# (Mis)allocation of Renewable Energy Sources

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# Introduction and Background

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Introduction

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- Renewable Energy Sources (RES) in electricity markets come with large economic impacts:
  - High levelized costs (although close to grid parity in some regions)
  - Not perfectly correlated with demand
  - Intermittency (non-negligible unforecastable component)
  - High storage costs
  - Non-dispatchable

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- Renewable Energy Sources (RES) in electricity markets come with large economic impacts:
  - High levelized costs (although close to grid parity in some regions)
  - Not perfectly correlated with demand
  - Intermittency (non-negligible unforecastable component)
  - High storage costs
  - Non-dispatchable
- Do uniform policies to incentivize the deployment of RES, such as Feed-in-Tariffs (FiTs), properly account for the costs & benefits of these technologies?

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# Feed-in-Tariffs (FiTs)

- Guarantee a preferential rate paid to producers of electricity from RES
- Regulated by the government
- Specified as long-term contracts of about 15 20 years



### Main questions

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- Are the uniform levels of FiTs comparable to the distribution of marginal benefits across regions?
- Is the current allocation of solar PV plants optimal?

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### Use of an extensive and high-frequency dataset on electricity production and demand

- We measure the benefits from an additional unit of electricity output from RES due to the displacement of production from conventional sources in order to satisfy demand
- Ocmpute counterfactual scenarios in which RES capacity gets reallocated to maximize its benefits while keeping the total amount of RES capacity constant
- We calculate the gains from an increase in transmission capacity between subregions
  - Compute shadow cost of transmission and use it to back out implied size of the transmission capacity

Contribution

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- Provide a comprehensive framework to analyze uniform FiT policies
- Extend existing literature that focuses on emission displacement and ignores RES policies
- Quantifying the effects of RES expansions on ancillary services costs
- The use of actual RES output data as opposed to simulated data

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# The Case of Germany

- Germany was the first country to implement large-scale FiTs (Renewable Energy Act, 2000)
- FiT are uniform for type of RES technology, not taking into account:
  - Regional differences in sunshine radiation
  - Regional differences in electricity demand
- Focus on solar as the main distributed RES with uniform FiT

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# Sunshine and Residential Solar Installations (2016)



(a) Global solar radiation.

(b) Installed solar capacity.

(C) Electricity Demand.

*Notes:* Global solar radiation (long-term averages) measured in kWh /  $m^2$  in Panel 1a, cumulative solar capacity (Dec 2016) in Panel 1b, and electricity demand (2015) at state level in Panel 1c. Darker areas represent higher solar radiation, more installed capacity, and higher electricity demand, respectively. Data sources: German Weather Service, Official RES registry, and Statistical Offices of the German States, respectively.

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- Electricity market: 4 Transmission System Operators (TSOs) in Germany, 2015 2016, 15-minute data resolution
  - Load and supply from renewables and non-renewables for each TSO (ENTSO-E)
  - Cost of ancillary services for each TSO (tender for the procurement of primary and secondary control reserve, *regelleistung.net*)
  - Daily electricity production costs by technology (coal, natural gas, fuel oil) (Bloomberg, fuel prices; Energy Balance for Germany, AG Energiebilanzen)

### • Micro data:

- Administrative data on RES (solar) installations and capacity
- Solar production data at plant-level (*PV Output*) approx. 300 stations.
- Data on power plant outages and unavailability

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## Transmission System Operators (TSOs)



Figure: TSO service areas

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# Marginal Sources

- At each 15-min interval, sort technologies by marginal cost to simulate dispatching
  - Assumption: load is dispatched by minimizing production costs
  - Retain identity of the marginal technology each period


	Table: Simulated	Frequencies	of Marginal	Technologies
--	------------------	-------------	-------------	--------------

Source	Freq.	Percent
Natural Gas	172,501	61.45
Hard Coal	100,765	35.90
Nuclear	3,522	1.25
Oil	3,187	1.14
Brown Coal / Lignite	655	0.23
Hydro: River	46	0.02
Hydro: Pumped storage	24	0.01
Biomass	4	0.00

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#### Figure: Distribution of Marginal Operating Costs by TSO



*Notes:* Each panel shows the histogram of  $\lambda_{it}$  for each TSO.

