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Market Power in a System of Tradeable CO2 Quotas

Abstract:
This paper examines the connection between market power and the size of efficiency loss in a market for tradeable CO2 permits. Countries, not firms, are the players in the market. A situation is analyzed where some of the, participants have market power, i.e., they can influence the price of a CO2 quota. Each country with market power decides how many quotas to buy or sell, given the other market power countries' sales or purchases of quotas, and the behavior of countries without market power. The latter countries act as price takers. The market equilibrium is compared to a cost effective market situation in order to quantify the efficiency loss resulting from market power.

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Energy Specializations: Energy Modeling – Other; Energy and the Environment – Climate Change and Greenhouse Gases; Energy and the Environment – Policy and Regulation

JEL Codes: Q54: Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming, L11: Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms, Q52: Pollution Control Adoption and Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects, D47: Market Design

Keywords: Carbon Dioxide emissions, climate policy CO2 quotas, market power, Cournot, tradable carbon permits

DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol17-No3-6

Published in Volume17, Number 3 of the bi-monthly journal of the IAEE's Energy Economics Education Foundation.

 

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