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Nuclear Capacity Auctions

Sven-Olof Fridolfsson and Thomas P. Tangeras

Year: 2015
Volume: Volume 36
Number: Number 3
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.36.3.sfri
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Abstract:
We propose nuclear capacity auctions as a means to correcting the incentives for investing in nuclear power. In particular, capacity auctions open the market for large-scale entry by outside firms. Requiring licensees to sell a share of capacity as virtual power plant contracts increases auction efficiency by mitigating incumbent producers' incentive to bid for market power. A motivating example is Sweden's policy reversal to allow new nuclear power to replace old reactors.





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