Begin New Search
Proceed to Checkout

Search Results for All:
(Showing results 1 to 3 of 3)

Merchant Storage Investment in a Restructured Electricity Industry

Afzal S. Siddiqui, Ramteen Sioshansi, and Antonio J. Conejo

Year: 2019
Volume: Volume 40
Number: Number 4
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.40.4.asid
View Abstract

Restructuring and liberalisation of the electricity industry creates opportunities for investment in energy storage, which could be undertaken by a profit-maximising merchant storage operator. Because such a firm is concerned solely with maximising its own profit, the resulting storage-investment decision may be socially suboptimal (or detrimental). This paper develops a bi-level model of an imperfectly competitive electricity market. The modelling framework assumes electricity-generation and storage-operations decisions at the lower level and storage investment at the upper level. Our analytical results demonstrate that a relatively high (low) amount of market power in the generation sector leads to low (high) storage-capacity investment by the profit-maximising storage operator relative to a welfare maximiser. This can result in net social welfare losses with a profit-maximising storage operator compared to a no-storage case. Moreover, there are guaranteed to be net social welfare losses with a profit-maximising storage operator if the generation sector is sufficiently competitive. Using a charge on generation ramping between off- and on-peak periods, we induce the profit-maximising storage operator to invest in the same level of storage capacity as the welfare-maximising firm. Such a ramping charge can increase social welfare above the levels that are attained with a welfare-maximising storage operator.

Economic and Environmental Consequences of Market Power in the South-East Europe Regional Electricity Market

Verena Viskovic, Yihsu Chen, Afzal S. Siddiqui, and Makoto Tanaka

Year: 2021
Volume: Volume 42
Number: Number 6
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.42.6.vvis
View Abstract

Market power in electricity and emission-permit markets in the South-East Europe Regional Electricity Market, which comprises both EU members subject to the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) and non-EU members exempt from it, affects social welfare and carbon leakage. We examine its impact under three market settings: perfect competition (PC) and two leader-follower versions, in which a leader can exert market power in either the electricity market (S-T) or both the electricity and permit markets (S). Under PC, carbon leakage is equal to 11%-39% of ETS emission reduction depending on the cap stringency. Generally, in S-T, the leader's capacity withholding results in ETS emissions below and non-ETS emissions above PC levels. However, carbon leakage is lower vis-à-vis PC as the ETS emission reduction offsets the non-ETS emission increase. Finally, in S, the leader's propensity to lower the permit price increases ETS emissions and exacerbates carbon leakage compared to S-T.

The Economics of Demand-side Flexibility in Distribution Grids

Athir Nouicer, Leonardo Meeus, and Erik Delarue

Year: 2023
Volume: Volume 44
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.44.1.anou
View Abstract

To avoid unnecessary distribution network investments, distribution tariffs are expected to become more cost-reflective, and DSOs are expected to procure flexibility. This will provide an implicit and an explicit incentive to provide demand-side flexibility. In this paper, we develop a long-term bi-level equilibrium model. In the upper level, the DSO optimizes social welfare by deciding the level of investment in the distribution network and/or curtailing consumers. The regulated DSO also sets a network tariff to recover the network and flexibility costs. In the lower level, the consumers, active and passive, maximize their own welfare. We find that implicit and explicit incentives for demand-side flexibility are complementary regulatory tools, but there are limits. If network tariffs are too imperfect, the resulting consumption profiles can become too expensive to fix with curtailment. We also find that it is difficult to set an appropriate level of compensation because of the reaction by prosumers.

Begin New Search
Proceed to Checkout


© 2022 International Association for Energy Economics | Privacy Policy | Return Policy