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Comment on International Energy Agency's World Energy Outlook

David M. Kline and John P. Weyant

Year: 1983
Volume: Volume 4
Number: Number 4
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol4-No4-8
No Abstract



Acknowledgments

n/a

Year: 1983
Volume: Volume 4
Number: Number 4
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol4-No4-9
No Abstract



Volume 4 Index

n/a

Year: 1983
Volume: Volume 4
Number: Number 4
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol4-No4-10
No Abstract





Notes - The Real Price of Imported Oil Revisited

Michael J. Coda and John E. Jankowski, Jr.

Year: 1983
Volume: Volume 4
Number: Number 4
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol4-No4-7
No Abstract



Oil Supply Disruptions and the Role of the International Energy Agency

Douglas R. Bohi and Michael A. Toman

Year: 1986
Volume: Volume 7
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol7-No2-3
View Abstract

Abstract:
This paper examines key crisis management provisions of the IEA Agreement in relation to the interests of member countries in energy security cooperation' and considers ways these interests might be further served by altering the agreement. Two observations underlie both the motivation and thrust of this investigation. The first is that the potential benefits to members of energy security cooperation are likely to be substantial.' Thus, it may be assumed that TEA members have an incentive to find methods inside or outside the agreement for reaping at least part of these gains. Given these incentives, it is important to consider how potential gains from cooperation can be achieved in practice.



Uncertainty Analysis of the IEA/ORAU CO2 Emissions Model

J. M. Reilly, J. A. Edmonds, R. H. Gardner, and A. L. Brenkerf

Year: 1987
Volume: Volume 8
Number: Number 3
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol8-No3-1
View Abstract

Abstract:
Future levels of carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels are an important determinant of the severity and timing of global warming due to elevated levels of radiatively active (greenhouse) gases in the atmosphere. Many studies have addressed this issue,. These include Rotty (1977), Keeling and Bacastow (1977), Siegenthaler and Oeschger (1978), JASON (1979), Marchetti (1980), IIASA in Haefele (1981), Lovins (1981), Hamm (1982), Nordhaus and Yohe (1983), and Reister and Rotty (1983). Ausubel and Nordhaus (1983) provide a recent critical review of emissions forecasts with a focus on methodological development, citing the advance in methodological sophistication leading to improvements in understanding long-term patterns of energy use and their relationship to CO2 emissions.



The IEA Oil-Sharing Plan: Who Shares with Whom?

David R. Henderson

Year: 1987
Volume: Volume 8
Number: Number 4
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol8-No4-3
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Abstract:
The United States and twenty other countries are all members of the International Energy Agency (TEA). The members' have an agreement which requires' them to share their oil with each other if the oil supplies to the members fall substantially. Both the formula for allocating oil among members and the size of the reduction in oil supplies that triggers the sharing formula are predetermined.



The Economics of International Oil Sharing

George Horwich and David Leo Weimer

Year: 1988
Volume: Volume 9
Number: Number 4
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol9-No4-2
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Abstract:
Fifteen years after the 1973-74 oil embargo, two of the programs designed by consuming countries to cope with oil disruptions are still in place. One is the strategic stockpiles of oil owned or controlled by the governments of the industrial nations. The other is the oil-sharing plan of the International Energy Agency. In fact, both programs received their impetus from the IEA, which was formed in 1974 by the United States, Canada, most Western European countries (except France), Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. The TEA requires signatory countries to hold oil stocks equal to ninety days' imports of oil (interpreted generally as an amount over and above normal working stocks). This has largely been accomplished. Oil sharing, however, is to be imposed only in the event of oil-supply cutoffs of 7 percent or more to any individual member or the group as a whole. Although petitioned several times by individual countries, sharing has never been implemented. Neither has the program been systematically evaluated by a task force outside the IEA. This is the purpose of the study which this paper draws upon (Horwich and Weimer, eds., 1988).



Inherent Difficulties in Producer-Consumer Cooperation

James R. Schlesinger

Year: 1991
Volume: Volume 12
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol12-No2-2
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Abstract:
In August/September 1990 we experienced the first oil crisis brought on by the actions of consumers. That oil price run-up reflected the novelty of importing nations banding together to refuse to purchase oil -- rather than the unwillingness or inability of producer nations to supply oil.A writer from the United States, which until September 1990 was the world's second largest oil producer, might in the past have been expected also to "speak for" the producer countries. Now, however, America's appetite for energy has reached the point that it already imports one-third or more of the oil moving in international trade. At one time America's crude oil-production capacity could cushion the impact of supply interruptions on its partners. That was the case in the Suez crisis. But those days are long since gone. One must also recall that, in the days when the United States was the major supplier nation, its role was not always the benign one of cushioning the effects of supply interruptions. President Roosevelt's decision to cut off oil supplies to Japan in August 1941 may have precipitated Japan's decision to go to war.



What Use the IEA Emergency Stockpiles? A Price-based Model of Oil Stock Management

Bright E. Okogu

Year: 1992
Volume: Volume 13
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol13-No1-5
View Abstract

Abstract:
Although the International Energy Agency (IEA) has had a program of maintaining strategic oil stockpiles since 1974 in order to cope with unforeseen interruptions to supplies, it has failed to prevent the worst effects of the 1979 and recent interruptions. This paper develops a price-based model of stock management which is then used to simulate the management of an actual supply interruption. It is argued that such a system is more appropriate for the kind of net supply shortfalls that have been, or are likely to be, experienced than the current JEA program. The JEA program relies rigidly on a predetermined net quantity shortage to activate it -- a condition which almost guarantees that it will never be used in a real crisis. By contrast, the subtrigger approach proposed in this study has the advantage of flexibility and promptness of response which would make it relevant in a real supply interruption.





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