Search

Begin New Search
Proceed to Checkout

Search Results for All:
(Showing results 1 to 2 of 2)



Antidumping and Feed-In Tariffs as Good Buddies? Modeling the EU-China Solar Panel Dispute

Patrice Bougette and Christophe Charlier

Year: 2018
Volume: Volume 39
Number: Number 6
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.39.6.pbou
View Abstract

Abstract:
The paper analyzes the interactions between trade and renewable energy policies based on the EU-China solar panel dispute which is the most significant antidumping (AD) complaint in Europe. We build a price competition duopoly model with differentiated products and intra-industry trade in photovoltaic (PV) equipment. We show that an optimal antidumping duty always increases with the feed-in tariff (FIT) program set in the home country. An appropriate antidumping duty - nullifying the dumping margin - decreases with the FIT program. We show that optimal FIT increases with the AD duty. Therefore, trade and renewable energy optimal policies may complement one another. Lastly, we introduce R&D activities in the PV sector, and international spillovers. We show that R&D makes the optimal FIT lower and increases the dumping margin. These effects are reinforced by technological spillovers.



Under Pressure! Nudging Electricity Consumption within Firms. Feedback from a Field Experiment

Christophe Charlier, Gilles Guerassimoff, Ankinée Kirakozian, and Sandrine Selosse

Year: 2021
Volume: Volume 42
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.42.1.ccha
View Abstract

Abstract:
Many economists and psychologists have studied the impact of nudges on households' pro-environmental behaviors. Interestingly, "private nudges" can be imagined for companies. Yet, studies focusing on nudging employees' energy use are rare. The objective of our paper is to explore this issue with the help of a field experiment conducted at 47 French companies' sites. Using a difference-in-difference methodology, the effects of three nudges on employees' energy conservation are tested. The first nudge, "moral appeal", stresses the responsible use of energy. The second one, "social comparison", informs employees on the energy consumption of other firms participating in the experiment. Finally, the third nudge, "stickers", alerts employees about good energy conservation practices. Our results stress the complementarity of these nudges. When implemented alone, the three nudges have no significant effects on energy consumption. However, when the moral appeal and social comparison nudges are combined with the stickers nudge, they become effective.





Begin New Search
Proceed to Checkout

 

© 2021 International Association for Energy Economics | Privacy Policy | Return Policy