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The Benefits of an Alaskan Natural Gas Pipeline

Douglas B. Fried and William F. Hederman, Jr.

Year: 1981
Volume: Volume 2
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol2-No1-2
View Abstract

Abstract:
The United States, reacting to rising prices and supply uncertainties of imported energy, has begun to move aggressively to develop its untapped domestic energy resources. The Department of Energy has recently awarded funds to support feasibility studies as well as design, engineering, and construction activities for 110 synthetic fuel projects. Despite pressures for budgetary restraint, Congress has steadily increased (in real terms) budgets for research and development for a variety of technologies utilizing solar and geothermal energy. The federal government has leased potentially oil-rich offshore tracts in the Northeast despite strong opposition from the fishing industry and environmental groups. Yet, despite this apparent scramble to exploit domestic energy resources, a variety of factors has delayed construction of the pipeline that would transport natural gas from deposits on Alaska's North Slope to gas markets in the lower 48 states.



European Reliance on Soviet Gas Exports: The Yamburg-Urengoi Natural Gas Project

Boyce L Greer and Jeremy L. Russell

Year: 1982
Volume: Volume 3
Number: Number 3
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol3-No3-2
View Abstract

Abstract:
Editor's Note: The proposal to construct a giant pipeline to transmit natural gas from the Soviet Union to Western Europe has received wide attention on both sides of the Atlantic. Its implications extend into all aspects of East-West relations, including security and economic effects on both the Soviet Union and the gas-importing countries. This article focuses on one main area of concern raised by the pipeline, dependence by Western Europe on Soviet gas. Given the controversial nature of the subject, we are especially interested in comments from our readers.



Field Price Deregulation and the Carrier Status of Natural Gas Pipelines

Harry G. Broadman, W. David Montgomery, and Milton Russell

Year: 1985
Volume: Volume 6
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol6-No2-10
View Abstract

Abstract:
The move to deregulate natural gas field markets is likely to stimulate changes in the way the downstream segments of the industry are regulated. In particular, because the uncertainty endemic to freer upstream markets will emerge for the first time in the contemporary gas industry, the relative merits of having pipelines perform different economic functions will be altered. Producers and distributors will also, in varying degrees, face greater price uncertainty than before. This will lead to changes in the desired allocation of risk and incentives associated with activities traditionally carried out by transmission companies.



Oil Shock

Hillard G. Huntington

Year: 1985
Volume: Volume 6
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol6-No2-11
View Abstract

Abstract:
The move to deregulate natural gas field markets is likely to stimulate changes in the way the downstream segments of the industry are regulated. In particular, because the uncertainty endemic to freer upstream markets will emerge for the first time in the contemporary gas industry, the relative merits of having pipelines perform different economic functions will be altered. Producers and distributors will also, in varying degrees, face greater price uncertainty than before. This will lead to changes in the desired allocation of risk and incentives associated with activities traditionally carried out by transmission companies.



Oil Prices, Energy Security, and Impact Policy

R. Glenn Hubbard

Year: 1985
Volume: Volume 6
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol6-No2-12
View Abstract

Abstract:
The move to deregulate natural gas field markets is likely to stimulate changes in the way the downstream segments of the industry are regulated. In particular, because the uncertainty endemic to freer upstream markets will emerge for the first time in the contemporary gas industry, the relative merits of having pipelines perform different economic functions will be altered. Producers and distributors will also, in varying degrees, face greater price uncertainty than before. This will lead to changes in the desired allocation of risk and incentives associated with activities traditionally carried out by transmission companies.



The Making of Federal Coal Policy

Richard L. Gordon

Year: 1985
Volume: Volume 6
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol6-No2-13
View Abstract

Abstract:
The move to deregulate natural gas field markets is likely to stimulate changes in the way the downstream segments of the industry are regulated. In particular, because the uncertainty endemic to freer upstream markets will emerge for the first time in the contemporary gas industry, the relative merits of having pipelines perform different economic functions will be altered. Producers and distributors will also, in varying degrees, face greater price uncertainty than before. This will lead to changes in the desired allocation of risk and incentives associated with activities traditionally carried out by transmission companies.