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- Following Callaway, Fowlie and McCormick (2018) and Tangeras and Wolak (2017)
- Separate marginal benefits (MB) from one unit of production of electricity from RES at region *j* and time *t* as:

 $egin{aligned} MB_{jt} = & ext{displaced emissions}_{jt} \ + ext{avoided operating costs}_{jt} \ \pm ext{ancillary service costs}_{jt} \end{aligned}$ 

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- **displaced emissions** are the avoided emissions from the marginal fossil-fueled source displaced by renewables output
- **avoided operating costs** are the savings from the last MWh produced by the dispatchable unit
- **ancillary service costs** are the costs associated with maintaining system stability

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We compare the distribution of MB<sub>jt</sub> against the uniform FiT incentive

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# Avoided Operating Costs and Displaced Emissions

$$OC_j = E[\text{avoided operating costs}_j] = \sum_{t=1}^T \omega_{jt} \lambda_{jt} = \overline{\lambda_j} + T \times Cov(\omega_j, \lambda_j)$$

- ω<sub>jt</sub>, a weight, is the solar output (in MWh) in region j at time t divided by total amount of solar output throughout the entire interval [0, T]
- $\lambda_{jt}$  is the marginal cost (in  $\in$ / MWh) of non-RES plants,  $\overline{\lambda_j}$  is its mean
- ⇒  $OC_j$  (in  $\in$ / MWh) is larger when the solar output is larger at times when  $\lambda_{jt}$  is also high

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- ⇒  $OC_j$  (in  $\in$ / MWh) is larger when the solar output is larger at times when  $\lambda_{jt}$  is also high
  - *Marginal emissions costs* based on the marginal technology displaced from solar production

$$E[\text{displaced emissions}_j] = \sum_{t=1}^T \omega_{jt} e_{jt} = \overline{e_j} + T \times Cov(\omega_j, e_j),$$

 $\bar{e}_j$  is the expected value of  $e_{jt}$ .

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# Ancillary Service Costs

- Intermittency of solar imposes ancillary services costs associated with maintaining system stability
- We define the ancillary services *AS<sub>jt</sub>* as:

$$\begin{array}{lll} AS_{jt}(R_{jt},Q_{jt}) & = & a_0 + a_1 R_{jt} + a_2 R_{jt}^2 + a_3 R_{jt}^3 + a_4 Q_{jt} + a_5 Q_{jt}^2 + a_6 Q_{jt}^3 + \\ & + & a_7 R_{jt} Q_{jt} + a_8 R_{jt} Q_{jt}^2 + a_9 R_{jt}^2 Q_{jt} + FE_{.} \end{array}$$

where  $a_i$  are the parameters to estimate,  $R_{jt}$  is the renewable output and  $Q_{jt}$  the total load at time *t* in TSO *j*.

⇒ marginal effect from an increase in RES output on ancillary services is  $\partial AS_{jt}/\partial R_{jt}$ 

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### Clustering load profiles k-means clustering




Figure: Clusters of Load Profiles by TSO Lamp and Samano (Mis)allocation of RES

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## Total marginal benefits

	avoided ancillary costs	avoided operating costs	avoided emissions	total
TSO	(€/MWh)	(€/MWh)	(€/MWh)	(€/MWh)
Amprion	0.01	29.43	12.39	41.83
	(1.53)	(6.3)	(2.04)	(6.18)
TenneT	0.46	22.53	21.59	44.58
	(1.08)	(9.94)	(7.28)	(7.93)
TransnetBW	0.80	19.76	23.37	43.93
	(1.64)	(13.23)	(7.68)	(16.48)
50Hertz	0.53	29.62	12.14	42.29
	(1.07)	(6.38)	(1.02)	(6.49)

Table: Expected Value and Standard Deviation of Marginal Benefits

*Notes:* The first three columns of results show each of the averages and standard deviations (in parentheses) of each of the components of marginal benefits. The last column contains the overall average and standard deviation (in parentheses) by TSO.

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# **Misallocation**

Misallocated RES?

