volume 3
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol3-No1-9
No Abstract



The Future of OPEC: Price Level and Cartel Stability

George Daly, James M. Griffin, and Henry B. Steele

Year: 1983
Volume: Volume 4
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol4-No1-4
View Abstract

Abstract:
In the wake of events associated with the Iranian revolution, the world price of oil increased from $15 to $32 per barrel. The Energy Modeling Forum's recent review of 10 world oil models shows virtual unanimity in holding that this price increase will be permanent and, indeed, that the real price of oil will increase in the future. The purpose of this paper is to seriously question the assumptions underlying such long-run projections-and hence the projections themselves. We conclude that the 1978-79 price hikes may prove to be a watershed event that effects fundamental changes in the long-run supply and demand for oil.



Petroleum Price Elasticity, Income Effects, and OPEC's Pricing Policy

F. Gerard Adams and Jaime Marquez

Year: 1984
Volume: Volume 5
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol5-No1-7
View Abstract

Abstract:
A standard result from static economic theory is that a monopolist with zero cost will maximize profits by charging the price at which the demand has unit elasticity. Yet, the demand for petroleum, as seen by consumers, is price inelastic, and empirical estimates of the price elasticity for petroleum are typically less than one. Given the relatively low production cost for Middle East oil and the optimization rule referred to above, a natural question is whether OPEC, acting as a monopoly, has exhausted its potential for forcing price increases or whether it will ultimately be able to charge still higher prices as it tries to optimize its earnings. This possibility of higher oil prices is important for OPEC and for oil-consuming countries-for OPEC because the finite nature of resources implies that excess production today represents an irrecoverable loss; for consuming countries because of the high cost of oil and the adverse consequences of still higher oil prices on inflation and unemployment.



Notes - Sense and Nonsense About World Oil

M. A. Adelman

Year: 1984
Volume: Volume 5
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol5-No1-13
No Abstract



Notes - A Comparison of the Costs and the Results in the On/Offshore Search for Oil and Gas

Jon A. Rasmussen and Michael J. Piette

Year: 1984
Volume: Volume 5
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol5-No1-11
No Abstract



Notes - Public Willingness to Invest in Household Weatherization

Marvin E. Olsen and Christopher Cluett

Year: 1984
Volume: Volume 5
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol5-No1-12
No Abstract







The Price of Oil and Conflict in OPEC

Ali M. Reza

Year: 1984
Volume: Volume 5
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol5-No2-2
View Abstract

Abstract:
The price-setting behavior of the oil-exporting nations is influenced by the various elasticities of demand for and supply of oil, and the long-run optimal price trajectory is also influenced by the rate of interest and reserves (see, for example, Pindyck, 1978, and Reza, 1981). Since it is generally agreed that the long-term price elasticity exceeds the short-term elasticity (in absolute value), measuring the latter can give a clearer picture of the former. The short-term price elasticity of demand for OPEC oil is also of interest because short-term financial constraints have apparently led at least some members of OPEC to weigh the short-run outcome of their pricing decisions more heavily. The issue addressed here is the magnitude of the short-run price elasticity of the demand for oil supplied by the OPEC core (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar) and of OPEC as a group.



Nigeria's Internal Petroleum Problems: Perspectives and Choices

Akin Iwayemi

Year: 1984
Volume: Volume 5
Number: Number 4
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol5-No4-4
View Abstract

Abstract:
As a major oil producer and member of OPEC, Nigeria benefited greatly from the sharp increases in world oil prices during the 1970s. It was especially hard hit by the weakening of oil markets during the past four years, when its oil production had to be cut back sharply and its prices reduced. The impact of these developments, including the replacement of the civilian government by a military regime in December 1983, has been discussed elsewhere. I Less well known abroad is the fact that during this entire period, Nigeria suffered sporadic but severe internal energy supply problems, including shortages of petroleum products and irregular availability of electricity. If past policies are continued, Nigeria's energy problems are likely to become severe enough to jeopardize its position as an oil exporter.




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