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Notes - A Comparison of Original Costs and Trended Original Cost Ratemaking Methods

Robert E. Anderson and David E. Mead

Year: 1983
Volume: Volume 4
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol4-No2-11
No Abstract









Notes - Sense and Nonsense About World Oil

M. A. Adelman

Year: 1984
Volume: Volume 5
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol5-No1-13
No Abstract



Notes - A Comparison of the Costs and the Results in the On/Offshore Search for Oil and Gas

Jon A. Rasmussen and Michael J. Piette

Year: 1984
Volume: Volume 5
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol5-No1-11
No Abstract



Notes - Public Willingness to Invest in Household Weatherization

Marvin E. Olsen and Christopher Cluett

Year: 1984
Volume: Volume 5
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol5-No1-12
No Abstract







Competitive Bidding In Electricity Markets: A Survey

Richard P. Rozek

Year: 1989
Volume: Volume 10
Number: Number 4
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol10-No4-8
View Abstract

Abstract:
A number of states as well as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission have been considering whether traditional regulatory regimes in electricity and natural gas markets should be replaced with competitive bidding systems. This shift is designed to yield a more efficient allocation of energy resources within the existing legal framework The paper examines both the theoretical basis and empirical evidence on bidding processes in light of the characteristics of energy markets, especially electricity markets. It then discusses the extent to which one can draw policy conclusions about designing specific bidding processes for these markets. It concludes that given the underlying complexity of the products involved, the optimal system for procuring power should include a mix of bidding negotiation and utility construction.



Deregulation and Common Carriage in the Nordic Power System

Kjetil Bjorvatn and Sigve Tjotta

Year: 1993
Volume: Volume14
Number: Number 4
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol14-No4-4
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Abstract:
In this paper we analyze deregulation and integration of the Nordic markets for electric power. Nordic trade in electricity is controlled by national monopolies and is confined to occasional power. No transit is allowed. Due to its central location, Sweden plays a crucial role in the Nordic electricity market. For Sweden, common carriage without some form of compensation is not likely to be an acceptable form of integration. The Shapley values reveal that compensatory demands are likely to be quite large-a fact which might complicate negotiations on the introduction of common carriage. An alternative to common carriagewould be for Sweden to exert market power through monopolistic pricing of its transmission services. Government involvement may be necessary to secure a successful integration of international electricity markets.



Market Structure and the Price of Electricity: An Ex Ante Analysis of the Deregulated Swedish Electricity Market

Bo Andersson and Lars Bergman

Year: 1995
Volume: Volume16
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol16-No2-5
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Abstract:
Following new legislation the Swedish electricity market is about to be deregulated. The new system is designed to ensure competition introduction and supply. The main motive for deregulation is to increase competition and thus achieve lower market prices. A possible threat to this outcome is the high degree of concentration on the seller side that characterizes the Swedish electricity market. In this paper we show that given the current structure of firms on the supply side, deregulation is not a sufficient condition for lower equilibrium prices in the electricity market. We use a numerical model to explore the quantitative relation between the Cournot-equilibrium price, the number of firms, and the size distribution of firms in the Swedish electricity market. We compute equilibrium electricity prices and a welfare measure in order to quantify the effect of asymmetric market concentration on competition.



Marginal Capacity Costs of Electricity Distribution and Demand for Distributed Generation

Chi-Keung Woo, Debra Lloyd-Zannetti, Ren Orans, Brian Horii and Grayson Heffner

Year: 1995
Volume: Volume16
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol16-No2-6
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Abstract:
Marginal costs of electricity vary by time and location. Past researchers attributed these variations to factors related to electricity generation, transmission and distribution. Past authors, however, did not fully analyze the large variations in marginal distribution capacity costs (MDCC) by area and time. Thus, the objectives of this paper are as follows: (1) to show that large MDCC variations exist within a utility's service territory; (2) to demonstrate inter-utility variations in MDCC; and (3) to demonstrate the usefulness of these costs in determining demand for distributed generation (DG).



Power Markets and Market Power

David M. Newbery

Year: 1995
Volume: Volume16
Number: Number 3
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol16-No3-2
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Abstract:
Privatization was intended to make the English bulk electricity market sufficiently competitive to avoid the need for regulation, but two generators set the spot price over 90% of the time though they supply less than 60% of total electricity generated. Their market power depends on their share of non-baseload plant, and agreed divestiture here should increase competition. The paper argues that the contract market, which makes entry contestable, will ensure that longrun average prices are kept at the competitive entry level, with increased competition mainly increasing medium-run volatility and short-run economic efficiency.



An Institutional Design for an Electricity Contract Market with Central Dispatch

Hung-po Chao and Stephen Peck

Year: 1997
Volume: Volume18
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol18-No1-4
View Abstract

Abstract:
In Chao and Peck (1996), we introduced a new approach to the design of an efficient electricity market that incorporates externalities due to loop flows. This approach enables an innovative flow-based bidding scheme for pricing transmission services. In the short term, due to some technological constraints, a hybrid institutional structure that encompasses a decentralized contract market (via the system operator) is necessary for implementation. In this paper, we present an incentive scheme that fosters efficiency and reliability within such art institutional structure. An essential ingredient is that the system operator provides all electricity traders choices of priority insurance against interruptions. We show how this scheme will ensure the integrity of the electrical contract market and provide the system operator incentives to maintain system reliability in all efficient manner in real-time dispatch.



Implementation of Priority Insurance in Power Exchange Markets

Robert Wilson

Year: 1997
Volume: Volume18
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol18-No1-5
View Abstract

Abstract:
Traders in a power exchange can use insurance to hedge against losses from curtailment by the system operator. If the system operator is liable for these reimbursements then its incentives encourage efficient real-time dispatch. This paper reviews the details of implementing such a scheme when third-party insurers offer insurance in an auxiliary competitive market, or the power exchange operates as a mutual insurance association of the traders. Because higher reimbursements entail higher service priorities, the actuarial premium for pure insurance must be accompanied by a surcharge for service priority. The amount of this surcharge can be inferred from the price of pure insurance. The Appendix shows that omission of this surcharge distorts traders' incentives in the power exchange.






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