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Adjustment Time, Capital Malleability and Policy Cost

Henry D. Jacoby and Ian Sue Wing

Year: 1999
Volume: Volume 20
Number: Special Issue - The Cost of the Kyoto Protocol: A Multi-Model Evaluation
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol20-NoSI-4
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Abstract:
The cost of meeting Kyoto-style emissions reductions is heavily dependent on the malleability of an economy's stock of capital and the number of years available for adjustment. Each year of delay introduces more emissionproducing activities that must be squeezed out of the system and shortens the time horizon for change, raising the carbon price required to produce the needed changes in capital structure. The MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Assessment model is used to explore the effects of uncertainty in the degree of capital malleability in the short run, and to analyze how implied carbon prices vary depending on the time of credible commitment to emissions targets.



Supplementarity: An Invitation to Monopsony?

A. Denny Ellerman and Ian Sue Wing

Year: 2000
Volume: Volume21
Number: Number 4
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol21-No4-2
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Abstract:
Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol allows Annex B parties to meet their greenhouse gas emissions commitments by emissions trading so long as such trading is "supplemental" to domestic abatement actions. Whether and how "supplemental" should be defined is one of the most contentious issues in the post-Kyoto climate negotiations. We demonstrate that implementing supplementarity by imposing concrete ceilings on permit imports in a market for tradable emissions rights gives rise to monopsonistic effects similar to those that characterize a buyers' cartel. We assess the EU proposal on supplementarity in this context. Our results show that, under the most favorable assumptions, the proposal avoids the redistributive effects of an import limit, albeit at added cost. Under less favorable assumptions, namely, that the required demonstrations of verifiable abatement cannot be made, the EU proposal severely limits emissions trading and the associated reductions in the costs of achieving the Kyoto commitments.





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