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The Energy Crisis and Macroeconomic Policy

William D. Nordhaus

Year: 1980
Volume: Volume 1
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol1-No1-2
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Abstract:
It is hard to find an issue more confusing than energy policy. Is there a shortage of oil? Why? How long will the shortages last? Who's to blame? What will be the supply and demand response to price decontrol? What are the appropriate policy responses today? Can the president or the secretary of energy or the Congress be trusted to find the answers? And so on.



Simulation of World Oil Market Shocks: A Markov Analysis of OPEC and Consumer Behavior

Richard F. Kosobud and Houston H. Stokes

Year: 1980
Volume: Volume 1
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol1-No2-3
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Abstract:
One major determinant of crude oil price will be the question of whether or not OPEC can resolve its internal conflicts and act effectively as a coalition in restricting the quantities it will supply. For the economist, this question stands at the center of the energy problem; unfortunately, economic analysis has little that is definite to say about the question, and consequently little to say about how OPEC determines its posted price policies and the quantities of oil to be placed on the market. Economic analysis has also failed to provide any definite explanation of the fact that individual OPEC members have not been prone to seek net revenue increases through additional sales, even during periods of declining sales or during oil gluts such as the 1975 recession in OECD countries.



Methods for Measuring the Oil Import Reduction Premium and the Oil Stockpile Premium

James L. Plummer

Year: 1981
Volume: Volume 2
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol2-No1-1
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Abstract:
Energy problems can be differentiated into the following three broad categories:1. Oil supply disruptions. These can cause both large short-term price increases and huge short-term economic losses. Some of the price increase impacts may persist after the disruption is over. Energy policies to address this problem, such as oil stockpiles, must have impacts beginning in a zero- to five-year time frame.



Policy Implications of Energy Vulnerability

James L. Plummer

Year: 1981
Volume: Volume 2
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol2-No2-2
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Abstract:
The research of the Energy Vulnerability Modeling Project has concluded that the oil stockpile premium probably lies in the range of $20 to $40 per barrel, and the oil import reduction premium in the range of $5 to $20 per barrel.ENERGY POLICY VS. OIL POLICYSince the price of oil Btu's is three to four times the price of coal Btu's, energy Btu's are definitely "not created equal." If an oil import reduction premium of $5 to $20 is added on top of the price of domestic oil, the inequality grows much larger.



Reducing the Economic Impacts of Oil Supply Interruptions: An International Perspective

Henry S. Rowen, John P. Weyant

Year: 1982
Volume: Volume 3
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol3-No1-1
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Abstract:
Several circumstances could lead to deep and extended interruptions of the world's supply of oil during the 1980s. The range of potential interruptions includes those on the scale experienced in 1973-74 and 1979-80 but is not limited to them. Much deeper and longer interruptions may occur or be threatened.



Coping with Supply Insecurity

M. A. Adelman

Year: 1982
Volume: Volume 3
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol3-No2-1
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Abstract:
Since the end of World War II, there have been six world oil supply disruptions, in 1951, 1956, 1967, 1973, 1979, and 1980-one year in six, and the frequency seems to be increasing. This danger will continue, for there are many sources of disruption. Although the probability of any one type in any one year is low, the chances of escaping them all for several years are also low.



The Potential Role of Natural Gas in a Major Oil Crisis

Benjamin Schlesinger, Nelson E. Hay, and Jacquelyn S. Mitchell

Year: 1982
Volume: Volume 3
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol3-No2-6
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Abstract:
Most energy experts in the federal government involved with contingency planning concern themselves with what to do when or if "the balloon goes up"; i.e., after the nation's 6-million-barrel-per-day oil supply is substantially cut off.



Still a Time to Choose ...Ten Years Later

S. David Freeman

Year: 1983
Volume: Volume 4
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol4-No2-2
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Abstract:
I think it is appropriate that we should end this conference on energy economics with a look at the record of the past nine years, the years since the energy world was turned upside down by the 1973 Arab oil embargo.This nation's foremost energy accomplishment of this period has not been in achieving increased production. Despite a tenfold increase in the price of crude oil, U.S. production in 1981 was about the same as in 1973. Natural gas production was down. Production of coal and uranium has gone up some, but overall, neither consumption nor domestic production of energy has increased in the last nine years.



World Oil Prices and Economic Growth In the 1980s

Henry D. Jacoby and James L. Paddock

Year: 1983
Volume: Volume 4
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol4-No2-4
View Abstract

Abstract:
The world oil market is a forecaster's nightmare: seldom have so many knowledgeable observers been so wrong so often. Prior to 1973, few foresaw the magnitude of the price jump that was possible under disrupted conditions, or predicted the years of relative stability that followed. The Iranian revolution brought a similar surprise. On the other hand, in the fall of 1980 came the Iran-Iraq war; again a major price shock seemed at hand. Experts are still arguing about why it did not occur.



Energy Demand Elasticities in Industrialized Countries: A Survey

George Kouris

Year: 1983
Volume: Volume 4
Number: Number 3
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol4-No3-5
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Abstract:
A high price elasticity for energy demand implies a long-term ability of the economy to absorb the impact of higher energy prices. Thus price shocks, after generating pronounced inflationary and recessionary effects over the short term, do not act as a constraint to economic growth over the longer term. By contrast, a low price elasticity implies weak reactions to increasing energy costs and a protracted adverse effect on output and inflation. Unfortunately, a survey of the literature on energy demand elasticities shows diverse results. Should econometric results be used for policymaking and planning, then a critical and eclectic attitude is imperative to screen out the most relevant aspects of the empirically determined price elasticities.




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