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Prospects for a Tighter World Oil Market

Edward W. Erickson

Year: 1985
Volume: Volume 6
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol6-No1-1
View Abstract

Abstract:
Once again, the world oil market has failed to behave according to expectation. This time, the predictions of sharp price drops did not materialize-nor did previous forecasts of continuing escalation. This ongoing divergence between expectations and reality is becoming standard-as is the remarkable resiliency in the position and behavior of Saudi Arabia.



Prospects for the World Oil Market

S. Fred Singer

Year: 1985
Volume: Volume 6
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol6-No1-3
View Abstract

Abstract:
This essay recapitulates a recent review article on world oil pricing.It also summarizes my own thinking and writing about oil problems over the last decade.In brief, I maintain that the first price jump (of 1973-1974), from about $3 to $12 per barrel, represents the "correct" adjustment from the point of view of the "core" producing countries (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arabs Emirates), whose objective it should be to maximize profits over time. (I agree with Erickson and other analysts that Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE are the swing producers that set the price.)



An Unstable World Oil Market

M. A. Adelman

Year: 1985
Volume: Volume 6
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol6-No1-4
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Abstract:
There is a permanent surplus because huge low-cost reserves are available for development. The cartel keeps them undeveloped to maintain the price. Their power is great, but they are a "clumsy cartel" and sometimes overreact to produce a shortage. Hence the future is cloudy and threatening, like the recent past.



Historical Causes of Postwar Oil Shocks and Recessions

James D. Hamilton

Year: 1985
Volume: Volume 6
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol6-No1-9
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Abstract:
Turbulent petroleum markets and poor economic performance have been making headlines for the last decade. Three major oil shocks (1973-1974, 1979, and 1980-1981) have each been followed by major recessions. While the magnitude and violence of recent oil price changes are unique in postwar experience, the phenomenon of political instability producing disruptions in petroleum supply is not. Hamilton (1983a) observed that all but one of the recessions in the United States since World War II were preceded-typically by about nine months-by a dramatic increase in the price of crude petroleum (see Figure 1).



Falling Oil Prices: Where Is the Floor?

James M. Griffin and Clifton T. Jones

Year: 1986
Volume: Volume 7
Number: Number 4
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol7-No4-2
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Abstract:
The recent precipitous decline in world oil prices from $28 per barrel in November 1985 to $12 per barrel in March 1986 has perplexed most industry analysts and OPEC watchers. As oil prices continue to deteriorate, the central question now seems to be: "Is there a price floor below which oil prices will not fall; and if so, where is it?" Economic theory would suggest that at some price level, short-run marginal extraction costs of oil will eventually exceed marginal revenues from that production, leading to the widespread abandonment of the relatively higher-cost oil wells currently operated by competitive producers in non-OPEC areas. Presumably, once the price of oil falls to this floor, massive production cutbacks in high-cost, non-OPEC areas due to abandonment and reductions in new drilling activity would enable the lower-cost OPEC producers to significantly expand their market shares, thereby eliminating any incentives for further price reductions.



Do Volatile Oil Prices and Consumer Adjustment Costs Justify An Additional Petroleum Tax?

Franz Wirl

Year: 1990
Volume: Volume 11
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol11-No1-12
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Abstract:
A number of papers have considered different reasons for defending or refuting additional crude oil taxation directly or indirectly via an import duty. Hogan-Rahmani (1987) refer to "national security of supply" in advocating an oil import fee. This relates to another work of the authors (see Hogan-Rahmani-Jorgenson-Cooper (1988)), in which they state that energy demand (and in particular U.S. oil dependence) will dramatically rise due to prevailing low crude oil prices. An extensive discussion of this controversial issue has gone on in this journal, e.g., see Wright (1988), Singer (1988), Huntington (1988) reviewing the DOE report on Energy Security and the "American Debate" by Curlee, Tussing and Vactor (1988), Nesbitt and Choi (1988), and the defense of Broadman and Hogan (1988). Bizer and Stuart (1987) address a different aspect of an oil import fee, namely as an instrument of public finance. However, they dismiss import duties as an inefficient instrument for raising revenues.



Natural Gas Policy: The Unresolved Issues

Thomas P. Lyon

Year: 1990
Volume: Volume 11
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol11-No2-2
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Abstract:
This paper analyzes the restructuring of the natural gas industry which has been going on for several years. It gives the background to the current attempts at restructuring and describes Stanford University's 9th study by the Energy Modeling Forum on North American gas markets which is the analytical basis for this paper. It then describes the tension between the two regulatory objectives, economic efficiency and satisfyingpublic policy concerns regarding the distribution of economic surplus, which must be considered in any analysis of regulatory policy and market structure in the natural gas industry. Ten key natural gas policy issues that remain unresolved are analyzed and a more general discussion of how the gas industry may evolve under several alternative sets of market conditions are presented. Finally, it considers howpoliticalpressures may affect gas policies in future.



The Gulf Crisis: Oil Fundamentals, Market Perceptions and Political Realities

Ahmad Zaki Yamani

Year: 1991
Volume: Volume 12
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol12-No2-1
View Abstract

Abstract:
The oil market has certainly not disappointed those who might have feared that it had lost its ability to shock. The dramatic events in the Gulf in August 1990 resulted in the oil price more than doubling within two months, reaching -- at over $40 a barrel -- levels not seen since November 1980. This is a faster rise than that observed during the height of the Iranian crisis, when the price of oil took seven months to double. Once again political events in the turbulent Middle East managed to generate huge shock waves in the oil industry and to toss much else besides into dizzy confusion. Of course, the governments of many oil-producing states and a number of oil companies may feel euphoric about the price-driven surge in their incomes. However, price rises of this rapidity and magnitude are bound to make any jubilation turn sour, if past experience is anything to go by -- and these days the turn-around will happen sooner rather than later.



Oil Industry Structure and Evolving Markets

Joe Roeber

Year: 1994
Volume: Volume 15
Number: Special Issue
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol15-NoSI-14
View Abstract

Abstract:
Of all the changes in the oil industry over the past 20 years, the most radical have taken place in the market, and in the formation of prices. These are both a response to and a cause of changes in industry structure. From plannable supplies at relatively stable prices, companies have had to learn to handle short term supplies in condition of extreme volatility. Management of the resulting price risk has become a central role of the companies' supply departments, and the use of paper markets (forward, futures and derivatives) has become an integral part of price formation. It is not impossible that the changes would be reversed, if the conditions that brought them into being-surplus production and de-integrated supply structures-were reversed in conditions of scarcity, but it is highly unlikely. Far more likely, is that risk management and the use of paper markets will increase in importance.




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