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Pricing Natural Gas in Mexico: An Application of the Little-Mirrlees Rule

Dagobert L. Brito and Juan Rosellon

Year: 2002
Volume: Volume23
Number: Number 3
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol23-No3-4
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Abstract:
The Mexican energy regulatory commission--Comision Reguladora de Energia (CRE)--has implemented a netback rule for linking the Mexican market for natural gas with the North American market. This paper describes the economic analysis that supported this policy. We show that the netback rule is the efficient way to price natural gas and it is in fact an application of the Little-Mirrlees Rule.



A Dynamic Incentive Mechanism for Transmission Expansion in Electricity Networks: Theory, Modeling, and Application

Juan Rosellón and Hannes Weigt

Year: 2011
Volume: Volume 32
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol32-No1-5
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Abstract:
We propose a price-cap mechanism for electricity-transmission expansion based on redefining transmission output in terms of financial transmission rights. Our mechanism applies the incentive-regulation logic of rebalancing a two-part tariff. First, we test this mechanism in a three-node network. We show that the mechanism intertemporally promotes an investment pattern that relieves congestion, increases welfare, augments the Transco's profits, and induces convergence of prices to marginal costs. We then apply the mechanism to a grid of northwestern Europe and show a gradual convergence toward a common-price benchmark, an increase in total capacity, and convergence toward the welfare optimum.



Long-run Cost Functions for Electricity Transmission

Juan Rosellón, Ingo Vogelsang, and Hannes Weigt

Year: 2012
Volume: Volume 33
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol33-No1-5
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Abstract:
Electricity transmission has become the pivotal industry segment for electricity restructuring. Yet, little is known about the shape of transmission cost functions. Reasons for this can be a lack of consensus about the definition of transmission output and the complexitity of the relationship between optimal grid expansion and output expansion. Knowledge of transmission cost functions could help firms (Transcos) and regulators plan transmission expansion and could help design regulatory incentive mechanisms. We explore transmission cost functions when the transmission output is defined as point-to-point transactions or financial transmission right (FTR) obligations and particularly explore expansion under loop-flows. We test the behavior of FTR-based cost functions for distinct network topologies and find evidence that cost functions defined as FTR outputs are piece-wise differentiable and that they contain sections with negative marginal costs. Simulations, however, illustrate that such unusual properties do not stand in the way of applying price-cap incentive mechanisms to real-world transmission expansion. Key words: Electricity transmission, Cost function, Incentive regulation, Merchant investment, Congestion management



Power System Transformation toward Renewables: An Evaluation of Regulatory Approaches for Network Expansion

Jonas Egerer, Juan Rosellón, and Wolf-Peter Schill

Year: 2015
Volume: Volume 36
Number: Number 4
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.36.4.jege
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Abstract:
We analyze various regulatory regimes for electricity transmission investment in the context of a power system transformation toward renewable energy. Distinctive developments of the generation mix are studied, assuming that a shift toward renewables may have temporary or permanent impacts on network congestion. We specifically analyze the relative performance of a combined merchant-regulatory price-cap mechanism, a cost-based rule, and a non-regulated approach in dynamic generation settings. We find that incentive regulation may perform better than cost-based regulation but only when appropriate weights are used. While quasi-ideal weights generally restore the beneficial properties that incentive regulatory mechanisms are well-known for, pure Laspeyres weights may either lead to over-investment or delayed investments as compared to the welfare-optimum benchmark. Laspeyres-Paasche weights, in turn, seem appropriate under permanently or temporarily increased network congestion. Thus, our analysis provides motivation for further research in order to characterize optimal regulation for transmission expansion in the context of renewable integration.



Introduction of Nodal Pricing into the new Mexican Electricity Market through FTR Allocations

Friedrich Kunz, Juan Rosellón, and Claudia Kemfert

Year: 2017
Volume: Volume 38
Number: KAPSARC Special Issue
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.38.SI1.fkun
View Abstract

Abstract:
The change from a subsidized zonal pricing system to a full nodal pricing regime in the new Mexican electricity market could improve the efficiency of electricity system operation. However, resulting price modifications might also swing surplus across producers and consumers. In this paper, we calculate nodal prices for the Mexican power system and further analyze how allocations of financial transmission rights (FTRs) can be used to mitigate resulting distributional effects. The share of FTRs to be allocated to different generation plants and loads is studied as a second step of an electricity tariff subsidy reform agenda that includes, as a first step, the change to nodal pricing and, as a third step, the reformulation of actual regressive subsidies in a progressive way. We test our model in a realistic nodal price setting, based on an hourly modeling of the Mexican power system.



Electricity Tariff Rebalancing in Emerging Countries: The Efficiency-equity Tradeoff and Its Impact on Photovoltaic Distributed Generation

Pedro I. Hancevic, Hector M. Nuñez, and Juan Rosellón

Year: 2022
Volume: Volume 43
Number: Number 4
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.43.4.phan
View Abstract

Abstract:
Existing tariff schemes often fail to achieve basic economic objectives. They set prices per unit that either exceed or fall short the social marginal cost and produce unfair distributional outcomes. In many cases, electricity rates also contribute to unsustainable fiscal deficits due to the (almost) generalized electricity subsidies. Moreover, inefficient residential tariffs do not favor the adoption of green technologies and the investment in energy efficiency improvements. We argue that the efficient deployment of green technologies, and more generally, the clean energy transition, will require electricity tariff reforms. In this paper, we use household level data and hourly industry data from Mexico to show how more efficient pricing mechanisms (such as a two-part tariff scheme in the context of efficient nodal pricing), combined with well-design environmental regulations (e.g., net-metering schemes) and correctly targeted transfer programs (e.g., means testing mechanisms) can improve economic, social, and environmental outcomes significantly, all at once.





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