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Impact of Coordinated Capacity Mechanisms on the European Power Market

Michael Bucksteeg, Stephan Spiecker, and Christoph Weber

Year: 2019
Volume: Volume 40
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.40.2.mbuc
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Abstract:
There is an ongoing debate on the introduction of capacity markets in most European countries while a few of them have already established capacity markets. Since the implementation of independent national capacity markets is not in line with the target of a pan-European internal electricity market we investigate the impacts of uncoordinated capacity markets compared with coordinated capacity markets. A probabilistic approach for the determination of capacity requirements is proposed and a European electricity market model (E2M2s) is applied for evaluation. The model simultaneously optimizes investments and dispatch of power plants. Besides the impact on generation investments, market prices and system costs we analyze effects on production and security of supply. While coordinated capacity markets reveal high potentials for cross-border synergies and cost savings, uncoordinated and unilateral implementations can lead to inefficiencies, in particular free riding effects and endanger security of supply due to adverse allocation of generation capacity.



Evaluation of Risks for Electricity Generation Companies through Reconfiguration of Bidding Zones in Extended Central Western Europe

Caroline Deilen, Tim Felling, Robin Leisen, and Christoph Weber

Year: 2019
Volume: Volume 40
Number: The New Era of Energy Transition
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.40.SI1.cdei
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Abstract:
In Central Western Europe, a reconfiguration of bidding zones for electricity is frequently discussed as a way to improve congestion management. The current EU guideline on Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management even envisages reviews of the bidding zone configuration (BZC) in regular intervals of three years. Such a change of BZCs gives rise to additional regulatory risk for generation companies. Their expected net present value depends on local prices, which are directly influenced by the BZC. The paper at hand develops a methodology to investigate the impact of this regulatory risk. Therefore the risk of bidding zone changes is modeled using a partly-meshed scenario tree. The risk factors reflected therein are uncertainties in grid developments, in combination with other risks such as changing coal and gas spreads, demand, or renewable infeed variations. Results are compared to the current BZC in Europe and to a nodal setup.



On the Role of Risk Aversion and Market Design in Capacity Expansion Planning

Christoph Fraunholz, Kim K. Miskiw, Emil Kraft, Wolf Fichtner, and Christoph Weber

Year: 2023
Volume: Volume 44
Number: Number 3
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.44.2.cfra
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Abstract:
Investment decisions in competitive power markets are based upon thorough profitability assessments. Thereby, investors typically show a high degree of risk aversion, which is the main argument for capacity mechanisms being implemented around the world. In order to investigate the interdependencies between investors' risk aversion and market design, we extend the agent-based electricity market model PowerACE to account for long-term uncertainties. This allows us to model capacity expansion planning from an agent perspective and with different risk preferences. The enhanced model is then applied in a multi-country case study of the European electricity market. Our results show that assuming risk-averse rather than risk-neutral investors leads to slightly reduced investments in dispatchable capacity, higher wholesale electricity prices, and reduced levels of resource adequacy. These effects are more pronounced in an energy-only market than under a capacity mechanism. Moreover, uncoordinated changes in market design may also lead to negative cross-border effects.





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