**Overview**

This paper reports results of statistical and econometric analyses of financial transmission rights (FTRs) in the Ontario—the most populous province in Canada—wholesale electricity market. FTRs entitle their holder to receive a stream of payments related to the degree of congestion observed on a given transmission path during a pre-specified period of time. Market performance is assessed from the perspective of the informational efficiency/unbiasedness of forward market auctions. Aspects of potential manifestations of intertemporal learning are considered as well. The analysis distinguishes between and considered both short- and long-term FTRs, that is, FTRs that are valid for one month and one year, respectively.

**Methods**

The data are associated with a set of transmission paths observed through time, thereby forming a panel. The methods chosen must accommodate the censored nature of these data. As linear estimators are expected to yield biased and inconsistent results, a variety of censored data-adapted alternatives are explored, including the Tobit dummy variable and Honoré trimmed least absolute deviations estimators, both with fixed effects, and a random-effects equivalent. These results are compared to each other as well as to those that pool the data. More basic issues, such as stationarity, are addressed in advance of estimation. As well, a variety of regressor specifications and functional forms are considered.

**Results**

Regardless of the method, it is concluded that while FTR market performance varied across the transmission paths considered and that some performed better than others, the market as a whole was not informationally efficient in the sense that the MCP for a particular auction does not tend to provide an unbiased forecast of future payout/congestion.

**Conclusions**

There are important implications to a finding evidence of informational inefficiency in Ontario’s market for FTRs. Among these is whether the market should be reformed to either encourage greater participation or whether the market should be eliminated altogether, with the congestion rents (ICP) being used directly to cover the costs of ongoing transmission investment. Significantly, the latter option would eliminate the availability of FTRs for use in hedging the risks of congestion. Both of these, and other, options are currently under discussion in Ontario and are expected (by the author) to be the subject of formal stakeholder consultations in the latter half of 2013 and require additional research.

**References**


