Abstract:
Of all the changes in the oil industry over the past 20 years, the most radical have taken place in the market, and in the formation of prices. These are both a response to and a cause of changes in industry structure. From plannable supplies at relatively stable prices, companies have had to learn to handle short term supplies in condition of extreme volatility. Management of the resulting price risk has become a central role of the companies' supply departments, and the use of paper markets (forward, futures and derivatives) has become an integral part of price formation. It is not impossible that the changes would be reversed, if the conditions that brought them into being-surplus production and de-integrated supply structures-were reversed in conditions of scarcity, but it is highly unlikely. Far more likely, is that risk management and the use of paper markets will increase in importance.

Abstract:
Allaz and Vila (1993) have shown that forward markets could mitigate market power and improve efficiency. This paper shows that efficiency-improving effect of forward markets is sensitive to the assumption that market participants behave like rational expectations agents when forecasting prices. The existence of forward contracts could increase spot prices and hurt efficiency if buyers engage in bilateral forward contracts and forward rates are influenced by historic prices. These findings have important policy implications for the electricity industry.

Abstract:
This paper analyses a wholesale electricity market with supply function competition. Trade in the forward and spot markets is represented by a two-stage game, and its subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) is characterized. It is verified that increased forward sales of a producer constitute a credible commitment to aggressive spot market bidding. The paper identifies market situations when this pro-competitive commitment is unilaterally profitable for the producer. It is also proven that a producer has incentives to sell in the forward market in order to reduce competitors' forward sales, which softens their spot market offers.

Abstract:
Tradable allowances have received considerable attention in recent years. One emerging issue is their interaction with electricity markets. This paper extends the model of Allaz and Vila (1993) by incorporating emissions trading with forward and spot markets for electricity. We focus on the effects of strategic forward position and initial allowances allocation on the equilibrium outcomes. We find that firms with a dirty portfolio would have stronger incentives to take a long position in the forward market to raise the electricity price. Increasing the amount of allowances assigned to clean firms leads to a reduction in electricity and allowance prices. Keywords: Cap-and-Trade, Market Power, Forward Contract

Abstract:
Financial transmission rights (FTR) are financial products that entitle their holder to receive a payment based on the degree of congestion in a transmission system. In many liberalized electricity markets, FTR are sold at auction by the local electricity system operator. This paper addresses several questions about the performance of FTR auctions in Ontario's restructured electricity market, including whether auction market clearing prices approximate realized payouts and whether there is any evidence that the competitiveness of auctions, as measured by the number of bidders, affects the forward market unbiasedness or informational efficiency of the auctions. The paper finds that the auction process is inefficient in the sense that market clearing prices are substantially and systematically lower than realized payouts, resulting in substantial transfers away from consumers. However, there is some evidence that the auction market is more efficient when there are three or more bidders.

Abstract:
We present a new model for pricing electricity swaps. Two general factors affect contracts but unique risk elements affect each contract. General factors are average swap prices and deterministic trend-seasonal components, and unique elements are forward premiums. Innovations follow MNIG distributions. We estimate the model with data from the European Energy Exchange. The model outperforms four competitors, both in in-sample valuation and in out-of-sample forecasting, and in fitting the term structure of volatilities by market segments. Competitor models are (i) diffusion spot prices, (ii) jump-diffusion spot prices with time dependent volatility, (iii) HJM-based and (iv) Levy multifactor model with NIG distributions. Value-at-Risk measures based on normality strongly underestimate tail risk but our model gives estimates that are more exact.