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Comparison of congestion management techniques: Nodal, zonal and discriminatory pricing

Pär Holmberg and Ewa Lazarczyk

Year: 2015
Volume: Volume 36
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.36.2.7
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Wholesale electricity markets use different market designs to handle congestion in the transmission network. We compare nodal, zonal and discriminatory pricing in general networks with transmission constraints and loop flows. We conclude that in large games with many producers and certain information, the three market designs result in the same efficient dispatch. However, zonal pricing with counter-trading results in additional payments to producers in export-constrained nodes, which leads to inefficient investments in the long-run.

Cross-Border Exchange and Sharing of Generation Reserve Capacity

Fridrik M. Baldursson, Ewa Lazarczyk, Marten Ovaere, and Stef Proost

Year: 2018
Volume: Volume 39
Number: Number 4
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.39.4.fbal
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This paper develops a stylized model of cross-border balancing. We distinguish three degrees of cooperation: autarky, reserves exchange and reserves sharing. The model shows that TSO cooperation reduces costs. The gains of cooperation increase with cost asymmetry and decrease with correlation of real-time imbalances. Based on actual market data of reserves procurement of positive and negative automatic frequency restoration reserves in Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, we estimate the procurement cost decrease of exchange to be €165 million per year without transmission constraints and €135 million per year with transmission constraints. The cost decrease of sharing is estimated to be €500 million per year. The model also shows that voluntary cross-border cooperation could be hard to achieve, as TSOs do not necessarily have correct incentives.

Strategic Withholding through Production Failures

Sara Fogelberg and Ewa Lazarczyk

Year: 2019
Volume: Volume 40
Number: Number 5
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.40.5.sfog
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Anecdotal evidence indicates that electricity producers use production failures to disguise strategic reductions of capacity in order to influence prices, but systematic evidence is lacking. We use an instrumental variable approach and data from the Swedish electricity market to examine such behavior. In a market without strategic withholding, reported production failures should not depend directly on the market price. We show that marginal producers in part base their decision to report a failure on prices, which indicates that production failures are a result of economic incentives as well as of technical problems.

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