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Joint Energy and Economic Optimization: A Proposition

Donald I. Hertzmark

Year: 1981
Volume: Volume 2
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol2-No1-5
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Abstract:
This article gives some analytical results of an attempt to optimize economic and thermodynamic efficiency simultaneously. The attempt to impose complete mathematical rationality and consistency on the pricing of energy commodities fails. since it is not possible to weigh consistently purely physical efficiency measures. much less social factors. This means that energy or entropy theories of value must suffer the fate of other single-factor theories. such as the labor theory of value. Such a single-factor theory cannot adequately handle such questions as fixed capital, subjective utility. and contradictory constraints on economic choice.



The Diminishing Role of Regulation in the Natural Gas Industry

Charles G. Slalon

Year: 1986
Volume: Volume 7
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol7-No2-1
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Abstract:
The natural gas industry grew to maturity under a system of strong monopoly power of pipelines and local distribution companies (LDCs) and balkanized markets at wellheads and burnertips. Recent developments in the industry, especially phased deregulation of wellhead prices implemented by the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA) and competition induced by the gas bubble since 1982, have somewhat reduced pipeline monopoly power in some markets. Considerations of economic efficiency and economic justice now require that competitive forces be strengthened further. The FERC's Order 436 was an attempt to do that.



Do Volatile Oil Prices and Consumer Adjustment Costs Justify An Additional Petroleum Tax?

Franz Wirl

Year: 1990
Volume: Volume 11
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol11-No1-12
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Abstract:
A number of papers have considered different reasons for defending or refuting additional crude oil taxation directly or indirectly via an import duty. Hogan-Rahmani (1987) refer to "national security of supply" in advocating an oil import fee. This relates to another work of the authors (see Hogan-Rahmani-Jorgenson-Cooper (1988)), in which they state that energy demand (and in particular U.S. oil dependence) will dramatically rise due to prevailing low crude oil prices. An extensive discussion of this controversial issue has gone on in this journal, e.g., see Wright (1988), Singer (1988), Huntington (1988) reviewing the DOE report on Energy Security and the "American Debate" by Curlee, Tussing and Vactor (1988), Nesbitt and Choi (1988), and the defense of Broadman and Hogan (1988). Bizer and Stuart (1987) address a different aspect of an oil import fee, namely as an instrument of public finance. However, they dismiss import duties as an inefficient instrument for raising revenues.



An Empirical Test of An Electric Utility Under An Allowable Rate of Return

George J.Y. Hsu and Tser-Yieth Chen

Year: 1990
Volume: Volume 11
Number: Number 3
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol11-No3-4
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Abstract:
This paper examines a utility's behaviour under the regulatory constraint of a maximum allowable rate of return. The golden rule of production efficiency, i.e. that the marginal productivities of the input factors are equal, is used as our criterion to examine the utility's economic behaviour. Our case study uses a translogproduction function to investigate the production efficiency of the Taiwan Power Company. Two null hypotheses are tested with the results obtained supporting the existence of the A-f effect. The implications of the results are discussed, a comparison with previous studies is presented, and suggestions for further research are made.



Limits on the Economic Effectiveness of a Carbon Tax

Robert K Kaufmann

Year: 1991
Volume: Volume 12
Number: Number 4
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol12-No4-9
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Abstract:
Much of the discussion regarding policies to reduce the emission of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases focuses on least-cost strategies. Policies that minimize costs are desirable because they are economically more efficient than policies that are based on a command and control strategy (Gasloms and Stram, 1990). Among the many least-cost policies now under consideration, a carbon tax has received the most attention. As currently envisioned, a carbon tax would be levied on users of fossil fuels according to the amount of carbon that is emitted when the fuel is burned. Because the combustion of coal emits more CO2 per heat unit than oil, which emits more CO2 per heat unit than natural gas, the tax on coal would be larger than the tax on oil, which would be larger than the tax on natural gas.The fuel specific charges that would be imposed by a carbon tax are a popular policy option because many believe that a carbon tax will reduce emissions of carbon dioxide in an economically efficient manner. That is, a carbon tax will reduce the use of fossil fuels by spurring technical change and by inducing the substitution of capital, labour, and non-energy materials. Furthermore, a carbon tax will reduce emissions of CO2 by inducing substitution of fuels that emit less CO2 per heat unit. The reduction in emissions that is achieved by interfuel substitution is caused by the differences in the size of the tax on coal, oil, and natural gas. Because the tax on coal is largest, the price of coal will rise relative to oil and natural gas and users will substitute oil or natural gas for coal.



The Effects of NAFTA on the Environment

Robert K. Kaufmann, Peter Pauly and Julie Sweitzer

Year: 1993
Volume: Volume14
Number: Number 3
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol14-No3-10
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Abstract:
This paper reviews the impacts of NAFTA on the environment. Discussion focuses on the degree to which economic conditions in Canada, Mexico, and United States are consistent with the assumptions on which the benefits of free trade are based. Specifically, we discuss how NAFTA may exacerbate or alleviate the environmental impacts of economic activity via environmental externalities, the rate and efficiency of resource extraction, increased income, increased trade and transportation, and harmonizing environmental policy among nations at different levels of economic development. Because of difficulties in comparing different types of environmental impacts, we do not offer a conclusion about the overall effect of NAFTA on the environment, positive or negative. Rather, we argue that NAFTA must preserve the rights of all affected parties to intervene so that the costs and benefits associated with a particular project that arises out of increased trade can be evaluated on a case by case basis in the same imperfect way that such issues are addressed within the confines of a single nation.



The Greenhouse Debate: Econonmic Efficiency, Burden Sharing and Hedging Strategies

Alan Manne and Richard Richels

Year: 1995
Volume: Volume16
Number: Number 4
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol16-No4-1
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Abstract:
We address the issue of economic efficiency as it relates to climate change. We begin with a classical cost-benefit perspective. Mat is, we focus on emission trajectories which maximize net benefits. We then examine the consequences of adopting alternative decision making paradigms-for example, those based on limiting atmospheric concentrations so as to achieve an "ample margin of safety." We also consider the regional distribution of costs and benefits under alternative burden sharing schemes. Although the climate issue is often viewed from a global perspective, international negotiators will be acutely interested in how damages and mitigation costs might be distributed among individual regions. Finally, we address the issue of decision making under uncertainty. The challenge confronting today's policy makers is to identify it sensible hedging strategy-one that balances the risks of waiting against those of premature action.





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