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Clubs, Ceilings and CDM: Macroeconomics of Compliance with the Kyoto Protocol

Johannes Bollen, Arjen Gielen, and Hans Timmer

Year: 1999
Volume: Volume 20
Number: Special Issue - The Cost of the Kyoto Protocol: A Multi-Model Evaluation
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol20-NoSI-8
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Abstract:
The Kyoto Protocol suggests that imposing restrictions on emission trade among Annex I countries may force domestic action in each country. The Protocol also mentions the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) as On instrument to extend trade to countries outside Annex I. We analyze both restrictions on and extensions of permit trade among Annex I countries. We use the applied general equilibrium model WorldScan in this analysis. We show that, compared to unrestricted trade, the USA tends to gain from restrictions on emission trade while other OECD countries are likely to be harmed. We further show that restrictions probably do not prevent so-called hot air in the former Soviet Union from being used. On the contrary, restrictions tend to increase global emissions. Finally, we conclude that CDM can be an efficient option to reduce abatement costs, but certain conditions should be fulfilled to avoid severe carbon leakage.





Should Developing Countries Take on Binding Commitments in a Climate Agreement? An Assessment of Gains and Uncertainty

Steffen Kallbekken and Hege Westskog

Year: 2005
Volume: Volume 26
Number: Number 3
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol26-No3-2
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Abstract:
In this paper we explore whether efficiency gains obtained by developing countries participation in emission trading could offset the economic risks that would be incurred by taking on binding commitments when future emissions are uncertain. Such commitments would allow developing countries to participate in emissions trading, which has significantly lower transaction costs than the present Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). However, because future emissions cannot be known, commitments can become more costly for the developing countries than expected. Using a dynamic computable general equilibrium model, we analyse whether the efficiency gains obtained by participating in emissions trading can offset this risk. We find that the efficiency gains that can be obtained by developing countries might not be very large compared to the risks they incur. Developing countries might therefore have good reasons not to embrace binding commitments in order to participate in �cap and trade� emissions trading.



Emissions Trading, CDM, JI, and More: The Climate Strategy of the EU

Gernot Klepper and Sonja Peterson

Year: 2006
Volume: Volume 27
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol27-No2-1
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Abstract:
The objective of this paper is to assess the likely allocation effects of the current climate protection strategy as it is laid out in the National Allocation Plans (NAPs) for the European Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). The multi-regional, multi-sectoral CGE-model DART is used to simulate the effects of the current policies in the year 2012 when the Kyoto targets need to be met. Different scenarios are simulated in order to highlight the effects of the grandfathering of permits to energy-intensive installations, the use of the project-based mechanisms (CDM and JI), and the restriction imposed by the supplementarity criterion.





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