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An Institutional Design for an Electricity Contract Market with Central Dispatch

Hung-po Chao and Stephen Peck

Year: 1997
Volume: Volume18
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol18-No1-4
View Abstract

Abstract:
In Chao and Peck (1996), we introduced a new approach to the design of an efficient electricity market that incorporates externalities due to loop flows. This approach enables an innovative flow-based bidding scheme for pricing transmission services. In the short term, due to some technological constraints, a hybrid institutional structure that encompasses a decentralized contract market (via the system operator) is necessary for implementation. In this paper, we present an incentive scheme that fosters efficiency and reliability within such art institutional structure. An essential ingredient is that the system operator provides all electricity traders choices of priority insurance against interruptions. We show how this scheme will ensure the integrity of the electrical contract market and provide the system operator incentives to maintain system reliability in all efficient manner in real-time dispatch.



Analyzing California's Power Crisis

Ahmad Faruqui, Hung-po Chao, Vic Niemeyer, Jeremy Platt and Karl Stahlkopf

Year: 2001
Volume: Volume22
Number: Number 4
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol22-No4-2
No Abstract



The Spanish Electricity Industry: Plus ca change

Claude Crampes and Natalia Fabra

Year: 2005
Volume: Volume 26
Number: Special Issue
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol26-NoSI-6
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Abstract:
In this paper we describe the Spanish electricity industry and its current regulatory regime. Special emphasis is given to the description and discussion of market design issues (including stranded cost recovery), the evolution of market structure, investment in generation capacity and network activities. We also provide a critical assessment of the 1997 regulatory reform, which did not succeed in introducing effective competition, but retained an opaque regulation which has been subject to continuous governmental interventionism. Furthermore, the implementation of the Kyoto agreement could show the lack of robustness of the regulatory regime.



Electricity Wholesale Markets: Designs Now and in a Low-carbon Future

Richard J. Green

Year: 2008
Volume: Volume 29
Number: Special Issue #2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol29-NoSI2-6
View Abstract

Abstract:
This paper compares electricity wholesale markets in the United States and Europe. The Standard Market Design in the US involves an independent system operator, nodal pricing with financial transmission rights, and integrated markets for capacity and ancillary services. In Europe, there are national, or occasionally zonal, spot markets run by companies independent of the transmission operator, and of the latter's purchases of ancillary services. As the amount of low-carbon generation increases, prices and transmission constraints are likely to become more volatile, increasing the need to adopt an efficient market design. In most respects, the US standard market design is likely to give better results than the European models.



Market Design with Centralized Wind Power Management: Handling Low-predictability in Intraday Markets

Arthur Henriot

Year: 2014
Volume: Volume 35
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.35.1.6
View Abstract

Abstract:
This paper evaluates the benefits for an agent managing the wind power production within a given power system to trade in the intraday electricity markets, in a context of massive penetration of intermittent renewables. Using a simple analytical model we find out that there are situations when it will be costly for this agent to adjust its positions in intraday markets. A first key factor is of course the technical flexibility of the power system: if highly flexible units provide energy at very low prices in real-time there is no point in participating into intraday markets. Besides, we identify the way wind production forecast errors evolve constitutes another essential, although less obvious, key-factor. Both the value of the standard error and the correlation between forecasts errors at different gate closures will determine the strategy of the wind power manager. Policy implications of our results are the following: low liquidity in intraday markets will be unavoidable for given sets of technical parameters, it will also be inefficient in some cases to set discrete auctions in intraday markets, and compelling players to adjust their position in intraday markets will then generate additional costs.



The Visible Hand: Ensuring Optimal Investment in Electric Power Generation

Thomas-Olivier Léautier

Year: 2016
Volume: Volume 37
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.37.2.tlea
View Abstract

Abstract:
This article formally analyzes the various corrective mechanisms that have been proposed and implemented to alleviate underinvestment in electric power generation. It yields three main analytical findings. First, physical capacity certificates markets implemented in the United States restore optimal investment if and only if they are supplemented with a "no short sale" condition, i.e., producers can not sell more certificates than they have installed capacity. Then, they raise producers' profits beyond the imperfect competition level. Second, financial reliability options, proposed in many markets, are effective at curbing market power, although they fail to fully restore investment incentives. If "no short sale" conditions are added, both physical capacity certificates and financial reliability options are equivalent. Finally, a single market for energy and operating reserves subject to a price cap is isomorphic to a simple energy market. Standard peak-load pricing analysis applies: under-investment occurs, unless production is perfectly competitive and the cap is never binding.



