Abstract:
Increased transmission capacity and diminishing returns to scale in power production capacities have raised the opportunity cost of electricity in many countries. The resulting market changes have often been counteracted by policy, i.e. subsidized electricity prices to for instance energy intensive industries. Firm data, emphasizing cost heterogeneity, confirm that a large share of Norwegian energy intensive firms would not be profitable in the long run if they lose their present electricity subsidies. However, CGE estimates show that removing the subsidies allows a tax cut that is more than sufficient to bring about the changes in relative prices needed to restore internal and external balances.

Abstract:
We formulate a long run model with black, green and white certificate markets that function in conjunction with an electricity market. The markets function well together in the sense that a common equilibrium solution exists, where all targets are satisfied (e.g., the share of green electricity and share of energy saving/ efficiency increase). The equilibrium solution adapts to changing targets but it is, in general, impossible to tell whether this will lead to more, less, or unchanged consumption of "black," "green" or "white" electricity. Hence, if the long run target is to expand the capacity of green electricity generation and energy savings to certain given levels, then these markets may not be the best to use. To obtain clear results, specific parameter values and functional forms are needed. An example based on Norwegian data is provided. In addition, gains and losses in terms of consumers' and producers' surpluses are calculated.