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Market Power in a System of Tradeable CO2 Quotas

Hege Westskog

Year: 1996
Volume: Volume17
Number: Number 3
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol17-No3-6
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Abstract:
This paper examines the connection between market power and the size of efficiency loss in a market for tradeable CO2 permits. Countries, not firms, are the players in the market. A situation is analyzed where some of the, participants have market power, i.e., they can influence the price of a CO2 quota. Each country with market power decides how many quotas to buy or sell, given the other market power countries' sales or purchases of quotas, and the behavior of countries without market power. The latter countries act as price takers. The market equilibrium is compared to a cost effective market situation in order to quantify the efficiency loss resulting from market power.



Fairness Measures and Importance Weights for Allocating Quotas to OPEC Member Countries

Ahmad Saleh Alsalem, Subhash C. Sharma and Marvin D. Troutt

Year: 1997
Volume: Volume18
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol18-No2-1
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Abstract:
This study considers what we call the "degree of optimality" of quota assignments for each OPEC member country based on certain proposed fairness "factors. We argue that these factors should ideally be based on energy and economic conditions that ought to be taken into consideration when production quotas are assigned. Thus, in this study, importance weights based on proven reserves, available productive capacity, GDP per capita and domestic investment needs are first obtained for allocating fair quotas to each member country in the period 1982-1990. Then a degree of fairness optimality index is computed for each member country and is applied to measure the performance of these countries during the quota system period. Our investigations reveal that OPEC appears to give greater importance to the energy factors, proved reserves and productive capacity, although domestic investment needs seem to play a significant role in determining the direction of quota assignments. Statistical tests reveal that all the weights are consistent over time. Finally, we observe that the member countries whose ideal quotas are based on low GDP per capita have higher degrees of optimality than those whose ideal quotas are based on proven reserves or available productive capacity. The computed importance weights and optimality measures can be used both by OPEC and energy analysts interested in OPEC behavior.



Are Differentiated Carbon Taxes Inefficient? A General Equilibrium Analysis

Brita Bye and Karine Nyborg

Year: 2003
Volume: Volume24
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol24-No2-4
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Abstract:
Revenue-raising environmental policy instruments, such as carbon taxes, tend to be politically controversial. In practice, carbon taxes are often differentiated between polluters, implying unequal marginal abatement costs. Grandfathered tradeable permits seem less controversial; this instrument yields equal marginal abatement costs, but does not raise revenue. We compare a system of differentiated carbon taxes, exemplified by the current Norwegian carbon tax regime, to uniform carbon taxation and grandfathered tradeable emission permits. In this particular case, differentiated taxes are welfare superior to grandfathered permits. Nevertheless, uniform carbon taxes outperform both.



Does OPEC Matter? An Econometric Analysis of Oil Prices

Robert K. Kaufmann, Stephane Dees, Pavlos Karadeloglou and Marcelo Sanchez

Year: 2004
Volume: Volume 25
Number: Number 4
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol25-No4-4
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Abstract:
We assess claims that OPEC's ability to influence real oil prices has diminished and that the relationship between real oil prices and OPEC production can be used to test competing hypotheses about OPEC behavior. An econometric analysis indicates that there is a statistically significant relationship among real oil prices, OPEC capacity utilization, OPEC quotas, the degree to which OPEC exceeds these production quotas, and OECD stocks of crude oil. These variables "Granger cause" real oil prices but real oil prices do not "Granger cause" these variables. These results imply that OPEC influences oil prices and that previous models cannot be used to test competing models for OPEC production behavior. The effect of OECD oil stocks on real oil prices indicates that there may be an important externality in private decisions regarding optimal crude oil stocks.



Inscrutable OPEC? Behavioral Tests of the Cartel Hypothesis

James L. Smith

Year: 2005
Volume: Volume 26
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol26-No1-3
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Abstract:
Although OPEC is commonly viewed as a syndicate of producers engaged in cooperative efforts to restrict production and raise price, to date there is a surprising dearth of supporting statistical evidence to that effect. I show that standard statistical tests of OPEC behavior have very low power across a wide range of alternative hypotheses regarding market structure. Consequently, it is difficult, given the current availability and precision of data on demand and costs, to distinguish collusive from competitive behavior in the world oil market. I apply a new, production-based approach for examining alternative hypotheses and find strong evidence of cooperative behavior among OPEC members. My results also suggest that OPEC�s formal quota mechanism, introduced in 1982 to replace a system based on posted prices, increased transactions costs within the organization. Statistical evidence is mixed on the question of whether Saudi Arabia and other core producers have played a special role within the cartel.





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