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V. Policy Trends: The Future Is Now - The Decline and Fall of Regulation in the Natural Gas Industry

Arlon R. Tussing and Connie C. Barlow

Year: 1982
Volume: Volume 3
Number: Number 4
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol3-No4-5
View Abstract

Abstract:
A theme that runs through the long, convoluted history of natural gas regulation is the seemingly inexorable expansion of government intervention. Regulation has spawned further regulation; soon after one regulatory gap was filled, another appeared. Municipal franchising and price regulation of gas distributors led to state oversight of intrastate gas transmission, which prompted federal regulation of interstate transmission, followed by control of interstate affiliated field prices and later interstate independent field prices. Finally, the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA) extended federal jurisdiction to all intrastate field sales.



The Natural Gas Industry in Transition

George H. Lawrence and Michael I. German

Year: 1983
Volume: Volume 4
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol4-No1-8
View Abstract

Abstract:
After 25 years of field price regulation, the U.S. natural gas industry is moving to a deregulated field market. This transition period has been made more difficult because of the international recession, depressed oil prices, and statutory restraints on gas use that were originally designed under assumptions of declining gas supply.



Field Price Deregulation and the Carrier Status of Natural Gas Pipelines

Harry G. Broadman, W. David Montgomery, and Milton Russell

Year: 1985
Volume: Volume 6
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol6-No2-10
View Abstract

Abstract:
The move to deregulate natural gas field markets is likely to stimulate changes in the way the downstream segments of the industry are regulated. In particular, because the uncertainty endemic to freer upstream markets will emerge for the first time in the contemporary gas industry, the relative merits of having pipelines perform different economic functions will be altered. Producers and distributors will also, in varying degrees, face greater price uncertainty than before. This will lead to changes in the desired allocation of risk and incentives associated with activities traditionally carried out by transmission companies.



Oil Shock

Hillard G. Huntington

Year: 1985
Volume: Volume 6
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol6-No2-11
View Abstract

Abstract:
The move to deregulate natural gas field markets is likely to stimulate changes in the way the downstream segments of the industry are regulated. In particular, because the uncertainty endemic to freer upstream markets will emerge for the first time in the contemporary gas industry, the relative merits of having pipelines perform different economic functions will be altered. Producers and distributors will also, in varying degrees, face greater price uncertainty than before. This will lead to changes in the desired allocation of risk and incentives associated with activities traditionally carried out by transmission companies.



Oil Prices, Energy Security, and Impact Policy

R. Glenn Hubbard

Year: 1985
Volume: Volume 6
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol6-No2-12
View Abstract

Abstract:
The move to deregulate natural gas field markets is likely to stimulate changes in the way the downstream segments of the industry are regulated. In particular, because the uncertainty endemic to freer upstream markets will emerge for the first time in the contemporary gas industry, the relative merits of having pipelines perform different economic functions will be altered. Producers and distributors will also, in varying degrees, face greater price uncertainty than before. This will lead to changes in the desired allocation of risk and incentives associated with activities traditionally carried out by transmission companies.



The Making of Federal Coal Policy

Richard L. Gordon

Year: 1985
Volume: Volume 6
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol6-No2-13
View Abstract

Abstract:
The move to deregulate natural gas field markets is likely to stimulate changes in the way the downstream segments of the industry are regulated. In particular, because the uncertainty endemic to freer upstream markets will emerge for the first time in the contemporary gas industry, the relative merits of having pipelines perform different economic functions will be altered. Producers and distributors will also, in varying degrees, face greater price uncertainty than before. This will lead to changes in the desired allocation of risk and incentives associated with activities traditionally carried out by transmission companies.



Electric Power Strategic Issues

Richard L. Gordon

Year: 1985
Volume: Volume 6
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol6-No2-14
View Abstract

Abstract:
The move to deregulate natural gas field markets is likely to stimulate changes in the way the downstream segments of the industry are regulated. In particular, because the uncertainty endemic to freer upstream markets will emerge for the first time in the contemporary gas industry, the relative merits of having pipelines perform different economic functions will be altered. Producers and distributors will also, in varying degrees, face greater price uncertainty than before. This will lead to changes in the desired allocation of risk and incentives associated with activities traditionally carried out by transmission companies.



Risk Analysis and Decision Processes

Nelson E. May

Year: 1985
Volume: Volume 6
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol6-No2-15
View Abstract

Abstract:
The move to deregulate natural gas field markets is likely to stimulate changes in the way the downstream segments of the industry are regulated. In particular, because the uncertainty endemic to freer upstream markets will emerge for the first time in the contemporary gas industry, the relative merits of having pipelines perform different economic functions will be altered. Producers and distributors will also, in varying degrees, face greater price uncertainty than before. This will lead to changes in the desired allocation of risk and incentives associated with activities traditionally carried out by transmission companies.



The Natural Gas Industry

Harry G. Broadman

Year: 1985
Volume: Volume 6
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol6-No2-16
View Abstract

Abstract:
The move to deregulate natural gas field markets is likely to stimulate changes in the way the downstream segments of the industry are regulated. In particular, because the uncertainty endemic to freer upstream markets will emerge for the first time in the contemporary gas industry, the relative merits of having pipelines perform different economic functions will be altered. Producers and distributors will also, in varying degrees, face greater price uncertainty than before. This will lead to changes in the desired allocation of risk and incentives associated with activities traditionally carried out by transmission companies.



