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Evaluating an Interconnection Project: Do Strategic Interactions Matter?

Sébastien Debia, David Benatia, and Pierre-Olivier Pineau

Year: 2018
Volume: Volume 39
Number: Number 6
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.39.6.sdeb
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Abstract:
High-Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) merchant transmission lines allow trade across separate power markets and often in different countries. Flows on existing cross-border lines are often assessed as suboptimal, which may be due to the light regulation that often prevails in these cases. This paper studies the impact of market power on HVDC interconnections as a determinant of imperfect arbitrage. We assess the impact of Physical Transmission Rights (PTRs) allocation on the management of an HVDC interconnection between a thermal and a hydroelectricity market, assuming dynamic water management. We use a two-stage game formulated as an Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC) to model the strategic trade between the New York (US) and Quebec (Canada) systems. The numerical model is calibrated with public data. We find that although the interconnection can create wealth, a high concentration of PTRs can destroy value because of dumping strategies. The impact of trade on local price levels may be of concern and calls for the functional unbundling of traders and generators.



Reciprocal Dumping under Dichotomous Regulation

Sébastien Debia and Georges Zaccour

Year: 2022
Volume: Volume 43
Number: Number 5
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.43.5.sdeb
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Abstract:
An essential ingredient to net-zero-emissions policies is to regionally integrate electricity markets. But electricity cross-border trades are often assessed as inefficient. We explain this inefficiency by the presence of a dichotomous regulation: producers are highly regulated with regard to their local activities, but weakly regulated when it comes to their exports. Such a dichotomy in regulation can be generalized to every economic sector, with varying intensity. We develop a generic 2-player 2-stage game theoretical framework where producers anticipate the impact of their exports on the clearing of regulated local markets. We characterize the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the game as a function of the relative price-elasticity between markets. Overall, dichotomous regulation leads producers to over-export in order to create scarcity in their home market. Hence, despite that local markets clear efficiently, the global equilibrium is inefficient. When the two jurisdictions are relatively symmetric, the equilibrium is Pareto-dominated by the first-best outcome. These results call for better coordination between regulators across different jurisdictions.





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