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Regional Trade Agreements, Emissions Bubbles, and Carbon Tariff Harmonization

Yazid Dissou and Muhammad Shahid Siddiqui

Year: 2013
Volume: Volume 34
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.34.2.3
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Abstract:
In the context of sub-global participation in greenhouse gas mitigation efforts, this paper investigates the effectiveness of a Canada-U.S. emissions bubble under their existing regional trade agreement. It also explores the potential economic impact of carbon tariff harmonization through the implementation of a common Canada-U.S. external border tariff adjustment as a mean to address competitiveness issues. Using a multi-region, multi-sector computable general equilibrium model, the paper finds that the creation of an emission bubble between the two countries could improve efficiency. The findings also suggest that a carbon tariff harmonization policy could give rise to distributional issues among Annex I regions and could fail to mitigate the negative competitiveness impacts of carbon abatement policies.



Did the EU ETS Make a Difference? An Empirical Assessment Using Lithuanian Firm-Level Data

Jurate Jaraite-Kažukauske and Corrado Di Maria

Year: 2016
Volume: Volume 37
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.37.2.jjar
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Abstract:
We use a panel dataset of about 5,000 Lithuanian firms between 2003 and 2010, to assess the impact of the EU ETS on the environmental and economic performance of participating firms. Using a matching methodology, we are able to estimate the causal impact of EU ETS participation on CO2 emissions, CO2 intensity, investment behaviour and profitability of participating firms. Our results show that ETS participation did not lead to a reduction in CO2 emissions, while we identify a slight improvement in CO2 intensity. ETS participants are shown to have retired part of their less efficient capital stock, and to have made modest additional investments from 2010. We also show that the EU ETS did not represent a drag on the profitability of participating firms.



Carbon Leakage and Competitiveness of Cement and Steel Industries Under the EU ETS: Much Ado About Nothing

Frédéric Branger, Philippe Quirion, Julien Chevallier

Year: 2016
Volume: Volume 37
Number: Number 3
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.37.3.fbra
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Abstract:
In a world of uneven climate policies, concerns about carbon leakage and competitiveness for heavy industries are the main arguments against the implementation of ambitious climate policies. In this paper we investigate a potential competitiveness-driven operational carbon leakage due to the European Union Emissions Trading scheme (EU ETS). We focus on two energy-intensive sectors, cement and steel, and phases I and II of the EU ETS. From a simple analytical model, we derive an equation linking net imports of cement and steel to local and foreign demand along with carbon price. We then econometrically estimate this relation both with ARIMA regression and Prais-Winsten estimation, finding that local and foreign demand are robust drivers of trade flows. We find no significant effect of the carbon price on net imports of steel and cement. We conclude that there is no evidence of carbon leakage in these sectors, at least in the short run.



Ontario's Auction Market for Financial Transmission Rights: An Analysis of its Efficiency

Derek E. H. Olmstead

Year: 2018
Volume: Volume 39
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.39.1.dolm
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Abstract:
Financial transmission rights (FTR) are financial products that entitle their holder to receive a payment based on the degree of congestion in a transmission system. In many liberalized electricity markets, FTR are sold at auction by the local electricity system operator. This paper addresses several questions about the performance of FTR auctions in Ontario's restructured electricity market, including whether auction market clearing prices approximate realized payouts and whether there is any evidence that the competitiveness of auctions, as measured by the number of bidders, affects the forward market unbiasedness or informational efficiency of the auctions. The paper finds that the auction process is inefficient in the sense that market clearing prices are substantially and systematically lower than realized payouts, resulting in substantial transfers away from consumers. However, there is some evidence that the auction market is more efficient when there are three or more bidders.





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