The Diminishing Role of Regulation in the Natural Gas Industry

Charles G. Slalon

Year: 1986
Volume: Volume 7
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol7-No2-1
View Abstract

Abstract:
The natural gas industry grew to maturity under a system of strong monopoly power of pipelines and local distribution companies (LDCs) and balkanized markets at wellheads and burnertips. Recent developments in the industry, especially phased deregulation of wellhead prices implemented by the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA) and competition induced by the gas bubble since 1982, have somewhat reduced pipeline monopoly power in some markets. Considerations of economic efficiency and economic justice now require that competitive forces be strengthened further. The FERC's Order 436 was an attempt to do that.



Structure and Organization of the Natural Gas Industry: Differences between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany and Implications for the Carrier Status of Pipelines

David J. Teece

Year: 1990
Volume: Volume 11
Number: Number 3
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol11-No3-1
View Abstract

Abstract:
This paper explores various ways to organize the natural gas industry. In particular, it examines the function of merchant pipelines and explores how mandatory carriage has come to be introduced into the United States. The applicability of the US experience to the European Community is questioned because of the very different regulatory histories of the United States and Europe. The paper concludes that the "open access" trend in the United States has stemmed from the need to patch up the results of previous regulatory errors; and though the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) may have helped relieve certain short-term problems by championing open access, it may have created long-term problems that are disguised by the current gas glut. The American regulatory experience in natural gas over the past two decades is seen as most unfortunate, and the benefits available to Europe from imitating recent FERC regulatory strategies are found to be illusory.



The Development of a UK Natural Gas Spot Market

Joe Roeber

Year: 1996
Volume: Volume17
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol17-No2-1
View Abstract

Abstract:
This paper examines parallels between the evolution of spot markets jor oil during the 1980s, particularly Brent, and what is now happening in the UK gas industry. The structure of supply, formerly within the control of British Gas, is breaking up under antitrust and regulatory pressures, and the short-term balancing needs of the system are being externalised. This is giving rise to a spot market. This paper identifies four stages in the development of a spot market, of which the UK market is presently in the first and second stages (physical balancing and the development of price transparency). Feedback effects on prices are already apparent, and the fourth stage, the development of risk management tools, is being discussed. This scenario was drawn up three years ago, based upon the experience of oil before the existence of a gas spot market was acknowledged. It has so far not missed a step. According to this analysis, the question over the extension of this logic to the gas markets in Continental Europe is not whether, but when?



Strategic Interdependence in European East-West Gas Trade: A Hierarchical Stackelberg Game Approach

Waft Grais and Kangbin Zheng

Year: 1996
Volume: Volume17
Number: Number 3
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol17-No3-5
View Abstract

Abstract:
The current and potential benefits of European East-West gas trade are enormous for all participants. The new and more complex structure of the natural gas transit system, as emerged with political and economic changes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, has created uncertainties about the interdependence and interactions among the participants. Using a Stackelberg game with three layers of players (suppliers, transiters and importers), this paper establishes a framework to analyze rational behaviors of the participants and reasonable ways to formulate transparent, flexible, and incentive-compatible contracts. This framework is also used to show how to modify the trade contract to accommodate changes in the gas trade environment. Improving predictability of the players' reactions to external changes can enhance the reliability of gas trade and allow its expansion to benefit all participants.



Expectations and the Evolving World Gas Market

Dagobert L. Brito and Peter R. Hartley

Year: 2007
Volume: Volume 28
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol28-No1-1
View Abstract

Abstract:
A number of authors have noted that recent changes in the liquefied natural gas (LNG) industry are likely to favor shorter term multilateral trades of LNG relative to long term bilateral and project-specific contracts. We present a model in which expectations of such a change in market structure alter investment behavior in a way that reinforces the original tendency. The result is that the structure of the natural gas market could change quite quickly, as happened previously in the world oil market.



Oil Risk in Oil Stocks

Bert Scholtens  and Lei Wang

Year: 2008
Volume: Volume 29
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol29-No1-5
View Abstract

Abstract:
We assess the oil price sensitivities and oil risk premiums of NYSE listed oil & gas firms returns by using a two-step regression analysis under two different arbitrage pricing models. Thus, we apply the Fama and French (1992) factor returns in a study of oil stocks. In all, we find that the return of oil stocks is positively associated with the return of the market, the increase of the spot crude oil price, and negatively with the firm�s book-to-market ratio. The oil firms sensitivities to the market, the oil price and the book-to-market ratio are positively priced by the market under the integrated model. However, both the size and significance of the oil risk premium are unstable. This suggests that increases in the oil price impact on expectations about the oil stocks� future return. The positive oil risk premium may disappear as investors change their perception of the effect of oil price changes on stock returns.



EU Gas Industry Reforms and Consumers' Prices

Rinaldo Brau, Raffaele Doronzo, Carlo V. Fiorio and Massimo Florio

Year: 2010
Volume: Volume 31
Number: Number 4
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol31-No4-8
View Abstract

Abstract:
This paper offers an empirical analysis of the impact of reforms in the natural gas industry on consumer prices across the EU-15 area. After briefly reviewing the most recent reforms, we study the relationship between regulatory indicators and price dynamics by means of panel data econometrics. Our findings suggest that so far there is limited evidence of beneficial effects for European consumers from the standard package of gas industry reforms.




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