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Market Power with Tradable Performance-Based CO2 Emission Standards in the Electricity Sector

Yihsu Chen, Makoto Tanaka, and Afzal S. Siddiqui

Year: 2018
Volume: Volume 39
Number: Number 6
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.39.6.yche
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Abstract:
The U.S. Clean Power Plan stipulates a state-specific performance-based CO2 emission standard, delegating states with considerable flexibility for using either a tradable performance-based or a mass-based permit program. This paper analyzes these two standards under imperfect competitive. We limit our attention to (1) short-run analyses and (2) a situation in which all states are subject to the same type of standard. We show that while the cross-subsidy inherent in the performance-based standard might effectively reduce power prices, it could also inflate energy consumption. A dominant firm with a relatively clean endowment under the performance-based standard would be able to manipulate the electricity market as well as to elevate permit prices, which might worsen market outcomes compared to its mass-based counterpart. On the other hand, the "cross-subsidy" could be the dominant force leading to a higher social welfare if the leader has a relatively dirty endowment.



Merchant Storage Investment in a Restructured Electricity Industry

Afzal S. Siddiqui, Ramteen Sioshansi, and Antonio J. Conejo

Year: 2019
Volume: Volume 40
Number: Number 4
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.40.4.asid
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Abstract:
Restructuring and liberalisation of the electricity industry creates opportunities for investment in energy storage, which could be undertaken by a profit-maximising merchant storage operator. Because such a firm is concerned solely with maximising its own profit, the resulting storage-investment decision may be socially suboptimal (or detrimental). This paper develops a bi-level model of an imperfectly competitive electricity market. The modelling framework assumes electricity-generation and storage-operations decisions at the lower level and storage investment at the upper level. Our analytical results demonstrate that a relatively high (low) amount of market power in the generation sector leads to low (high) storage-capacity investment by the profit-maximising storage operator relative to a welfare maximiser. This can result in net social welfare losses with a profit-maximising storage operator compared to a no-storage case. Moreover, there are guaranteed to be net social welfare losses with a profit-maximising storage operator if the generation sector is sufficiently competitive. Using a charge on generation ramping between off- and on-peak periods, we induce the profit-maximising storage operator to invest in the same level of storage capacity as the welfare-maximising firm. Such a ramping charge can increase social welfare above the levels that are attained with a welfare-maximising storage operator.



Economic and Environmental Consequences of Market Power in the South-East Europe Regional Electricity Market

Verena Viskovic, Yihsu Chen, Afzal S. Siddiqui, and Makoto Tanaka

Year: 2021
Volume: Volume 42
Number: Number 6
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.42.6.vvis
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Abstract:
Market power in electricity and emission-permit markets in the South-East Europe Regional Electricity Market, which comprises both EU members subject to the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) and non-EU members exempt from it, affects social welfare and carbon leakage. We examine its impact under three market settings: perfect competition (PC) and two leader-follower versions, in which a leader can exert market power in either the electricity market (S-T) or both the electricity and permit markets (S). Under PC, carbon leakage is equal to 11%-39% of ETS emission reduction depending on the cap stringency. Generally, in S-T, the leader's capacity withholding results in ETS emissions below and non-ETS emissions above PC levels. However, carbon leakage is lower vis-à-vis PC as the ETS emission reduction offsets the non-ETS emission increase. Finally, in S, the leader's propensity to lower the permit price increases ETS emissions and exacerbates carbon leakage compared to S-T.



Climate Policy and Strategic Operations in a Hydro-Thermal Power System

Farzad Hassanzadeh Moghimi, Hanna Ek Fälth, Lina Reichenberg, and Afzal S. Siddiqui

Year: 2023
Volume: Volume 44
Number: Number 5
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.44.4.fmog
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Abstract:
Decarbonisation of the Nordic power sector entails substantial variable renewable energy (VRE) adoption. While Nordic hydropower reservoirs can mitigate VRE output's intermittency, strategic hydro producers may leverage increased flexibility requirements to exert market power. Using a Nash-Cournot model, we find that even the current Nordic power system could yield modest gains from strategic reservoir operations regardless of a prohibition on "spilling" water to increase prices. Instead, strategic hydro producers could shift generation from peak to off-peak seasons. Such temporal arbitrage becomes more attractive under a climate package with a €100/t CO2 price and doubled VRE capacity. Since the package increases generation variability, lowers average prices, and makes fossil-fuelled plants unprofitable, strategic hydro producers face lower opportunity costs in shifting output from peak to off-peak seasons and encounter muted responses from price-taking fossil-fuelled plants. Hence, a climate package that curtails CO2 emissions may also bolster strategic hydro producers' leverage.





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