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Cost-Effective Control Strategies for Energy-Related Transboundary Air Pollution in Western Europe

Heinz Welsch

Year: 1990
Volume: Volume 11
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol11-No2-5
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Abstract:
In this paper a simulation model of the West European power plant industry, combined with transboundary source-receptor relationships, is used to determine cost-effective reduction rates for SO2 emissions in any one country so that certain, exogenously given, deposition reduction targets are attained. The overall costs implied by the proposed strategies, and their distribution among countries, are examined and compared to those associated with the traditional emission-standard approach. It is found that the cooperative and flexible strategies considered allow for overall cost savings of up to 60 percent, given the same degree of deposition reduction.



The Costs of Stabilizing Global CO2 Emissions: A Probabilistic Analysis Based on Expert Judgments

Alan S. Manne and Richard G. Richels

Year: 1994
Volume: Volume15
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol15-No1-3
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Abstract:
In this paper, we examine the economic costs of stabilizing global CO2 emissions at 1990 levels. Previous analyses of the costs of emissions abatement have tended to be deterministic. That is, no attempt was made to assign probabilities to various scenarios. Policy-makers need information both on the range of possible outcomes and on their relative likelihood. We use a probability poll to characterize the uncertainty surrounding critical parameters and to construct probability distributions over the outcomes of interest. The analysis suggests a wide range for abatement costs. In order to stabilize global emissions, the annual price tag lies between a 2 and 6.8 percent of gross world product. This distribution is highly skewed. The expected costs are approximately 1.5 percent.



At What Cost do We Reduce Pollution? Shadow Prices of SO2 Emissions

John R. Swinton

Year: 1998
Volume: Volume19
Number: Number 4
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol19-No4-3
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Abstract:
The U. S. EPA's infant market for SO2 emissions has the potential for improving the cost effectiveness of reducing acid rain pollutants. If the market works as planned, over time one should see the cost of reducing additional amounts of sulfur dioxide converge across plants. The results of the study described here demonstrate that before the market opened marginal abatement costs varied wildly across plants. This work provides estimates of the shadow price of SO2 abatement using the output distance function approach for Illinois, Minnesota and Wisconsin coal-burning electric plants. The results demonstrate that the coal-burning electric plants with the highest emissions rates are also the plants with the lowest marginal abatement costs, a fact that may explain lower-than-expected prices in the new market for allowances. The data include information about plants with installed scrubber capital allowing for an investigation of the effect of scrubber capital on marginal abatement costs.



The Kyoto Protocol: A Cost-Effective Strategy for Meeting Environmental Objectives?

Alan S. Manne and Richard G. Richels

Year: 1999
Volume: Volume 20
Number: Special Issue - The Cost of the Kyoto Protocol: A Multi-Model Evaluation
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol20-NoSI-2
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Abstract:
This paper has three purposes: 1) to identify the near-term costs to the United States of ratifying the Kyoto Protocol; 2) to assess the significance of the Protocol's "flexibility provisions"; and, 3) to evaluate the Kyoto targets in the context of the long-term goal of the Framework Convention. We find that the short-term U.S. abatement costs of implementing this Protocol are likely to be substantial. These costs can be reduced through international trade in emission rights. The magnitude of the costs will be determined by the number of countries participating in the trading market, the shape of each country's marginal abatement cost curve, and the extent to which buyers can satisfy their obligation through the purchase of emission rights. Finally and perhaps most important: unless the ultimate concentration target is well below 550 ppmv, the Protocol seems to be inconsistent with a long-term strategy for stabilizing global concentrations.



Carbon Abatement Costs: Why the Wide Range of Estimates?

Carolyn Fischer and Richard D. Morgenstern

Year: 2006
Volume: Volume 27
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol27-No2-5
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Abstract:
Estimates of marginal abatement costs for reducing carbon emissions derived from major economic-energy models vary widely. Controlling for policy regimes we use meta-analysis to examine the importance of structural modeling choices in explaining differences in estimates. The analysis indicates that particular assumptions about perfectly foresighted consumers and Armington trade elasticities generate lower estimates of marginal abatement costs. Other choices are associated with higher cost estimates, including perfectly mobile capital, inclusion of a backstop technology, and greater disaggregation among regions and sectors. Some features, such as greater technological detail, seem less significant. Understanding the importance of key modeling assumptions, as well as the way the models are used to estimate abatement costs, can help guide the development of consistent modeling practices for policy evaluation.



Diffusion of Climate Technologies in the Presence of Commitment Problems

Taran Faehn and Elisabeth T. Isaksen

Year: 2016
Volume: Volume 37
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.37.2.tfae
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Abstract:
Publicly announced greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation targets and emissions pricing strategies by individual governments may suffer from inherent commitment problems. When emission prices are perceived as short-lived, socially cost-effective upfront investment in climate technologies may be hampered. This paper compares the social abatement cost of a uniform GHG pricing system with two policy options for overcoming such regulatory uncertainty: One combines the emissions pricing with a state guarantee scheme whereby the regulatory risk is borne by the government and one combines the system with subsidies for upfront climate technology investments. A technology-rich computable general equilibrium model is applied that accounts for abatement both within and beyond existing technologies. Our findings suggest a tripling of abatement costs if domestic climate policies fail to stimulate investment in new technological solutions. Since the cost of funding investment subsidies is found to be small, the subsidy scheme performs almost as well as the guarantee scheme.



Identifying Strategic Traders in China's Pilot Carbon Emissions Trading Scheme

Lei Zhu, Xu Wang, and Dayong Zhang

Year: 2020
Volume: Volume 41
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.41.2.lzhu
View Abstract

Abstract:
This paper uses a sample of 1,867 firms that participate in the "Top-10,000 Energy-Consuming Enterprises Program" in China and aims to identify strategic traders in its pilot emissions trading scheme. Firms included in the ETS can exert their market power and manipulate allowance prices to achieve low compliance costs, which will consequently influence the effectiveness of this platform. This is of great importance to regulators or designers of this system in identifying these strategic traders and understanding their impact. We follow the basic principle proposed by Godal (2005) and develop a simple and implementable empirical procedure to study firm-level data from seven pilot programs in China. The results show that strategic traders exist with clear regional and sectoral differences. As a consequence of strategic trading by these firms, the overall volume of trading falls remarkably, with a clear increase in total compliance costs.





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