Electric Power Strategic Issues

Richard L. Gordon

Year: 1985
Volume: Volume 6
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol6-No2-14
View Abstract

Abstract:
The move to deregulate natural gas field markets is likely to stimulate changes in the way the downstream segments of the industry are regulated. In particular, because the uncertainty endemic to freer upstream markets will emerge for the first time in the contemporary gas industry, the relative merits of having pipelines perform different economic functions will be altered. Producers and distributors will also, in varying degrees, face greater price uncertainty than before. This will lead to changes in the desired allocation of risk and incentives associated with activities traditionally carried out by transmission companies.



Risk Analysis and Decision Processes

Nelson E. May

Year: 1985
Volume: Volume 6
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol6-No2-15
View Abstract

Abstract:
The move to deregulate natural gas field markets is likely to stimulate changes in the way the downstream segments of the industry are regulated. In particular, because the uncertainty endemic to freer upstream markets will emerge for the first time in the contemporary gas industry, the relative merits of having pipelines perform different economic functions will be altered. Producers and distributors will also, in varying degrees, face greater price uncertainty than before. This will lead to changes in the desired allocation of risk and incentives associated with activities traditionally carried out by transmission companies.



The Natural Gas Industry

Harry G. Broadman

Year: 1985
Volume: Volume 6
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol6-No2-16
View Abstract

Abstract:
The move to deregulate natural gas field markets is likely to stimulate changes in the way the downstream segments of the industry are regulated. In particular, because the uncertainty endemic to freer upstream markets will emerge for the first time in the contemporary gas industry, the relative merits of having pipelines perform different economic functions will be altered. Producers and distributors will also, in varying degrees, face greater price uncertainty than before. This will lead to changes in the desired allocation of risk and incentives associated with activities traditionally carried out by transmission companies.



Elements of Market Power in the Natural Gas Pipeline Industry

Harry G. Broadman

Year: 1986
Volume: Volume 7
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol7-No1-8
View Abstract

Abstract:
As a result of the distortions that have beset natural gas markets in the wake of partial wellhead deregulation under the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA)-the most visible problem being the existence of increased prices amid a glut of deliverable supplies-concern has mounted about whether the natural gas pipeline industry will perform in a socially efficient manner in the long run when field prices are completely decontrolled.In addition to transporting natural gas from the field to the city-gate, interstate natural gas pipeline companies have traditionally performed two functions. Granted private carrier status by the Natural Gas Act of 1938 (NGA), they both purchase gas shipments in upstream markets and resell them in downstream markets as well as match up gas producers who have available supply with distribution companies and wholesale end-users (direct industrial consumers and electric utilities) who have unfilled demand. In other words, as private carriers gas pipelines not only provide a gas transmission service but also assume the twin roles of gas merchandiser and broker.



A North American Gas Trade Model (GTM)

Mark A. Beltramo, Alan S. Manne, and John P. Weyant

Year: 1986
Volume: Volume 7
Number: Number 3
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol7-No3-2
View Abstract

Abstract:
Natural gas ranks second only to crude oil as a primary source of energy in North America, During recent years, gas has satisfied 25 percent of all energy requirements in the United States. Most of this gas has been produced domestically, but 5 to 10 percent has been supplied by pipeline imports from Canada and Mexico. Additional amounts could be provided by pipelines from Alaska or by LNG (liquefied natural gas) imports from overseas, but these facilities would be expensive, and their construction continues to be delayed. Transport costs are high, and geography plays a far more important role in international gas markets than in the oil markets. For this reason, we view the North American continent as a largely self-contained system.