Power markets with Renewables: New perspectives for the European Target Model

Karsten Neuhoff, Sophia Wolter and Sebastian Schwenen

Year: 2016
Volume: Volume 37
Number: Bollino-Madlener Special Issue
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.37.2.kneu
View Abstract

Abstract:
We discuss at the European example how power market design evolves with increasing shares of intermittent renewables. Short-term markets and system operation have to accommodate for the different needs of renewable and conventional generation assets and flexibility options. This can be achieved by pooling resources over larger geographic areas through common auction platforms, realizing the full flexibility of different assets based on multi-part bids while efficiently allocating scarce network resources. For investment and re-investment choices different technology groups like wind and solar versus fossil fuel based generation may warrant a different treatment - reflecting differing levels of publicly accessible information, requirements for grid infrastructure, types of strategic choices relevant for the sector and shares of capital cost in overall generation costs. We discuss opportunities for such a differentiated treatment while maintaining synergies in short-term system operation.



Renewable Electricity and Backup Capacities: An (Un-) Resolvable Problem?

Aaron Praktiknjo and Georg Erdmann

Year: 2016
Volume: Volume 37
Number: Bollino-Madlener Special Issue
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.37.SI2.apra
View Abstract

Abstract:
Public support for renewables has led to an unexpected investment momentum in Germany. A consequence is a reduction in wholesale electricity prices, the so-called merit order effect of renewables. We estimate this reduction using an econometric approach and provide a quantitative overview of the financial situation of conventional generators. Our results indicate that investments in new conventional capacities are economically unviable. With the current market design, this situation is going to impact supply security, at least in the long run. A popular approach to address this issue is the introduction of additional public support for conventional power plants. However, we believe that subsidizing renewable and conventional capacities contradicts the idea of a liberal market. We present two alternatives: State control of investments in renewables through auctions (as proposed by the European Commission), and a premium paid to representatives of the demand side (such as retailers) in dependence of their shares of renewables.



The relevance of grid expansion under zonal markets

Joachim Bertsch, Tom Brown, Simeon Hagspiel, and Lisa Just

Year: 2017
Volume: Volume 38
Number: Number 5
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5547/01956574.38.5.jber
View Abstract

Abstract:
The European electricity market design is based on zonal markets with uniform prices. Hence, no differentiated locational price signals are provided within these zones. If intra-zonal congestion occurs due to missing grid expansion, this market design reveals its inherent incompleteness, and might lead to severe short and long-term distortions. In this paper, we study these distortions with a focus on the impact of restricted grid expansion under zonal markets. Therefore, we use a long-term model of the European electricity system and restrict the allowed expansion of the transmission grid per decade. We find that the combination of an incomplete market design and restricted grid expansion leads to a misallocation of generation capacities and the inability to transport electricity to where it is needed. This results in an energy imbalance in some regions of up to 2-3% and difficulty when reaching envisaged political targets in the power sector.



What future(s) for liberalized electricity markets: efficient, equitable or innovative?

David M Newbery

Year: 2018
Volume: Volume 39
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.39.1.dnew
View Abstract

Abstract:
Well-designed electricity liberalization has delivered effciency gains, but political risks of decarbonizing the sector have undermined investment incentives in en-ergy-only markets, while poorly designed regulated tariffs have increased the cost of accommodating renewables. The paper sets out principles from theory and public economics to guide market design, capacity remuneration, renewables support and regulatory tariff setting, with an illustration from a high capital cost low variable cost electricity system. Such characteristics are likely to become more prevalent with increasing renewables penetration, where poor regulation is already threatening current utility business models. The appendix develops and applies a method for determining the subsidy justifed by learning spillovers from solar PV.




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