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Field Price Deregulation and the Carrier Status of Natural Gas Pipelines

Harry G. Broadman, W. David Montgomery, and Milton Russell

Year: 1985
Volume: Volume 6
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol6-No2-10
View Abstract

Abstract:
The move to deregulate natural gas field markets is likely to stimulate changes in the way the downstream segments of the industry are regulated. In particular, because the uncertainty endemic to freer upstream markets will emerge for the first time in the contemporary gas industry, the relative merits of having pipelines perform different economic functions will be altered. Producers and distributors will also, in varying degrees, face greater price uncertainty than before. This will lead to changes in the desired allocation of risk and incentives associated with activities traditionally carried out by transmission companies.



Oil Shock

Hillard G. Huntington

Year: 1985
Volume: Volume 6
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol6-No2-11
View Abstract

Abstract:
The move to deregulate natural gas field markets is likely to stimulate changes in the way the downstream segments of the industry are regulated. In particular, because the uncertainty endemic to freer upstream markets will emerge for the first time in the contemporary gas industry, the relative merits of having pipelines perform different economic functions will be altered. Producers and distributors will also, in varying degrees, face greater price uncertainty than before. This will lead to changes in the desired allocation of risk and incentives associated with activities traditionally carried out by transmission companies.



Oil Prices, Energy Security, and Impact Policy

R. Glenn Hubbard

Year: 1985
Volume: Volume 6
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol6-No2-12
View Abstract

Abstract:
The move to deregulate natural gas field markets is likely to stimulate changes in the way the downstream segments of the industry are regulated. In particular, because the uncertainty endemic to freer upstream markets will emerge for the first time in the contemporary gas industry, the relative merits of having pipelines perform different economic functions will be altered. Producers and distributors will also, in varying degrees, face greater price uncertainty than before. This will lead to changes in the desired allocation of risk and incentives associated with activities traditionally carried out by transmission companies.



The Making of Federal Coal Policy

Richard L. Gordon

Year: 1985
Volume: Volume 6
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol6-No2-13
View Abstract

Abstract:
The move to deregulate natural gas field markets is likely to stimulate changes in the way the downstream segments of the industry are regulated. In particular, because the uncertainty endemic to freer upstream markets will emerge for the first time in the contemporary gas industry, the relative merits of having pipelines perform different economic functions will be altered. Producers and distributors will also, in varying degrees, face greater price uncertainty than before. This will lead to changes in the desired allocation of risk and incentives associated with activities traditionally carried out by transmission companies.



Electric Power Strategic Issues

Richard L. Gordon

Year: 1985
Volume: Volume 6
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol6-No2-14
View Abstract

Abstract:
The move to deregulate natural gas field markets is likely to stimulate changes in the way the downstream segments of the industry are regulated. In particular, because the uncertainty endemic to freer upstream markets will emerge for the first time in the contemporary gas industry, the relative merits of having pipelines perform different economic functions will be altered. Producers and distributors will also, in varying degrees, face greater price uncertainty than before. This will lead to changes in the desired allocation of risk and incentives associated with activities traditionally carried out by transmission companies.



Risk Analysis and Decision Processes

Nelson E. May

Year: 1985
Volume: Volume 6
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol6-No2-15
View Abstract

Abstract:
The move to deregulate natural gas field markets is likely to stimulate changes in the way the downstream segments of the industry are regulated. In particular, because the uncertainty endemic to freer upstream markets will emerge for the first time in the contemporary gas industry, the relative merits of having pipelines perform different economic functions will be altered. Producers and distributors will also, in varying degrees, face greater price uncertainty than before. This will lead to changes in the desired allocation of risk and incentives associated with activities traditionally carried out by transmission companies.



The Natural Gas Industry

Harry G. Broadman

Year: 1985
Volume: Volume 6
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol6-No2-16
View Abstract

Abstract:
The move to deregulate natural gas field markets is likely to stimulate changes in the way the downstream segments of the industry are regulated. In particular, because the uncertainty endemic to freer upstream markets will emerge for the first time in the contemporary gas industry, the relative merits of having pipelines perform different economic functions will be altered. Producers and distributors will also, in varying degrees, face greater price uncertainty than before. This will lead to changes in the desired allocation of risk and incentives associated with activities traditionally carried out by transmission companies.