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• There is evidence of heterogeneous MBs from increasing RES capacity

- Productive inefficiencies occur through more capacity being allocated to areas with lower solar productivity
- Counterfactual: compare 'actual' output to 'simulated' (optimal) output
- Allocate maximum capacity to areas with higher solar productivity
- Allocate the remaining capacity to areas in decreasing order of solar productivity
- Take ratio of actual and benchmark total benefits

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## Measuring Misallocation

 Value of current allocation: each unit of observed solar output valued at the *MB<sub>jt</sub>* (different every 15-min in each TSO)

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- Value of current allocation: each unit of observed solar output valued at the *MB<sub>it</sub>* (different every 15-min in each TSO)
- 2 Rank TSOs by mean productivity and choose a value of solar penetration γ (similar to an RPS)

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- 2 Rank TSOs by mean productivity and choose a value of solar penetration γ (similar to an RPS)
- **③** Let S be the total amount of currently installed residential solar capacity in all the TSOs together. For a given value of  $\gamma$  we reallocate S as follows:
  - 1 Add  $\gamma \times$  (total capacity in the TSO with the *highest* average productivity) to the capacity of this TSO.

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  - **(3)** If S has not yet been depleted, add  $\gamma \times$  (total capacity in the TSO with the *third* highest productivity) of capacity to this TSO.

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  - 4 Continue until S has been completely reallocated.

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  - 4 Continue until S has been completely reallocated.
- Use individual PV plants output data and MB estimates to estimate new value of solar output in reallocation

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# Individual PV plant data (PV Output)




Figure: TSO service areas with PV plants (< 10 KW)

*Notes:* Each blue dot represents a residential solar PV installation (installed capacity < 10 kW) for which we observe electricity generation data at high frequency. Data obtained from PVoutput.org

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
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## Quantifying the misallocation

Reallocation value = 
$$100 \times \left(\frac{\text{value of reallocated solar cap.}}{\text{value of current distribution of solar cap.}} - 1\right)$$

Figure: Value of Reallocation for Different Values of  $\gamma$ 



 $\gamma$  is the fraction of TSO<sub>j</sub>'s total capacity that gets added to TSO<sub>j</sub> in the form of RES

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### Changes in each component relative to baseline




Figure: Changes in each component relative to baseline


*Notes:* For each component we compute the difference of its value for a given value of  $\gamma$  and expressed as a percentage relative to the value of that component before any reallocation.

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## Decomposition of gains



#### Figure: Decomposition of gains

*Notes:* At each value of  $\gamma$ , we compute the fraction of the value of each component relative to the total gains and express it as percentage.

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### The Value of Transmission

- Increasing penetration of distributed energy makes transmission lines more valuable
- Ongoing policy debate: German electricity grid development plan foresees high-voltage lines from North to South (*Suedlink*)
- To determine the value of transmission we repeat the misallocation counterfactual by splitting the largest TSO (TenneT) in two areas, North and South, and identify time periods with binding capacity constraint

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### Counterfactual allocation: TenneT

#### Split TenneT in North and South region:


- Map the location of each power plant in TenneT (conventional & RES)
- Ocmbine realized production data for RES with data on plant unavailability and average capacity factors of conventional power plants to construct hourly supply curves for both regions
- **3** Split demand in North and South region based on population figures
- ④ → Obtain the marginal costs  $\lambda_N$  and  $\lambda_S$  for both the North and South region within TenneT as the intersection of supply and demand

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### TSO areas and location of conventional power plants



*Notes:* Each symbol represents a conventional power plant. Data obtained from Open Power System Data https://open-power-system-data.org.

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### Estimate Capacity Constraint

Following Joskow and Tirole (2005) and LaRiviere and Lu (2017), we estimate the following supply functions:

$$E[\lambda_N] = a_N + b_N(R_N - Q_N) + b_NQ + FEs$$
(1)

$$E[\lambda_S] = a_S + b_S(R_S - Q_S) + b_SQ + FEs$$
(2)

- Q<sub>S</sub>: load in the Southern region, Q: quantity traded
- Estimate equations for time intervals in which transmission constraint is binding (λ<sub>N</sub> ≠ λ<sub>S</sub>)
- At these hours, any increases in load in *N* should not affect the scheduling of sources in *S* and vice versa
- With increasing capacity constraint, more expensive technologies need to be used in importing region

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### Estimating the supply functions

