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Still a Time to Choose ...Ten Years Later

S. David Freeman

Year: 1983
Volume: Volume 4
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol4-No2-2
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Abstract:
I think it is appropriate that we should end this conference on energy economics with a look at the record of the past nine years, the years since the energy world was turned upside down by the 1973 Arab oil embargo.This nation's foremost energy accomplishment of this period has not been in achieving increased production. Despite a tenfold increase in the price of crude oil, U.S. production in 1981 was about the same as in 1973. Natural gas production was down. Production of coal and uranium has gone up some, but overall, neither consumption nor domestic production of energy has increased in the last nine years.



A Note on Rowen and Weyant,"Reducing the Economic Impacts of Oil Supply Interruptions: An International Perspective"

Harry D. Saunders

Year: 1984
Volume: Volume 5
Number: Number 4
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol5-No4-5
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Abstract:
Henry Rowen and John Weyant (1982) commit the classic error of trying to answer an important policy question with tools that do not fit the job. Nor does their care in attaching explicit caveats to their conclusions overcome the fact that the limitations of their approach are serious.The question of oil supply disruptions and their potential economic impact is indeed important, and it remains so despite slack oil markets. Policymakers may yet be faced with situations that require them to decide quickly on the advisability of emergency tariffs and other such measures; and they will need reasonable assurances that the caveats analysts attach to policy recommendations do not overwhelm the recommendations themselves. Just such a danger is inherent in the inappropriate application of models and the application of inappropriate models.



Oil Supply Disruptions and the Role of the International Energy Agency

Douglas R. Bohi and Michael A. Toman

Year: 1986
Volume: Volume 7
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol7-No2-3
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Abstract:
This paper examines key crisis management provisions of the IEA Agreement in relation to the interests of member countries in energy security cooperation' and considers ways these interests might be further served by altering the agreement. Two observations underlie both the motivation and thrust of this investigation. The first is that the potential benefits to members of energy security cooperation are likely to be substantial.' Thus, it may be assumed that TEA members have an incentive to find methods inside or outside the agreement for reaping at least part of these gains. Given these incentives, it is important to consider how potential gains from cooperation can be achieved in practice.



What Use the IEA Emergency Stockpiles? A Price-based Model of Oil Stock Management

Bright E. Okogu

Year: 1992
Volume: Volume 13
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol13-No1-5
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Abstract:
Although the International Energy Agency (IEA) has had a program of maintaining strategic oil stockpiles since 1974 in order to cope with unforeseen interruptions to supplies, it has failed to prevent the worst effects of the 1979 and recent interruptions. This paper develops a price-based model of stock management which is then used to simulate the management of an actual supply interruption. It is argued that such a system is more appropriate for the kind of net supply shortfalls that have been, or are likely to be, experienced than the current JEA program. The JEA program relies rigidly on a predetermined net quantity shortage to activate it -- a condition which almost guarantees that it will never be used in a real crisis. By contrast, the subtrigger approach proposed in this study has the advantage of flexibility and promptness of response which would make it relevant in a real supply interruption.



Crude Oil Prices and U.S. Economic Performance: Where Does the Asymmetry Reside?

Hillard G. Huntington

Year: 1998
Volume: Volume19
Number: Number 4
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol19-No4-5
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Abstract:
Sustained decreases in crude oil prices appear to affect the U.S. economy differently than sustained increases. This paper shows that a significant part of the observed asymmetry is due to adjustments within the energy sector and not within the rest of the economy. In particular, sustained decreases in petroleum product or general energy prices do not appear to have qualitatively different macroeconomic impacts than do sustained price increases. The singular focus on crude oil price changes in previous studies is misplaced. Moreover, the 1986 oil price collapse did not operate in isolation from other important events. As crude oil prices fell in the 1986 period, other factors caused a major devaluation of the U.S. dollar that had potentially important effects on the U.S. economy.



Oil Prices and State Unemployment Rates

Mohamad B. Karaki

Year: 2018
Volume: Volume 39
Number: Number 3
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.39.3.mkar
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Abstract:
This paper studies the effect of oil price shocks on U.S. state-level unemployment rates. First, using a test of symmetry, I evaluate whether the relationship between oil prices and state unemployment rates is symmetric. I find no evidence against the null of symmetry after accounting for data mining. Second, I use a symmetric structural VAR model to analyze the effect of oil supply shocks, aggregate demand shocks and oil-specific demand shocks on state unemployment. I find that an adverse supply shock triggers increases in unemployment, whereas a positive aggregate demand shock reduces the unemployment rate across most U.S. states. I also show that oil-specific demand shocks have little effect on state unemployment. Finally, I dig into the historical contribution of the various oil shocks to the changes in state unemployment rates during the shale boom period. I find that aggregate demand shocks contributed the most to the change of unemployment.





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