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How large is the Owner-Renter Divide in Energy Efficient Technology? Evidence from an OECD cross-section

Chandra Kiran B. Krishnamurthy and Bengt Kriström

Year: 2015
Volume: Volume 36
Number: Number 4
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.36.4.ckri
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Abstract:
When the agent making an investment decision is different from the one bearing the costs of the decision, the outcome (energy usage, here) is socially sub-optimal, a scenario known in the energy efficient technology case as "split incentive" effect. Using a sample of households (from a survey conducted in 2011) from 11 OECD countries, this paper investigates the magnitude of the "split incentive" effect between home occupants who are owners and those who are renters. A wide variety of energy-related "technologies" are considered: appliances, energy efficient bulbs, insulation, heat thermostat, solar panels, ground source heat pumps and wind turbines. Mean difference in patterns of access to these technologies are consistent with the "split incentives" hypothesis. Regression results suggest that, even after controlling for the sizeable differences in observed characteristics, owners are substantially more likely to have access to energy efficient appliances and to better insulation as well as to heat thermostats. For relatively immobile investments such as wind turbines and ground source heat pumps, we find no differences between owners and renters.



Utilities Included: Split Incentives in Commercial Electricity Contracts

Katrina Jessoe, Maya Papineau, and David Rapson

Year: 2020
Volume: Volume 41
Number: Number 5
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.41.5.kjes
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Abstract:
This paper quantifies a tenant-side �split incentives� problem that exists when the largest commercial sector customers are on electricity-included property lease contracts, causing them to face a marginal electricity price of zero. We use exogenous variation in weather shocks to show that the largest firms on tenant-paid contracts use up to 14 percent less electricity in response to summer temperature fluctuations. The result is retrieved under weaker identifying assumptions than previous split incentives papers, and is robust when exposed to several opportunities to fail. The electricity reduction in response to temperature increases is likely to be a lower bound when generalized nationwide and suggests that policymakers should consider a sub-metering policy to expose the largest commercial tenants to the prevailing retail electricity price.



Factors Affecting Renters' Electricity Use: More Than Split Incentives

Rohan Best, Paul J. Burke, Shuhei Nishitateno

Year: 2021
Volume: Volume 42
Number: Number 5
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.42.5.rbes
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Abstract:
This paper uses data from the 2015 Residential Energy Consumption Survey to explore the extent to which renters' electricity use in the United States exceeds that of otherwise similar non-renters. Renting households are found to use approximately 9% more electricity than non-renters when controlling for location, socioeconomic, and many appliance-quantity controls. There are multiple factors that explain this extra electricity use, including inferior energy efficiency of appliances, behavioral factors, differences in bill payment responsibilities, and additional reliance by renters on electric space and water heaters. The paper finds that none of these factors are dominant. The phenomenon of renters' (conditionally) higher electricity use is thus best understood as one that emerges from multiple sources.



The Energy Efficiency Gap in the Rental Housing Market: It Takes Both Sides to Build a Bridge

Xavier Lambin, Joachim Schleich, and Corinne Faure

Year: 2023
Volume: Volume 44
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.44.1.xlam
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Abstract:
We revisit the issue of the energy efficiency (EE) gap by explicitly acknowledging the two-sided nature of the rental housing market and two-sided asymmetries of information between tenants and landlords. Employing a theoretical matching model, we show that Energy Performance Certificates (EPCs) that signal a dwelling’s energy performance induce optimal EE investments by landlords only if tenants pay their energy expenditures in full. When landlords pay part of the energy expenditures, they seek tenants who will conserve energy. Our model shows that asymmetry of information over tenant characteristics results in suboptimally low investments in EE. This may even render EPCs counterproductive. As a remedy, we show that tenant-side signaling needs to be rolled out jointly with EPCs and may even be sufficient when contracts include energy expenditures. Data from an original survey provides support for these insights and suggests that information on the tenants’ side contributes to more EE investment.





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