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Cutting CO2 Emissions: The Effects of Alternative Policy Approaches

John Whalley and Randall Wigle

Year: 1991
Volume: Volume 12
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol12-No1-7
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Abstract:
This paper starts from the premise that attempts to curtail global emissions of greenhouse gases are likely to be made in the next few decades. We discuss some of the possible international effects which could result from attempts to achieve such a cutback, and illustrate a methodology which we hope to extend, in subsequent work, to further evaluating the consequences of responding to the problem of global warming. We identify possible magnitudes of effects of cutting global CO2 emissions, and illustrate ways in which inter-country terms-of-trade effects and changes in trade patterns may occur.



Efficient International Agreements for Reducing Emissions of CO2

Michael Hoel

Year: 1991
Volume: Volume 12
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol12-No2-6
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Abstract:
International agreements are necessary to achieve significant reductions of emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases. Traditional agreements of the type "uniform percent reductions" have two disadvantages: in the first place, it would probably be difficult to get a sufficiently large participation in such an agreement, since it gives a distribution of costs of reducing emissions which may differ strongly from the advantages the countries have from avoiding climatic changes. In the second place, agreements of this type are generally not efficient.An international CO2 tar and tradeable CO2 quotas are two alternative schemes which have several common features, and which both are (almost) efficient under reasonable conditions. With appropriately chosen tax reimbursements in the case of a CO2 tax or initial distribution of quotas in the case of tradeable quotas, it is possible to make all, or at least almost al4 countries better off with the agreement than without.



Optimizing Tax Strategies to Reduce Greenhouse Cases Without Curtailing Growth

Roger E. Brinner, Michael G. Shelby, Joyce M. Yanchar and Alex Cristofaro

Year: 1991
Volume: Volume 12
Number: Number 4
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol12-No4-1
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Abstract:
Increasing federal gasoline taxes is one of the policy options available for reducing gasoline consumption and the resulting carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions that contribute to global warming. At the request of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), DRI/MeGraw-Hill (DRI) estimated the levels of gasoline tax that would be necessary to stabilize CO2 emissions from the light-vehicle fleet over a 20-year period, and the economic impacts of such a tax. Three options for utilizing the revenues generated are examined: a reduction of the federal budget deficit, a reduction in personal and corporate income taxes, and a reduction in the emnployer paid portion of payroll taxes. Each option would yield markedly different levels of economic performance: while the first two options would result in reductions in economic growth, the third option (a reduction in the employer-paid portion of payroll taxes) would result in relatively slight negative economic impacts in the short term and positive economic impacts in the long term.



The impact of Treaty nonparticipation on the Costs of Slowing Global Warming

William Nordhaus

Year: 2009
Volume: Volume 30
Number: Special Issue #2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol30-NoSI2-3
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Abstract:
The Impact of Treaty nonparticipation on the Costs of Slowing Global Warming William Nordhaus* One of the important features of public bads like global warming is that countries face widely disparate incentives to participate in measures to mitigate the impacts.1 In the specific case of global warming, these differences in in�centives reflect differences in income, political structure, environmental attitudes, country size, geography, and perceptions of the eventual damage. For example, Russia may believe that it will benefit from at least limited warming, while India may believe it will suffer significant harm.2 The structures of the Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol assign very different responsibilities to high-income and low-income countries. Indeed, the Framework Convention requires only high-income countries to participate, while the Kyoto Protocol excludes major developing countries in principle and the United States in practice.3 A realistic analysis of policy toward global warming, or of any policy that involves coordination among multiple nations, must allow for differing national or sectoral rates of participation in international agreements. It is critical that analysts and policymakers understand the potential costs of allowing incom�plete participation. Are these costs large or small? This is the question to which the present study is addressed.





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