The Effect of Load Management upon Transmission and Distribution Costs: A Case Study

Michael A. Einhorn

Year: 1988
Volume: Volume 9
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol9-No1-6
View Abstract

Abstract:
A new era may be emerging for the strategists and decision makers who are responsible for reliably and economically supplying electricity to America's homes and businesses. In the last decade, fuel shortages, price hikes, record-high interest rates, and a new environmentalist awareness have led the nation's utility planners to use conservation and load management strategies in order to curtail their customers' demands for energy and plant capacity. Undertaken primarily to reduce requirements for future generation capacity, load management strategies generally succeeded in reducing system peak load. However, utility planners often implemented these strategies with little regard to the effects upon their company's transmission and distribution (T&D) capacity requirements.



Common Carriage and the Pricing of Electricity Transmission

Chris Doyle and Maria Maher

Year: 1992
Volume: Volume 13
Number: Number 3
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol13-No3-4
View Abstract

Abstract:
The electric supply industry in Europe is increasingly under pressure to become more competitive. Deregulation and privatisation in the United Kingdom demonstrate the feasibility of this. Draft directives have already been agreed upon by the European Commission to open access in energy markets. We examine the relationship between generators, transmission networks and consumers within a full information static, short-run framework. We show that open access is desirable if accompanied by common carriage and competition in generation. Common carriage is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for efficient outcomes to emerge. We also discuss the pricing of transmission services under conditions of open access and competition in generation.



Reactive Power is a Cheap Constraint

Edward Kahn and Ross Baldick

Year: 1994
Volume: Volume15
Number: Number 4
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol15-No4-9
View Abstract

Abstract:
Hogan (1993) has proposed a version of marginal cost pricing for electricity transmission transactions that include a component for reactive power to support voltage at demand nodes. His examples support the notion that the cost of satisfying voltage constraints can be quite high. We show that in his simplest example the price on this constraint results from an uneconomic and artificial characterization of the problem, namely an inefficient and unnecessarily constrained dispatch. By eliminating this characterization, the price of reactive power falls to a very modest level. Our counterexample has implications for the institutional arrangements under which transmission pricing reform will take place. We believe that environment will be an open access competitive setting, where dispatch is still controlled by one group of participants. Manipulation of marginal transmission costs becomes quite feasible in complex networks through subtle changes to dispatch. Therefore an open access regime using marginal cost pricing must involve either some kind of monitoring and audit function to detect potential abuses, or alternatively, institutional restructuring to eliminate conflicts of interest.



Using Distributed Resources to Manage Risks Caused by Demand Uncertainty

Thomas E. Hoff

Year: 1997
Volume: Volume 18
Number: Special Issue
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol18-NoSI-4
View Abstract

Abstract:
This paper presents a method to calculate the cost of satisfying transmission and distribution (T&D) system capacity needs as a function of investment modularity and lead-time. It accounts for the dynamic nature of demand uncertainty, the decision-maker's risk attitude, and the correlation between costs and firm profits. Results indicate that the modularity and short lead-times associated with the distributed resources can increase their attractiveness in comparison to long lead-time, large-scale T&D investments. Results also suggest that distributed resources can operate as a type of "load growth insurance" if demand growth is positively correlated with profits (so that costs are incurred when profits are high) and if the distributed resource costs are part of a larger portfolio that cannot be diversified.



Integrated Local Transmission and Distribution Planning Using Customer Outage Costs

Greg Ball, Debra Lloyd-Zannetti, Brian Horii, Dan Birch, Robert E. Ricks, and Holly Lively

Year: 1997
Volume: Volume 18
Number: Special Issue
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol18-NoSI-7
View Abstract

Abstract:
Changing regulatory incentives in the electric power industry are forcing utility transmission and distribution (T&D) planners to change their approach to investment planning. To minimize the risk of over-investment, utilities need to perform an analysis of system capacity limitations which goes beyond traditional peak load and temperature planning, and routinely consider a variety of alternate incremental capacity expansion measures. Existing engineering tools are inadequate for determining the potential cost advantage of deferring an expansion, or for evaluating the net benefits of distributed resources (DR). Conversely, integrated resource planning (IRP) tools often underestimate or ignore important DR siting restrictions and operational impacts. This paper describes a process to identify T&D capacity constraints, evaluate conventional and alternative capacity additions and DR applications, and explore the risk of operating beyond limits imposed by current reliability practices. The process uses hourly load-flow information to quantify the total annual energy and customer outage costs. The same information is used to build plans incorporating and dispatching DR where they have the greatest impact on minimizing expansion needs. A detailed case study demonstrates the process by quantifying the economic benefits of deferring an expansion with a do-nothing plan. The study reveals both unforeseen advantages and impracticalities of DR use.



