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Representing GASPEC with the World Gas Model

Abstract:
This paper presents results of simulating a more collusive behavior of a group of natural gas producing and exporting countries, sometimes called GASPEC. We use the World Gas Model, a dynamic, strategic representation of world gas production, trade, and consumption between 2005 and 2030. In particular, we simulate a closer cooperation of the GASPEC countries when exporting pipeline gas and liquefied natural gas; we also run a more drastic scenario where GASPEC countries deliberately hold back production. The results show that compared to our Base Case, a gas cartel would reduce total supplied quantities and induce price increases in gas importing countries up to 22%. There is evidence that the natural gas markets in Europe and North America would be affected more than other parts of the world. Lastly, the vulnerability of gas importers worldwide is further illustrated by the results of a sensitivity case in which price levels are up to 87% higher in Europe and North America.

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Energy Specializations: Energy Modeling – Energy Data, Modeling, and Policy Analysis; Natural Gas – Markets and Prices

JEL Codes: Q42: Alternative Energy Sources, Q40: Energy: General, L95: Gas Utilities; Pipelines; Water Utilities, L13: Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets, L11: Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms, D43: Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection, Q35: Hydrocarbon Resources

Keywords: Natural gas, trade, cartel collusion, World Gas Model

DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol30-NoSI-7

Published in Volume 30, Special Issue of the bi-monthly journal of the IAEE's Energy Economics Education Foundation.

 

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