Competition in Natural Gas Pipeline Wellhead Supply Purchases

Harry G. Broadman

Year: 1987
Volume: Volume 8
Number: Number 3
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol8-No3-6
View Abstract

Abstract:
Throughout most of the last three decades, interstate natural gas pipeline companies-operating mainly as private carriers, buying gas supplies in the field and reselling them downstream'-have competed primarily on the basis of nonprice terms. Under the regime of wellhead regulation stemming from Phillips,' in upstream (field) markets binding price ceilings meant thatinterpipeline competition in gas purchases was governed principally by the attractiveness of take-or-pay provisions pipelines offer in their contracts with gas producers.' In downstream (city-gate) markets the chronic excess demand induced by wellhead regulation meant that pipelines competed for gas sales to local distribution companies and direct wholesale consumers (large industrial end-users and electric utilities) largely on the basis of the maximumquantity of gas that could be delivered.



Futures Trading and the European Oil Market

Peter J. W. N. Bird

Year: 1987
Volume: Volume 8
Number: Number 3
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol8-No3-8
View Abstract

Abstract:
The subject of this paper is the behavior of daily gas oil futures prices on the London-based International Petroleum Exchange (IPE). It reports results consistent with the hypothesis that prices on the IPE follow a random walk.



Estimating the Cost of Switching Rights on Natural Gas Pipelines

Frank C. Graves, James A. Read, Jr., and Paul R Carpenter

Year: 1989
Volume: Volume 10
Number: Number 4
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol10-No4-5
View Abstract

Abstract:
This paper is about the pricing of contingent services. The immediate problem is this: What is the cost of the right to choose among pipeline and spot market purchases of natural gas? Changes in the regulation of natural gas pipelines created these rights for customers without providing a mechanism for compensating pipelines. Recently the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission recognized this oversight and called for the rights and obligations of pipelines and customers to be stated explicitly in pipeline service agreements. In the future, service agreements thatprovide switchingrights will be sold at a premium to those that do not. This paper shows how techniques of option pricing can be used to estimate the cost of switching rights. The cost depends on the spot and forward prices of gas, the volatility of gas prices, the rate of interest, and any fees or other restrictions on switching. The option pricing framework should prove useful for pricing contingent services in other sectors of the energy industry as well.



Natural Gas Policy: The Unresolved Issues

Thomas P. Lyon

Year: 1990
Volume: Volume 11
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol11-No2-2
View Abstract

Abstract:
This paper analyzes the restructuring of the natural gas industry which has been going on for several years. It gives the background to the current attempts at restructuring and describes Stanford University's 9th study by the Energy Modeling Forum on North American gas markets which is the analytical basis for this paper. It then describes the tension between the two regulatory objectives, economic efficiency and satisfyingpublic policy concerns regarding the distribution of economic surplus, which must be considered in any analysis of regulatory policy and market structure in the natural gas industry. Ten key natural gas policy issues that remain unresolved are analyzed and a more general discussion of how the gas industry may evolve under several alternative sets of market conditions are presented. Finally, it considers howpoliticalpressures may affect gas policies in future.



Structure and Organization of the Natural Gas Industry: Differences between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany and Implications for the Carrier Status of Pipelines

David J. Teece

Year: 1990
Volume: Volume 11
Number: Number 3
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol11-No3-1
View Abstract

Abstract:
This paper explores various ways to organize the natural gas industry. In particular, it examines the function of merchant pipelines and explores how mandatory carriage has come to be introduced into the United States. The applicability of the US experience to the European Community is questioned because of the very different regulatory histories of the United States and Europe. The paper concludes that the "open access" trend in the United States has stemmed from the need to patch up the results of previous regulatory errors; and though the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) may have helped relieve certain short-term problems by championing open access, it may have created long-term problems that are disguised by the current gas glut. The American regulatory experience in natural gas over the past two decades is seen as most unfortunate, and the benefits available to Europe from imitating recent FERC regulatory strategies are found to be illusory.




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