Economic Inefficiency of Passive Transmission Rights in Congested Electricity Systems with Competitive Generation

Shmuel S. Oren

Year: 1997
Volume: Volume18
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol18-No1-3
View Abstract

Abstract:
The main thesis of this paper is that passive transmission rights such as Transmission Congestion Contracts (TCCs) that are compensated ex-post based on nodal prices resulting from optimal dispatch by an Independent System Operator (ISO) will be preempted by the strategic bidding of the generators. Thus, even when generation is competitive, rational expectations of congestion will induce implicit collusion enabling generators to raise their bids above marginal costs and capture the congestion rents, leaving the TCCs uncompensated. These conclusions are based on a Cournot model of competition across congested transmission links where an ISO dispatches generators optimally based on bid prices. We characterize the Cournot equilibrium in congested electricity networks with two and three nodes. We show that absent active transmission rights trading, the resulting equilibrium may be at an inefficient dispatch and congestion rents will be captured by the generators. We also demonstrate how active trading of transmission rights in parallel with 42 competitive energy market can prevent the price distortion and inefficient dispatch associated with passive transmission rights.



An Institutional Design for an Electricity Contract Market with Central Dispatch

Hung-po Chao and Stephen Peck

Year: 1997
Volume: Volume18
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol18-No1-4
View Abstract

Abstract:
In Chao and Peck (1996), we introduced a new approach to the design of an efficient electricity market that incorporates externalities due to loop flows. This approach enables an innovative flow-based bidding scheme for pricing transmission services. In the short term, due to some technological constraints, a hybrid institutional structure that encompasses a decentralized contract market (via the system operator) is necessary for implementation. In this paper, we present an incentive scheme that fosters efficiency and reliability within such art institutional structure. An essential ingredient is that the system operator provides all electricity traders choices of priority insurance against interruptions. We show how this scheme will ensure the integrity of the electrical contract market and provide the system operator incentives to maintain system reliability in all efficient manner in real-time dispatch.



Implementation of Priority Insurance in Power Exchange Markets

Robert Wilson

Year: 1997
Volume: Volume18
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol18-No1-5
View Abstract

Abstract:
Traders in a power exchange can use insurance to hedge against losses from curtailment by the system operator. If the system operator is liable for these reimbursements then its incentives encourage efficient real-time dispatch. This paper reviews the details of implementing such a scheme when third-party insurers offer insurance in an auxiliary competitive market, or the power exchange operates as a mutual insurance association of the traders. Because higher reimbursements entail higher service priorities, the actuarial premium for pure insurance must be accompanied by a surcharge for service priority. The amount of this surcharge can be inferred from the price of pure insurance. The Appendix shows that omission of this surcharge distorts traders' incentives in the power exchange.



Electricity Market Integration in the Pacific Northwest

Chi-Keung Woo, Debra Lloyd-Zannetti and Ira Horowitz

Year: 1997
Volume: Volume18
Number: Number 3
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol18-No3-4
View Abstract

Abstract:
Evidence of market integration and price competition support a policy of price deregulation and open access in the electric power industry. The objective of this paper is to test the hypotheses that wholesale electricity submarkets in the Pacific Northwest region of the WSCC are integrated, and price competition exists within these integrated submarkets. To this end, we apply a bivariate cointegration test, a price-difference test and a causality test to the 1996 on-peak daily electricity prices off our submarkets in the Pacific Northwest of North America: Mid-Columbia and California-Oregon Border (COB) in the Western US, and BC/US Border and Alberta Power Pool in Western Canada. The price-difference test results support the hypothesis that the following pairs of markets are integrated: (a) BC/US Border and Mid-Columbia; (b) BC/US Border and COB; and (c) Mid-Columbia and COB. A comparison between the gross profit from price arbitrage and the posted transmission tariff indicates that price competition prevails in these market pairs, and the causality test results provide supporting evidence that price leadership does not exist in these three market pairs. Finally, a market-share analysis indicates that B. C. Hydro does not have market power in the aggregate market comprising BC/US Border, Mid-Columbia and COB.




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