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Petroleum Price Elasticity, Income Effects, and OPEC's Pricing Policy

F. Gerard Adams and Jaime Marquez

Year: 1984
Volume: Volume 5
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol5-No1-7
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Abstract:
A standard result from static economic theory is that a monopolist with zero cost will maximize profits by charging the price at which the demand has unit elasticity. Yet, the demand for petroleum, as seen by consumers, is price inelastic, and empirical estimates of the price elasticity for petroleum are typically less than one. Given the relatively low production cost for Middle East oil and the optimization rule referred to above, a natural question is whether OPEC, acting as a monopoly, has exhausted its potential for forcing price increases or whether it will ultimately be able to charge still higher prices as it tries to optimize its earnings. This possibility of higher oil prices is important for OPEC and for oil-consuming countries-for OPEC because the finite nature of resources implies that excess production today represents an irrecoverable loss; for consuming countries because of the high cost of oil and the adverse consequences of still higher oil prices on inflation and unemployment.





Pricing Policies of an Oil Cartel with Expectation of Substitute Producers

Majid Ahmadian

Year: 1988
Volume: Volume 9
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol9-No1-10
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Abstract:
The proposition that the net price in a competitive market and the net marginal revenue in a monopolistic market rise at the rate of interest was first demonstrated by Hotelling (1931) for a non-durable exhaustible resource. However, Levhari and Liviatan (1977) and Fisher (1981) have shown that Hotelling's r-percent rule is not valid when extraction costs rise with cumulative production. This r-percent rule also applies to a perfectly durable resource when the resource is produced in a competitive market. It does not apply in the case of a monopolistic market.



Oil Products in Latin America: The Politics of Energy Pricing

Thomas Sterner

Year: 1989
Volume: Volume 10
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol10-No2-4
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Abstract:
This paper looks at the pricing of petroleum products in Latin America and compares the policies adopted in countries with different endowments and with different traditions as to state involvement in the oil industry. I find that, in contrast to the OECD countries, product prices are used extensively as instruments of policy and that in general the more oil a country has the lower are its domestic prices. They also tend to be lower in the presence of state monopolies.



Demand for Ground Transportation Fuel and Pricing Policy in Asian Tigers: A Comparative Study of Korea and Taiwan

Sara Banaszak, Ujjayant Chakravorty and PingSun Leung

Year: 1999
Volume: Volume20
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol20-No2-6
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Abstract:
This paper examines the demand for gasoline and diesel in the ground transportation sectors of South Korea and Taiwan, comparing the effects of their different pricing policies and stages of economic growth. To account for substitutability between the two fuels, the model proposed here uses a system of equations estimated simultaneously with time-series data from 1973-1992. Results yield demand elasticities that confirm previous research showing that oil product demand is generally price inelastic, while income elasticities (reflecting a longer period of economic growth than previous studies in the Asian region) are lower than those previously reported. The estimated demand functions are then used to generate forecasts for both countries and, in particular, for an assumed reduction in a 180% tax on gasoline in Korea. Forecasted increases in demand by the year 2010 range from 40 to 180%, while the tax analysis suggests that Korea's pricing policy has reduced total demand and promoted the use of diesel over gasoline.





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