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A Competitive Fringe in the Shadow of a State Owned Incumbent: The Case of France

We examine what kind of competitive fringe has been built in France around the State owned incumbent without destroying it or significantly weakening its dominant position; what impacts has this particular reform process on the market in which the incumbent monopolist is still overly dominant; and what more can be done to strengthen the opening of the market while staying in this typical French policy framework (no industrial restructuring and no forced divestiture by the monopolist). We wonder if a larger window of opportunity will open up at some later date for contesting the position of the monopolist, especially when investment in generation resumes.

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Energy Specializations: Electricity – Markets and Prices ; Electricity – Policy and Regulation

JEL Codes:
D42 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Monopoly
E60 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook: General

Keywords: Electricity market, reform, France, Monopoly, EDF

DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol26-NoSI-8

Published in Volume 26, Special Issue of The Quarterly Journal of the IAEE's Energy Economics Education Foundation.