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Canadian Oil and Gas Taxation

Campbell Watkins and Brian Scarfe

Year: 1985
Volume: Volume 6
Number: Special Issue
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol6-NoSI-3
No Abstract







Exploration Risks and Mineral Taxation: How Fiscal Regimes Affect Exploration Incentives

T. R. Stauffer and John C. Gault

Year: 1985
Volume: Volume 6
Number: Special Issue
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol6-NoSI-10
No Abstract



Scheduling and Taxation of Resource Deposits

Sjur D. Fldm and Trond E. Olsen

Year: 1985
Volume: Volume 6
Number: Special Issue
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol6-NoSI-11
No Abstract



Efficiency Versus Equity in Petroleum Taxation

Dale W. Jorgenson and Daniel T. Slesnick

Year: 1985
Volume: Volume 6
Number: Special Issue
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol6-NoSI-14
No Abstract



Levies on U.S. Coal Production

Richard L. Gordon

Year: 1985
Volume: Volume 6
Number: Special Issue
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol6-NoSI-18
No Abstract



A Natural Resource Theory of Unitary Taxation

James L. Johnston and Alan Reynolds

Year: 1985
Volume: Volume 6
Number: Special Issue
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol6-NoSI-23
No Abstract



Residential Energy Demand and the Taxation of Housing

William M. Gentry

Year: 1994
Volume: Volume15
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol15-No2-5
View Abstract

Abstract:
This paper examines how the favorable tax treatment of housing capital in the U.S. affects the demand for residential energy. Relative to a tax system that is neutral between different investments, the current taxation of housing lowers the cost of housing capital by 23%. The tax subsidy for housing capital increases the demand for housing services and the concomitant energy demand and creates an incentive for the substitution of capital for energy in the production of housing services. Eliminating this tax subsidy for housing would lower the demand for housing services by 11.8% and residential energy demand by 68%. Alternatively, the same reduction in residential energy demand could be obtained through a 20% tax on residential energy.



The Target Revenue Model and the World Oil Market: Empirical Evidence from 1971 to 1994

A.F. Alhajji and David Huettner

Year: 2000
Volume: Volume21
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol21-No2-6
View Abstract

Abstract:
This study draws on other studies that concluded OPEC is not a cartel and Saudi Arabia acts as a dominant producer in the world oil market. The intention here is to see whether the Target Revenue (TR) model provides an explanation for the behavior of some OPEC members that do not coordinate production with Saudi Arabia. We investigate whether production cuts or increases by OPEC and non OPEC members are based on their investment or budgetary needs. By retesting the TR model, we show that investment and budgetary needs do not affect the production of oil in free-market economies (OPEC and non-OPEC), but they do affect production decisions of the more centrally-planned, isolated and oil dependent economies. Existing studies in the literature have conceptual and statistical limitations that justify retesting the model. This study is the first to investigate the TR model in a separate study and to compare the results of static and dynamic models. It is also the first to examine the relationship between the degree of economic freedom and the Target Revenue model and to note the TR model is stable when used for countries that are price takers.




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