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(Showing results 1 to 8 of 8)



Fuel Efficiency Incentives for Cars: Oil Import Vulnerability Reduction

Paul P. Craig

Year: 1984
Volume: Volume 5
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol5-No1-9
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Abstract:
U.S. oil imports have dropped from a peak of 8.9 mbd (million barrels per day) in 1977 (6.2 mbd from OPEC countries) to 5 mbd in 1982. Simultaneously, U. S. demand for oil has dropped from 18.4 mbd to 16 mbd, and our dependency on imports has dropped from 43 percent to 37 percent. Unfortunately, the costs of energy imports continued to climb, from $8 billion in 1973 to $44 billion in 1977 to $81 billion in 1981 (Department of Energy [DOE], 1982).



Exploration Risks and Mineral Taxation: How Fiscal Regimes Affect Exploration Incentives

T. R. Stauffer and John C. Gault

Year: 1985
Volume: Volume 6
Number: Special Issue
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol6-NoSI-10
No Abstract



The Failure of Solar Tax Incentives: A Dynamic Analysis

G. Thomas Sav

Year: 1986
Volume: Volume 7
Number: Number 3
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol7-No3-4
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Abstract:
In recent years we have witnessed governmental attempts to acceler-ate the stock demand for energy-saving durables with financial incentives implemented through the tax mechanism. At the federal level, income tax credits for the purchase of energy-saving durable stocks were introduced through the Energy Tax Act of 1978 (Public Law 95-618). In addition, many states have enacted their own energy-saving tax incentive legislation. A substantial body of this tax legislation has been aimed at accelerating substitution of solar-produced energy for conventional, nonrenewable energy resources in the residential and commercial building sectors. Along these lines, the bulk of engineering (so-called life-cycle) cost studies accompanying much of this legislation predicted that solar tax incentives would generate widespread market penetration with little or no delay.' However, casual observation reveals that tax-induced solar energy substitutions have not been widespread.This paper presents a dynamic model of investment decisions in solar processes-a model that captures the effect of tax legislation aimed at accelerating market penetration of solar energy.



Incentives for Energy Conservation in the Commercial and Industrial Sectors

Kenneth E. Train

Year: 1988
Volume: Volume 9
Number: Number 3
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol9-No3-5
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Abstract:
The commercial and industrial sectors consume over half of the United States' electricity. Several studies have indicated that this consumption can be reduced by as much as 40 to 50 percent through cost-effective energy conservation (e.g., Dubin, 1977; Taussig, 1978). Examples of conservation actions include installation of low voltage lamps, more effective placement of lights, electronic controls for air conditioners and lights, evaporative precoolers on air conditioners and refrigerators, heat recovery systems, and so on. These actions have been found to offer, on average, exceptionally good rates of return, both to the firms that take the actions and from a social perspective (Train and Ignelzi, 1987).



How large is the Owner-Renter Divide in Energy Efficient Technology? Evidence from an OECD cross-section

Chandra Kiran B. Krishnamurthy and Bengt Kriström

Year: 2015
Volume: Volume 36
Number: Number 4
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.36.4.ckri
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Abstract:
When the agent making an investment decision is different from the one bearing the costs of the decision, the outcome (energy usage, here) is socially sub-optimal, a scenario known in the energy efficient technology case as "split incentive" effect. Using a sample of households (from a survey conducted in 2011) from 11 OECD countries, this paper investigates the magnitude of the "split incentive" effect between home occupants who are owners and those who are renters. A wide variety of energy-related "technologies" are considered: appliances, energy efficient bulbs, insulation, heat thermostat, solar panels, ground source heat pumps and wind turbines. Mean difference in patterns of access to these technologies are consistent with the "split incentives" hypothesis. Regression results suggest that, even after controlling for the sizeable differences in observed characteristics, owners are substantially more likely to have access to energy efficient appliances and to better insulation as well as to heat thermostats. For relatively immobile investments such as wind turbines and ground source heat pumps, we find no differences between owners and renters.



The Implicit Carbon Price of Renewable Energy Incentives in Germany

Claudio Marcantonini, A. Denny Ellerman

Year: 2015
Volume: Volume 36
Number: Number 4
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.36.4.cmar
View Abstract

Abstract:
This research analyzes the German experience in promoting Renewable Energy (RE) as an instrument to reduce GHG emissions. It identifies the cost of reducing CO2 emissions in the power sector through the promotion of wind and solar energy for the years 2006-2010. A RE carbon surcharge and an implicit carbon price due to the RE incentives are calculated. The RE carbon surcharge is the ratio of the net cost of the RE over the CO2 emission reductions resulting from actual RE injections into the electric power system. The implicit carbon price is the sum of the RE carbon surcharge and the EUA price. Results show that for the period analyzed both the RE carbon surcharge and the implicit carbon price of wind are on the order of tens of euro per tonne of CO2, while for solar are on the order of hundreds of euro per tonne of CO2.



Free Riding, Upsizing, and Energy Efficiency Incentives in Maryland Homes

Anna Alberini, Will Gans, and Charles Towe

Year: 2016
Volume: Volume 37
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.37.1.aalb
View Abstract

Abstract:
We use a unique dataset that combines an original survey of households, information about the structural characteristics of their homes, utility-provided electricity usage records and program participation status, to study the uptake of energy efficiency incentives and their effect on residential electricity consumption. Attention is restricted to homes where heating and cooling is provided exclusively by air-source heat pumps. We deploy a difference-in-difference study design and find that replacing a heat pump with a new one does reduce electricity usage by 8% on average. The effect differs dramatically across households based upon whether they receive an incentive towards the purchase of a new heat pump. Among incentive recipients, the effect is small, and the larger the incentive, the smaller the reduction in electricity usage. These findings suggest that capital costs are incorporated into the (long-term) cost of energy, generating an apparent rebound effect that is much more pronounced for incentive recipients.



The Visible Hand: Ensuring Optimal Investment in Electric Power Generation

Thomas-Olivier Léautier

Year: 2016
Volume: Volume 37
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.37.2.tlea
View Abstract

Abstract:
This article formally analyzes the various corrective mechanisms that have been proposed and implemented to alleviate underinvestment in electric power generation. It yields three main analytical findings. First, physical capacity certificates markets implemented in the United States restore optimal investment if and only if they are supplemented with a "no short sale" condition, i.e., producers can not sell more certificates than they have installed capacity. Then, they raise producers' profits beyond the imperfect competition level. Second, financial reliability options, proposed in many markets, are effective at curbing market power, although they fail to fully restore investment incentives. If "no short sale" conditions are added, both physical capacity certificates and financial reliability options are equivalent. Finally, a single market for energy and operating reserves subject to a price cap is isomorphic to a simple energy market. Standard peak-load pricing analysis applies: under-investment occurs, unless production is perfectly competitive and the cap is never binding.





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