	(1) (2) Gap = 2 €/ MWh		(3) (4) Gap = 5 €/ MWh		(5) (6) Gap = 8 €/ MWh	
	$\lambda_N$	$\lambda_{S}$	λ <sub>N</sub>	$\lambda_{S}$	×N	λs
$R_N - Q_N$	-0.000737 (0.000481)		-0.000761 (0.000491)		-0.000434 (0.000505)	
Q	-0.00110 (0.00117)		-0.00126 (0.00118)		-0.00152 (0.00124)	
$R_S - Q_S$		-0.00769*** (0.000616)		-0.00783*** (0.000632)		-0.00791*** (0.000687)
Q		0.00260** (0.000984)		0.00274** (0.000996)		0.00340** (0.00104)
N	4,282	4,282	4,190	4,190	3,867	3,867
R <sup>2</sup>	0.779	0.709	0.787	0.711	0.815	0.732

Standard errors in parentheses

\* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

#### Table: Estimates of Shadow Costs of Transmission

*Notes:* Dependent variable: as indicated on top of each column. Columns (1) and (2) correspond to a gap of  $2 \in /MWh$ , columns (3) and (4) to a gap of  $5 \in /MWh$ , last two columns to a gap of  $8 \in /MWh$ . Standard errors clustered at the date level.

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
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### **Capacity Imbalance**

The change in price gap wrt capacity of the transmission line implies:

capacity imbalance
$$_t = \Delta K_t = rac{\Delta z_t}{b_N - b_S},$$



1

Let  $\overline{\Delta K}$  be the mean of the distribution of  $\Delta K_t$ , then imputed marginal cost in region *N* is

$$\lambda_{N,t} = \lambda_{S,t} + z_{t-1} + (b_N - b_S)\overline{\Delta K}.$$

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### Reallocation with transmission capacity expansions

Redo reallocation for different transmission capacity expansions




Figure: Gains from Expanding Transmission Capacity

*Notes:* Each curve depicts the gains from reallocation if the transmission capacity between regions North and South is expanded by the amount indicated to the right of the graph.

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#### Table: Benefit-Cost Analysis for Power Line Investment

$\Delta K$ (MW)	(1)	(2) 2,000	(3)	(4)	(5) 6,000	(6)		
$\gamma$ , $\gamma$	0.37	0.50	0.66	0.37	0.50	0.66		
Annual gains from reallocation [m€]	0.630	29.650	173.075	1.500	58.590	394.070		
Annualized investment costs 40 years, 1% annual discount								
Overhead lines [m€]	9.046	9.046	9.046	16.082	16.082	16.082		
Underground lines [m€]	135.693	135.693	135.693	241.232	241.232	241.232		
Benefit-cost ratio								
Overhead lines	0.070	3.278	19.132	0.093	3.643	24.504		
Underground lines	0.005	0.219	1.275	0.006	0.243	1.634		

*Notes:* Change in gains from reallocation for given  $\gamma$  comparing case of no interconnection ( $\Delta K = 0$ ) with interconnection scenarios of 2,000 and 6,000 MW, respectively. Annualized investment costs for underground lines based on SuedOstLink project, with estimated total costs of 5 billion euros (TenneT). We assume a total cost of 8 billion euros for the 6,000 MW interconnection. For overhead lines we assume that total investment cost represents approximately 1/15th of the underground cables. For both type of high-voltage lines we consider furthermore a 40 year lifespan and a 1% annual discount rate.

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### Conclusion

 We develop a comprehensive framework to measure misallocation of RES inspired by the rigidity of incentives used to accelerate the adoption of RES (constant FiTs)

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- We develop a comprehensive framework to measure misallocation of RES inspired by the rigidity of incentives used to accelerate the adoption of RES (constant FiTs)
- Framework has three steps: (1) measuring the marginal benefits from an additional unit of RES output, (2) use those valuations to measure the potential gains under an efficient allocation of solar PV installations, and (3) accounting for further gains if expansions in transmission capacities are built

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- Results: Relatively low penetration rates of  $\gamma = 20\%$  for reallocation represent approx. 5% gains in value (ancillary services + avoided production costs + avoided emissions)

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- If a new transmission line is built between the North and the South regions would yield gains that range from 14 to 22% depending on the rate of solar penetration.

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- Results: Relatively low penetration rates of  $\gamma = 20\%$  for reallocation represent approx. 5% gains in value (ancillary services + avoided production costs + avoided emissions)
- If a new transmission line is built between the North and the South regions would yield gains that range from 14 to 22% depending on the rate of solar penetration.
- A benefit-cost analysis shows that additional transmission can be beneficial if there is sufficient RES capacity reallocated across regions. Lamp and Samano

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# Thank you!

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