Facebook LinkedIn Instagram Twitter
Shop
Search
Begin New Search
Proceed to Checkout

Search Results for All:
(Showing results 1 to 3 of 3)



A Game Theoretic Model for Generation Capacity Adequacy: Comparison Between Investment Incentive Mechanisms in Electricity Markets

Mohamed Haikel Khalfallah

Year: 2011
Volume: Volume 32
Number: Number 4
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol32-No4-7
View Abstract

Abstract:
In this paper we study the problem of long-term capacity adequacy in electricity markets. We implement a dynamic model in which firms compete for investment and electricity production under imperfect Cournot competition. The main aim of this work is to compare three investment incentive mechanisms: reliability options, forward capacity market and capacity payments. Apart from the oligopoly case, we also analyze collusion and monopoly cases. Dynamic programming is used to deal with the stochastic environment of the market and mixed complementarity problem and variational inequality formulations are employed to find a solution to the game. The main finding of this study is that market-based mechanisms would be the most cost-efficient mechanism for assuring long-term system capacity adequacy. Moreover, generators would exert market power when introducing capacity payments. Finally, compared with a Cournot oligopoly, collusion and monopolistic situations lead to more installed capacities with market-based mechanisms and increase consumers' payments.



Blowing in the Wind: Vanishing Payoffs of a Tolling Agreement for Natural-gas-fired Generation of Electricity in Texas

Chi-Keung Woo, Ira Horowitz, Brian Horii, Ren Orans, and Jay Zarnikau

Year: 2012
Volume: Volume 33
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol33-No1-8
View Abstract

Abstract:
We use a large Texas database to quantify the effect of rising wind generation on the payoffs of a tolling agreement for natural-gas-fired generation of electricity. We find that while a 20% increase in wind generation may not have a statistically-significant effect, a 40% increase can reduce the agreement's average payoff by 8% to 13%. Since natural-gas-fired generation is necessary for integrating large amounts of intermittent wind energy into an electric grid, our finding contributes to the policy debate of capacity adequacy and system reliability in a restructured electricity market that will see large-scale wind-generation development.Keywords: Wind generation, Tolling agreement, Spark spread option, Investment incentive



The Visible Hand: Ensuring Optimal Investment in Electric Power Generation

Thomas-Olivier Léautier

Year: 2016
Volume: Volume 37
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.37.2.tlea
View Abstract

Abstract:
This article formally analyzes the various corrective mechanisms that have been proposed and implemented to alleviate underinvestment in electric power generation. It yields three main analytical findings. First, physical capacity certificates markets implemented in the United States restore optimal investment if and only if they are supplemented with a "no short sale" condition, i.e., producers can not sell more certificates than they have installed capacity. Then, they raise producers' profits beyond the imperfect competition level. Second, financial reliability options, proposed in many markets, are effective at curbing market power, although they fail to fully restore investment incentives. If "no short sale" conditions are added, both physical capacity certificates and financial reliability options are equivalent. Finally, a single market for energy and operating reserves subject to a price cap is isomorphic to a simple energy market. Standard peak-load pricing analysis applies: under-investment occurs, unless production is perfectly competitive and the cap is never binding.





Begin New Search
Proceed to Checkout

 





function toggleAbstract(id) { alert(id); }